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Foreword 
 
 
The “population issue” will be long with us. This report contributes to an 
understanding of the challenges underlying Singapore’s demographic future.  
That future is likely to be dominated by an ageing population and a labour 
force growing at a much slower rate than we have been accustomed to for 
much of our existence as an island nation – unless of course we see a sharp 
increase in fertility or in-migration.  How will the country’s economic, social 
and political future be affected by these demographic trends? What are the 
adaptations we need to make to ensure future generations of Singaporeans 
live, work and play in a sustainable manner? 
 
Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 (POS2050) has been in long 
gestation. It was first conceived in 2007, when the Institute of Policy Studies 
(IPS) embarked on a project to generate scenarios of Singapore’s future 
population growth, size and age structures till 2050 based on different 
assumptions of in-migration and fertility rates. The project was later 
expanded to include a multi-disciplinary review of the implications of the 
projected demographic scenarios. This review involved 55 individuals drawn 
from a variety of fields in academia, as well as the private and people sectors. 
Organised into six study groups, they analysed the data and made 125 
recommendations on a range of policy matters -- from land use to housing, 
from productivity to human and social capital formation, from health sector 
reforms to ways to raise Singapore’s ultra-low fertility rates.  
 
This report is intended to provide a thoughtful context for all who need to 
consider the various policy implications of our demographic challenges. 
Agreement on the range of challenges we face is not possible – and probably 
not desirable. This report does well to raise, challengingly, the many 
questions we face without necessarily arriving too hastily at definitive 
answers. 
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Something Dr Goh Keng Swee said many years ago might be pertinent here. 
“We in Singapore,” he said, “believe in hard work.  
 
We believe that enterprise should be rewarded and not penalised. 
We believe that we must adjust ourselves to changing situations. We 
believe in seizing economic opportunities and not let them go past 
us. Finally, we believe in self-reliance… These are human qualities 
that have helped to transform an island-swamp into a thriving 
metropolis. They are the traditional virtues of Singaporeans and so 
long as we retain these virtues, we can face the future with 
confidence1.” 
 
Dr Goh’s convictions remind us Singapore’s destiny depends on our ability 
to adapt and react to new challenges and opportunities. The story of this 
island nation is far from over. Becoming Singaporean has always been a 
matter of more, not less; addition, not subtraction; larger, not smaller – and 
may it always remain so. The “population issue” can spell new opportunities 
and new imaginings but it can also accentuate existing fault-lines and 
sharpen nascent differences. May this report make a modest contribution to 
weighing the scales in favour of the former possibility.  
 
   
Janadas Devan 
Director, Institute of Policy Studies 
National University of Singapore  
  
                                            
1 Speech by Dr Goh Keng Swee (then Minister of Finance) at the swearing-in of the 
new committee of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 15 March 1969. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
POPULATION OUTCOMES: SINGAPORE 2050 PROJECT 
 
Singapore’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has been below the replacement level 
of 2.1 births per woman for more than three decades, with an “ultra-low” level 
of less than 1.3 births per woman since 2003. The implications of such low 
TFRs and extended life expectancy are that the population will age and in 
time rapidly decline. This could in turn have important economic, social and 
political implications for the country. 
 
Singapore’s recent experiences with raising the TFR and increasing 
immigration have shown that whilst the former is difficult to achieve, the latter 
has also its drawbacks. Although these challenges are not unique to 
Singapore, the consequences of demographic change are likely more keenly 
felt here than elsewhere due to Singapore’s small size and high-density 
urban environment. In addition, there are likely to be unique issues that 
Singapore needs to address due to its status as a city-state and the socio-
political contexts associated with population policies. 
 
In 2007, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) embarked on a project to 
generate scenarios of population size, growth rate and age structure for 
Singapore’s resident population under various assumptions of fertility, 
mortality and migration trends over the period 2005–2050. The project was 
extended to the total population, including “non-resident” foreigners, in 2012. 
Projections of the labour force growth and sizes were also made. 
 
IPS convened the Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 (POS2050) 
project the same year to consider and analyse public policy issues arising 
from Singapore’s demographic challenges through 2050, and offer possible 
solutions to address them. The project work was undertaken by six multi-
disciplinary study groups comprising experts from academia and the public, 
private and people sectors. The groups deliberated on issues such as the 
economic and labour force implications of population and workforce ageing 
and decline; the demands on land and physical planning; additional social 
infrastructure and social capital development requirements; and further ways 
to raise the TFR. This report is the result of the study groups’ eight-month 
discussion and work, which drew on their knowledge and expertise from their 
respective fields. 
 
The objective of the POS2050 project was to (a) undertake a holistic, multi-
disciplinary review of the economic, social and political implications of the 
       Executive Summary 
 
9  
 
projected demographic scenarios for Singapore over the next 40 years, and 
(b) identify the policy options available to respond to demographic trends. 
The ultimate goal is to identify balanced and flexible policies that can ensure 
that Singapore’s future generations will be able to live, work and play in a 
good environment, and in a sustainable manner.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The six study groups studied the population and labour force scenarios 
generated by IPS, discussed their implications and identified policy 
recommendations in the following substantive areas: 
 Capital (i.e., economic impact, including public sector 
expenditure, savings and taxation) 
 Labour (i.e., workforce, output and productivity) 
 Land and physical infrastructure development 
 Marriage and child-bearing 
 Social infrastructure development 
 Social capital and development 
 
The terms of reference were first formulated by IPS, taking into account what 
was viewed as the most critical aspects of the demographic challenges in 
each respective area, and subsequently revised by six study groups upon 
further extensive discussions with consensus from IPS.  
 
Each study group undertook their discussions independently, and in 
February 2013 the groups came together at a plenary session where key 
issues were deliberated amongst the members who were present. After the 
feedback from the plenary session, the groups then refined their arguments 
and produced their individual draft reports. The reports (see Chapters 2 to 7) 
were subsequently presented at a conference to an audience of relevant 
stakeholders in July 2013. 
 
PROJECTIONS OF SINGAPORE’S POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE 
 
The six study groups were provided with IPS’ population projections which 
showed (amongst other things) the ageing and shrinking of Singapore’s 
resident population in the absence of in-migration and with sustained ultra-
low fertility levels, rising old-age dependency ratios and declining 
proportions of working age persons in the resident and total population 
through 2050.  
 
Scenarios 1 and 3 of IPS’ population projections (which assume no in-
migration and TFR either at an ultra-low level of 1.24 or rising to 1.85 by 
2015) indicate that resident population sizes in 2050 would be lower than 
      Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 
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that in 2010. Scenario 2 (with TFR of 1.24 and the annual net addition of 
30,000 of citizens and Permanent Residents, or PRs) indicates that resident 
population would grow to 4.9 million in 2050. Further, by assuming three 
different levels of “non-resident” or foreign-to-resident ratios, Scenario 2 
generated three total population projections for 2050 ranging from 6.1 million 
to 7.3 million.  
 
The proportion of the resident population in the 15–64 age group declines 
from about 74% in 2010 to 57–63% in 2050 in Scenarios 1 to 3. In Scenarios 
2A–C the proportion of the total population in this age group would fall less 
sharply from about 79% in 2010 to 69–73% in 2050. 
 
Labour force projections show similar trajectories as that of total population. 
The resident labour force in Scenario 2 would rise from 2.076 million in 2010 
to 2.424 million in 2050, whilst the total labour force would rise from 3.122 
million in 2010 to a range of 3.452–4.402 million in Scenarios 2A–C. Non-
resident foreigners would constitute 37–45% of the total labour force in 2050, 
up from 34% in 2010. 
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ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 
 
The study groups were given the above population projections by IPS and 
asked to consider a number of inter-related issues in three areas:  
 
Society and Family 
 Will the changing demographics and generational mix create new 
dynamics for the family unit and divisions between young and old? 
 While in-migration can offset the ageing and shrinking of the 
population to some extent, could it introduce social and economic 
tensions between foreigners and locals? 
 
Economy 
 Will Singapore’s growth model need to be adjusted to ensure 
sustained economic growth and prosperity without inequity? 
 How will the country’s economic performance and resilience be 
affected by its immigration policies? 
 
Quality of Life 
 While the economy may be more vibrant with higher levels of in-
migration, will the quality of life be affected by increased population 
density and consequent pressures on the country’s infrastructure? 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY GROUPS 
 
Capital Study Group  
 
The Capital study group evaluated the overall economic impact of an ageing 
and shrinking resident population on public sector expenditures, the 
country’s savings and national reserves, pension schemes and taxation. It 
made specific policy recommendations in five key areas: (1) retirement 
adequacy, (2) housing affordability, (3) health and long-term care financing, 
(4) use of net investment returns on national reserves and (5) use of 
progressive and efficient taxation programmes. In addition, the study group 
supported recommendations by the Labour and Social Capital and 
Development study groups (Chapters 2 and 6, respectively) on raising 
labour force participation rates, especially amongst women and the younger 
elderly. 
 
In its analysis of the issues, the Capital study group noted that policymaking 
efforts had focused on mitigating the effects of an ageing and shrinking 
resident population. This emphasis underpins the approach towards 
replacement migration, or supplementing the resident labour force with 
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immigrants and foreign workers to make up for an expected shortfall in 
workers. The study group highlighted the need for adaptation and for policy 
and institutional changes to encourage people to behave in ways that will 
help the economy and society to adjust successfully to an ageing population. 
 
In order to sustain economic vitality it was important for the labour market to 
remain flexible with labour laws that support the creation of productive 
employment for large cohorts of progressively more highly educated workers. 
Productivity-led growth is the only sustainable way of raising incomes per 
capita and offsetting rising costs in sectors where productivity gains have 
been difficult to achieve, e.g., labour-intensive industries such as health and 
eldercare, and personal services. 
 
There is also a need for efficient intermediaries and institutions to mobilise 
the savings of workers to be channelled into productive investments with 
returns sufficient to provide financial adequacy for those workers in 
retirement. In this respect, the study group suggested adjusting policies to 
enable Singaporeans to “de-cumulate” and unlock the value of their housing 
assets, such as improving the monetisation options for retirees’ residential 
property.  
 
Singapore’s social security system would need to strike an appropriate 
balance between individual savings, social insurance and direct subsidies 
financed by general taxation. For many lower-income households, the lack 
of retirement adequacy is often due to the fact that their wages are such that 
they are unable to accumulate sufficient savings for retirement over their 
working lives. Policies would therefore have to be crafted to balance the 
need to provide financial support for such households whilst creating 
incentives for those who can work to continue to do so for longer. The study 
group suggests a two-pronged approach that (1) tops up the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) retirement accounts of the working “younger elderly” 
(aged 55–64) to make up for declining employers’ contributions as they get 
older and (2) retirement grants for those currently above 65 years who do 
not meet the CPF Minimum Sum. 
 
Whilst recognising that the principle of self-reliance will remain fundamental 
to a sustainable social security system, the study group argues against the 
shifting of the rising costs and health risks of a rapidly ageing population to 
individuals, their families, employers or private insurance in the hope that 
the market will impose more cost discipline in the system. More of the 
additional fiscal load will have to be borne by the state, which possesses 
considerable fiscal reserves and has therefore considerable scope to 
support these increased outlays without having to rely primarily on raising 
taxes in the short or medium term. The study group recommends increasing 
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the share of the net investment returns on the national reserves that can be 
utilised to finance increased social expenditure, or more radically, setting 
aside a part of the reserves to cover the needs of the pioneer generation. 
 
If the enlarged share of net investment returns from the reserves proves 
insufficient to cover increased social expenditure requirements in the future, 
the group proposes that it would be most equitable to raise taxes through 
progressive taxation structures (e.g., capital gains taxation and wealth taxes 
such as those on property) rather than to increase regressive consumption 
taxes. Capital gains taxes are also efficient in that they do not reduce work 
incentives. 
 
Labour Study Group 
  
The Labour study group reviewed the optimal level of immigration and 
foreign worker inflow that would balance productivity gains to achieve 
sustainable growth in national income per capita, in view of projected 
changes to Singapore’s working age population and labour force set out in 
IPS’ population projections. The group also considered the appropriate mix 
of skills required for development as a knowledge-based economy, and 
made recommendations for policies on the labour market and for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) to adapt to an increasingly volatile business and 
employment environment that is impacted by globalisation and significant 
technological change. 
 
The group noted three factors that would affect Singapore’s workers and 
their employers in the next four decades: (1) demographic changes leading 
to an ageing and shrinking of the resident population and labour force; (2) 
foreign workforce growth rates that would have to be reduced to levels 
significantly lower than those experienced in the past (or risk reaching total 
population levels that could threaten social well-being, cohesion and national 
identity) and (3) economic volatility and income inequality as a result of 
globalisation and technological changes. These factors could result in a 
higher rate of structural and cyclical unemployment, financial hardship for 
ageing, lower-wage workers and major adjustment difficulties for the 
country’s small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
 
The size of the labour force is determined by the size of the working-age 
population and the proportion of that group seeking employment (the labour 
force participation rate). Singapore can therefore maintain the size of the 
labour force in the face of ageing of the population in a few ways: (1) raising 
the age of retirement; (2) increasing the TFR, which admittedly will have an 
effect only in the very long term; (3) increasing immigration and/or importing 
foreign labour and (4) increasing the labour force participation rate. The 
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group supports policies that encourage greater labour force participation 
(especially amongst women and the elderly) and recognises that policies 
such as the provision of higher quality and affordable childcare facilities 
could have complementary positive effects in boosting female labour force 
participation as well as potentially raising the TFR in the long term.  
 
The use of immigration as a lever to offset potential shrinkage of the labour 
force and the intake of foreign labour have been major tools in managing the 
size of Singapore’s labour force, but it was noted that these are associated 
with social, economic and political costs. A poorly controlled and sizeable 
intake of foreign labour could depress wages and productivity in certain 
industries, and lead to higher property prices, over-use and depletion of 
public goods and services and weakened social cohesion and national 
identity. Large-scale immigration and naturalisation could reduce the returns 
on education to the citizen population, thereby dampening investments in 
human capital and potentially lowering social mobility amongst the 
indigenous population.  
 
The rate of foreign labour intake is currently demand-led, subject to taxes on 
foreign labour and prescribed ratios of local and foreigners hired. The Labour 
study group thus recommends the introduction of calibrated foreign labour 
and immigration policies such as annual quotas that are consistent with (1) 
the need to stimulate productivity in industries that have become over-reliant 
on ready access to relatively cheap foreign labour; (2) a shift away from 
labour-intensive industries to more capital-, skill- and technology-intensive 
activities and (3) the capacity of Singapore’s physical and social 
infrastructure to absorb the growth in the population. Assuming productivity 
gains of 1.5–2.0% per annum can be sustained, the group proposes setting 
a target of labour force growth of 0.5-1.0% per annum through 2020 and 0.5% 
per annum thereafter.  
 
In order to sharpen the focus on productivity, GDP per capita should be used 
as the primary economic performance indicator rather than GDP itself. GDP 
per capita growth provides a better representation of the improvement in the 
quality of life as well as income at the individual level. 
 
A more productive and adaptable labour force is required to enable the shift 
to the skill- and technology-intensive activities that are undertaken in a 
knowledge-based economy. Singapore should therefore increase its 
investments in the education system and intensify efforts to promote lifelong 
learning. The Labour study group supports the recommendations on 
education by the Social Infrastructure Development study group on levelling 
up schools, deferring streaming to later ages and smaller class sizes.  
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The pace of technological change has increased the rate of skills and 
knowledge obsolescence, increasing the need for multiple, flexible 
educational pathways where learning is seamlessly interspersed with work 
and is substantially employer-led. A comprehensive Continuing Education 
and Training (CET) system (also recommended by the Social Infrastructure 
Development study group) could raise labour market flexibility and boost 
labour force participation amongst women. 
As the employment market becomes more complex and uncertain with 
economic restructuring and volatility, structural unemployment may rise and 
cyclical unemployment could occur more frequently. The Labour study group 
proposes the introduction of a wage insurance and unemployment credit 
scheme to allow the unemployed to cover their basic expenditure whilst they 
retrain for a new job, thus enabling the labour market to become more 
flexible and preventing bouts of cyclical unemployment from becoming long-
term and structural. 
 
The SME sector is an integral part of the business eco-system in Singapore 
and in aggregate, the largest employer of workers. Economic volatility and 
requisite labour market changes as suggested above will have significant 
effects on SMEs in Singapore. Additional support may need to be provided 
to such businesses to help SMEs cope better with the rapid pace of 
economic restructuring, in particular in accessing aid provided by various 
government agencies, co-ordinating regulatory support and upgrading 
administrative, accounting and human resource capabilities. The study 
group proposes a new agency be established similar to the Economic 
Development Board (EDB) that focuses on providing co-ordinated 
assistance, aid and even multi-stage financing of SMEs. 
 
Land and Physical Infrastructure Study Group 
 
The Land and Physical Infrastructure study group (“Land study group”) 
reviewed the impact of the different IPS demographic scenarios on land use 
and physical environment, and made recommendations on potential 
strategic responses in relation to land use, transport, green and open spaces, 
housing and related issues. The group considered the concept of carrying 
capacity1 in the context of Singapore, not just as a city but also as a country, 
where the need for land goes beyond supporting conventional city functions 
such as housing, employment, mobility and recreation but also encompass 
reservoirs and water catchment areas, military training and defence 
                                            
1. Usually defined as the maximum population of a given species that can be 
supported indefinitely in a defined habitat without permanently impairing the 
productivity of that habitat. 
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installations as well as large-scale infrastructure such as airports and 
seaports and a range of industries to diversify its economic base. 
 
Since the 1960s, gross population density for the city-state has gradually 
increased, doubling from 3,000 persons per sq km to 7,257 persons per sq 
km in 2012. More significantly, net urban density (i.e., population in the built-
up area) has also risen, from 9,000 persons per sq km in 1980, to around 
12,400 persons per sq km today. This trend highlights a guarded attitude 
towards land consumption on the part of government planners in the face of 
a growing economy and population. 
 
IPS’ population projections imply a continued trend of higher population 
density, an ageing population and a large pool of migrant foreign workers 
who would require provision in terms of accommodation, transport, 
healthcare and other amenities. The various scenarios imply the necessity 
of planning for very diverse needs of the future population, for example, the 
aged living with their families (multi-generational households requiring large 
apartments); singles living by themselves (requiring separate housing 
provisions); elderly people downsizing to smaller apartments; and shared 
accommodation by migrant workers in dormitories. Higher living densities 
and potential unevenness in the density distribution would need to be 
addressed as this is often the main cause of residents’ perception of 
overcrowding, congestion and negative experiences of urban stress and 
unhappiness. 
 
The Land study group calls for integrated solutions for these issues that do 
not rely solely on physical planning. Since land as a resource is in largely 
fixed supply, Singapore would need to look for ways to achieve economic 
objectives that have lowest land requirements. Although Singapore’s 
economy would likely become more service-oriented in the future (as 
indicated by the Labour study group), manufacturing would still be a crucial 
component of the economy. The manufacturing sector’s land consumption 
patterns can and should be changed with advancement in technology. 
Concurrently, the economy must be developed increasingly through creative 
talents, innovative methods and a highly productive workforce, with a focus 
on high value-added industries with the most productive use of scarce land. 
 
On the supply side, the group recommends a multi-pronged approach of 
expanding land capacity and selective intensification of land use in areas of 
very good accessibility (such as those near MRT stations and interchanges). 
Options to increase land capacity such as the use of some of Singapore’s 
sea space of 680 sq km for large-scale storage and similar uses should be 
considered, whilst the proposed future relocation of the Tanjong Pagar, 
Keppel and Brani container terminals to Tuas (as well as the discontinuation 
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of use of the Paya Lebar airbase) would free up substantial land area which 
should be developed as intensively as possible to optimise current 
infrastructure, complement downtown commercial and residential 
developments, and lift the development pressure from the rest of the island. 
Underground space should also be used where feasible to free up surface 
land, with land uses such as factories, warehouses, roads and other 
infrastructure moved underground as and when cost and other constraints 
can be overcome. 
 
The Land study group calls for the adoption of design and urban planning 
principles that promote civic qualities and community integration, where high 
density is designed as a function of enhancing social integration. Education 
and community facilities are possible integrative elements, with the idea of 
inserting educational facilities as the “central nervous system” of towns that 
link the community network. This new urban form must be supported by a 
new local economy, centred on learning and other community functions. This 
idea is echoed in the Social Infrastructure Development study group’s 
concept of “schools-in-community” and the “community-in-school”. Multi-use, 
integrated facilities that are elder-friendly should also be designed to 
promote ageing in place, and public amenities should not be age-
differentiated to allow for greater social interaction and the development of 
a sense of community. 
 
Future land use plans will need to incorporate the potential housing needs 
for Singapore’s transient population. The study group proposes housing 
supply be planned and allocated in a manner that is calibrated to the 
projected stock of non-permanent foreign workers and their need for social 
and economic integration. In this there may have to be co-ordination 
between the ministries and agencies in charge of foreign labour intake (e.g., 
Ministry of Manpower and Ministry of Trade and Industry) with those with 
responsibility for land use and allocation. 
 
The Land study group recommends that planning for transport be better 
integrated with other land uses such as schools, hospitals and employment 
places, with the concept of “decentralised concentration” proposed as a 
means to improve the distribution of dense urban nodes and compactness 
across the island. It would promote better accessibility and less need for 
travel. The study group supports a multi-modal response to encourage 
private car users to switch to public transport, with the promotion of public 
transport such as buses and trains as well as non-motorised modes such as 
cycling and walking for shorter trips and leisure.  
 
As Singapore’s population and economy grows, there will be greater 
pressure to draw upon land that is currently not developed. The study group 
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believes Singaporeans have a deep desire for keeping greenery and are 
supportive of strong measures to protect nature reserves, parks, open 
spaces and heritage areas. Greater citizen consultation on issues of the 
conservation of heritage and green spaces would be needed, with the use 
of environmental impact assessments potentially providing a common 
ground for public engagement in the policymaking process.  
 
The Land study group also recommends that green spaces become more 
multi-functional, such as integrating educational facilities and community 
uses. Better use of resources should be made, such as the now disused 
railway corridor which presents opportunities for recreational, educational, 
community and a host of other co-located functions.  
 
Marriage and Child-bearing Study Group 
 
The Marriage and Child-bearing study group considered the impact of 
existing incentives and policies to encourage marriage and child-birth, and 
other direct and indirect ways to raise the TFR. The study group reviewed 
the trends in the factors influencing marriage and family formation, marital 
fertility and child-bearing with the objective of making policy 
recommendations that may improve Singapore’s ultra-low fertility levels. 
 
The study group was of the opinion that the current measures laid out in the 
enhanced Marriage and Parenthood Package announced in 2013, while 
certainly helpful, did not completely address many of the underlying 
concerns that may have an effect on future fertility. There should therefore 
be a shift in the policy emphasis to understanding and resolving underlying 
root causes, rather than focusing narrowly on the TFR with targeted policy 
measures. The study group recognises that these factors did not work in a 
simple causal relationship, but rather that they work together to shape 
perceptions that starting a family in Singapore is a highly burdensome 
activity considering the many obligations that it imposes, and the lack of 
easily available resources to make this task easier. 
 
A narrow definition of success in Singapore conceptualised by excellent 
performance in academic and job achievements ignores many other equally 
important areas of success that individuals can experience. This in turn 
increases the pressures arising from a highly competitive education system 
that has an emphasis on performance measurement and high-stakes 
examinations early on in a child’s life. Parents, in their pursuit to ensure good 
outcomes for their children, are pressured to commit substantial financial 
and time investments, failing which they fear that their children would not be 
adequately prepared for the rigours of competitive examinations and 
streaming systems. It is well known that much of the preoccupation in 
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families with school-going children revolves around their children’s academic 
attainment, leaving substantially less time to experience the joys of family 
life. To counter this, the Marriage and Child-bearing study group 
recommends a review of educational policies to ensure that the demands of 
school work and examinations are not overwhelming, and that parents do 
not feel that additional pressure on their children will be necessary for their 
future success. The group also suggests increased support for public 
education by civil society organisations to curb unrealistic and unnecessary 
aspirations that people have about parenthood and marriage. 
 
The study group noted the current emphasis placed on the individual’s early 
career phase in determining subsequent career potential. Workers who 
excel in the first few years of work are often fast-tracked and earmarked for 
more senior positions. Such selection schemes mean that there is little 
chance for those who are not high performers early in their careers to 
subsequently gain access to more desirable career options. This human 
resource practice has the effect of deferring marriage plans among young 
adults in order to concentrate on achieving career success.  
 
Related to this is the lack of a family-friendly work culture in many business 
settings. This is apparent considering the difficulty Singaporeans seem to 
have in asking their employers for flexi-time arrangements; the general 
concern about taking time off to attend to their children’s concerns or care 
for various exigencies in their families could be felt as signalling a lack of 
commitment to the job. The study group was strongly of the view that the 
state has a significant role in regulating businesses and ensuring work-life 
balance. Recommendations on this issue include legislating that businesses 
provide a well-considered response to their staff’s request for flexible work 
arrangements and incentivising companies that report greater use of work-
life balance measures. Legislating the right for workers to ask for flexible 
arrangements may normalise such requests rather than the current situation 
where workers are concerned that such requests may be viewed negatively 
by management and colleagues. 
 
The study group also recommends the establishment of greater incentives 
for companies that are able to obtain good outcomes through their 
implementation of work-life balance practices. The study group proposes 
legislation of employers to ensure that flexible time arrangements are 
appropriately considered and, where there is a lack of expertise in terms of 
the feasibility, suitable consultants are sought to help with the introduction of 
such arrangements. The group also suggests the introduction of schemes 
for women who leave work for childcare reasons to re-enter into employment 
without losing the value of their prior work experience. 
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High costs of living and child-rearing were found to be important factors in 
the decision-making process to marry and have children. With dual-incomes 
increasingly necessary to cover the basic expenses of the median 
household, broad-based provision of affordable childcare becomes a 
necessity. The study group therefore recommends the provision of universal 
(or at the very least well-subsidised) basic childcare and eldercare services 
to relieve the burden on families in a high-cost environment. They also 
suggest regular monitoring of the cost of raising children and its affordability 
for average Singaporeans, and for the results to be released regularly for 
public education purposes. 
 
Social Infrastructure Development Study Group  
 
The Social Infrastructure Development study group (“SID study group”) was 
tasked with reviewing Singapore’s public-private-people hybrid of social 
infrastructure systems in view of the demographic challenges of rapid 
population ageing and decline as set out in IPS’ population projections. The 
group set themselves the goals of efficiency, equity, quality and 
sustainability in evaluating the policies necessary to attain the optimum 
balance in providing, financing and regulating healthcare, social and 
community services, and education.  
 
In addition to projecting the social infrastructure needs of the population by 
demographic distribution, the group also makes recommendations for the 
reduction of social inequality and the fostering of social cohesion, given its 
view that these factors are necessary pre-conditions of a sustainable society. 
 
Social and community services 
The guiding principles (self-reliance and “many helping hands”) 
underpinning the way in which Singapore provides welfare were reviewed. 
These principles have been emphasised by the government so that 
individuals will rely on themselves and their families as the first lines of 
support. The principles also apply to voluntary welfare organisations (VWOs), 
where they are seldom fully funded by the government. Like the Labour 
study group, the SID study group pointed out that these principles would 
have to be reconsidered in the light of significant challenges such as 
economic volatility due to globalisation and technological change. This is 
because self-reliance depends on the availability of jobs and earnings whilst 
the MHH principle requires a robust and comprehensive community network 
with the appropriate support and co-ordination of which the state is best 
positioned to provide. 
 
The self-reliance principle should therefore be redefined from one that 
emphasises temporary and minimum help, to one that emphasises holistic 
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assistance to enable beneficiaries to gain a foothold towards self-reliance. 
Whilst the MHH principle is aligned with the study group’s concept of the 
“individual-in-community”2, it could be applied more effectively with holistic 
and integrated interventions that replace the (current) requirement that an 
individual apply separately for aid from different programmes, with a shift 
towards a full funding partnership between the government and VWOs in 
which trust and improved data-sharing become the foundation of the funding 
and regulatory environment.  
 
The group’s vision of an individual-in-community concept with strong social 
cohesion will require concerted efforts towards building that community. The 
study group sees much potential in a locality approach in healthcare, 
education and social care, through a single centre that provides the different 
programmes that needy families often need in tandem. Having the different 
social infrastructural development in a local centre where different activities 
are integrated within the centre can foster greater synergies in person-
centred social development.  
 
Integral to this development would be a whole-of-government commitment 
to a consolidation of the responsibilities of different ministries and agencies, 
and require multi-disciplinary teams of social workers, community workers, 
career consultants and community health workers to deliver appropriate 
holistic solutions. The manpower and skill shortages in the sector would 
have to be addressed, perhaps by improving the status, remuneration and 
recognition of such workers. 
 
Education 
The study group recognises the central role of the education system in the 
strategies and policies needed to deal with Singapore’s demographic 
challenges through 2050. The analyses and recommendations made by the 
other POS2050 study groups related to the education system (namely, the 
Labour, Marriage and Child-bearing and Social Capital and Development 
study groups) were taken on board and are reflected in the SID study group’s 
recommendations.  
 
The ideologies of marketisation and meritocracy have put efficiency as the 
key aim of Singapore’s education system — efficiency in terms of reducing 
wastage of school drop-outs, wastage of talent not being groomed to their 
                                            
2. The defining characteristics of the “individual-in-community” concept are the 
prioritising of social besides economic goals (as opposed to the “individual-in-
economy”), and recognising that the individual is an intimate part of a community, 
and it is important therefore not to develop just individuals, but also to develop 
communities. 
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best potential, wastage of non-competitive schools not striving to improve 
student performance, and wastage of not sorting students into specific tracks 
to suit their aptitudes. 
 
The study group notes the growing concern that instead of promoting the 
levelling up of schools and students, a highly differentiated and competitive 
system may actually lead to greater inequality and lower social mobility. 
Three reasons for these unintended effects are: (1) labelling and 
stigmatising of different groups (gifted/normal, Express/Normal, etc.) 
resulting in people behaving and performing to their assigned labels; (2) self-
reinforcing effects arising from the more prestigious schools attracting more 
resources and better students, whilst less prestigious schools suffer the 
opposite, which then accentuates and entrenches inequality and (3) the 
different groupings and networks that result from the active streaming and 
sorting become instrumental in defining the current and future success (or 
otherwise) of the various groups.  
 
The study group’s recommendations for the education system are focused 
on increasing priority on education’s role in fostering social cohesion, 
reducing inequality, raising social mobility and improving (both qualitatively 
and quantitatively) the country’s labour force participation rate. 
 
In particular, the group recommends a shift away from differentiated, ability-
segregated pathways especially at the early, foundational stages of 
education towards more individually tailored classrooms with smaller class 
sizes. Streaming should be postponed to age 16, when students are in a 
better position to make significant life choices to enter junior colleges, 
polytechnics or institutes of technical education. The “every school a good 
school” commitment should be backed by efforts to channel more teaching 
and physical resources to the schools assessed as the weakest to help them 
level up. Within each school, remedial help should be prioritised towards the 
weakest students with the support of allied educators, teacher assistants 
and even peer teachers. 
 
The group also proposes the development of a “school-in-community” 
principle where schools become engaged partners of their local 
neighbourhoods. This sees the school being involved in various community 
activities, whilst the “community-in-school” relationship is about the 
community being involved in the school, by sharing some school facilities 
with the community (e.g., shared sports facilities or having co-located 
community care services), and community participation in student learning 
in a real-world context. 
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The need for the education and training of scarce manpower in key social 
sectors is clear and the study group recommends significant government 
intervention and leadership in increasing the numbers and improving the 
quality of manpower in these sectors. Additional flexibility should be 
introduced in post-secondary educational pathways to facilitate mid-career 
switches, with Singapore’s CET system enhanced further through greater 
integration with the employment market.  
 
Healthcare 
A robust healthcare system is widely accepted as an integral part of a 
sustainable economy and society. Better health increases a community’s 
capacity to work, translating into higher productivity, which in turn leads to 
higher incomes. Good lifetime health can extend labour force participation 
and sustain the vitality of the workforce despite ageing trends. In the reverse 
direction, a well-performing economy also enables higher healthcare 
spending and therefore better health.  
 
Singapore’s public healthcare system is widely considered as well designed 
and financially sustainable. Nevertheless, it will face a number of significant 
challenges in the years to 2050, but especially so in the next 10 to 15 years. 
Firstly, the ageing of the population will likely require increased national 
expenditure on healthcare. The second challenge is healthcare price 
inflation, which has outpaced general price increases. Rising expectations 
for better care coupled with advances in medical technology raise the bar on 
what society considers as basic levels of healthcare, in turn putting upward 
pressure on costs. There are risks of supply-induced demand in addition to 
the reality that productivity gains are difficult to achieve in this sector. Third, 
current imbalances in the public-private-people mix of provision, financing 
and regulation as well as in the dominance of acute-care in the continuum 
of health services will increasingly strain the system and worsen 
distributional issues.  
 
Singapore’s current acute care-centric healthcare model also leads to the 
under- provision (and arguably more ad hoc provision) of preventive care 
such as health screenings, public education and promotion of healthy living, 
whilst mental healthcare becomes under-developed.  
 
The SID study group’s recommendations for the health and long-term care 
sector are in three broad areas: (1) strengthening the commitment to 
universal healthcare, (2) focusing healthcare on the well-being of patients 
and (3) developing resources to support a person-centric universal 
healthcare system. 
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On strengthening the commitment to universal healthcare by improving 
access and affordability, the group proposes that the government clearly 
define the universal healthcare commitment with regular reviews and 
updates. It should also support the introduction of basic and comprehensive 
universal social health insurance3 with greater integration between health 
and long-term care coverage, inflation-indexation of means-tested 
thresholds and the introduction of co-payment caps especially for cost-
effective preventive health interventions. 
 
A person-centric health system should be developed with the establishment 
of an outcomes-based regulatory framework (developed in tandem with the 
national health and social services databases), which is agnostic about the 
means of achieving health and balance healthcare provision towards more 
preventive and primary care. The study group suggests a shift in the value 
orientation of healthcare from professional-centric (mainly specialist doctors) 
to patient-centric, from remedial-focused to preventive and primary care-
focused, and from institution-based to community-based. Such a re-
orientation requires the devolution of power and responsibility from doctors 
to other health-related professionals such as nurses, social workers and 
community workers, and also to volunteer citizens, and is consistent with a 
more cost-effective and community-conscious delivery model. Steps should 
be taken to continue enhancing the portability and eligibility of the subsidies 
and services available under the Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS). 
The study group proposes the adoption of a localised community health 
model where health and long-term care services are co-located with other 
community services (a health clinic and a community library within a school, 
for example). Such a model is consistent with the proposal by the Land study 
group for the insertion of a “central nervous system” at the heart of a 
community network in township. 
 
As with the other social infrastructure sectors, acute manpower shortages 
will need to be addressed, with extra efforts suggested by the study group 
to train para-professionals in core competencies such as ethics, cross-
cultural work, integrated care and work with the elderly.  
  
                                            
3. As is being proposed under the MediShield Life scheme as announced in the 
Prime Minister’s National Day Rally speech on 18 August 2013. 
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Social Capital and Development Study Group 
 
The Social Capital and Development study group considered the core 
concept of social capital, along with its applications and relevance for the 
Singapore population scenarios and contexts, and discussed key issues 
pertaining to social capital.  
 
Like traditional economic capital, social capital can be drawn upon as a 
resource to provide the means to achieve intended goals. A consideration of 
social capital in the policymaking process is necessary because of its 
influence in matters such as collective action, problem-solving and social 
resilience to threats and crises. Social capital is critical to Singapore, given 
that it is a young and small country with a heterogeneous population made 
up of different races and religions. The development of social capital has 
become particularly relevant to Singapore as it is now confronted with 
various population scenarios associated with multiple demographic changes 
related to increases in population size and diversity.  
 
The Social Capital and Development study group makes specific policy 
recommendations in five key areas: (1) developing family and 
intergenerational relations, (2) building social identification within Singapore, 
(3) addressing social divides, (4) enhancing social cohesion and national 
identity and (5) strengthening National Service (NS) and service to the nation. 
 
As the family is an important site of social capital, and one that is likely to be 
significantly affected by Singapore’s changing demography, the study group 
proposes a comprehensive review of policies in various life domains that 
recognise the needs of diverse groups of Singaporeans (e.g., housing, work 
leave and financial incentives that are currently dependent on marital or 
parenthood status). In view of the larger numbers of transnational marriages 
in Singapore, more empirical studies are needed to develop evidence-based 
approaches to facilitate these marriages to become sites of positive rather 
than negative social capital.  
 
The study group supports the Social Infrastructure Development study 
group’s concept of “in-community”, localised provision of community 
services, and the Land study group’s proposed “central nervous system” as 
the focus of township development. Given the multitude of social capital 
implications in urban design, the group proposes that the government 
explicitly incorporate social and behavioural sciences in land use and 
infrastructure planning, so that the resulting physical environment will 
positively influence social interactions and behaviours and not create 
unintended negative social consequences.  
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The study group also proposes the government evaluate alternative care 
arrangements for the elderly and introduce new arrangements to 
complement existing ones. For example, the government may consider 
authorising the formation of a quasi-family unit where elderly Singaporeans 
are allowed to live together in the same housing unit and care for each other 
with legally binding rights and responsibilities. 
 
The restructuring of the former Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports into 
the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) and the Ministry of 
Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY) in November 2012 was undertaken 
to bring a sharper focus on the government’s work in the development of 
families and social services. The study group believes that a “whole-of-
government” approach to social capital development will go beyond the 
technical co-ordination across agencies to enhance policy integration 
involving these ministries as well as other relevant ministries such as the 
Ministry of Health (on matters such as active ageing and intergenerational 
relations). The “whole-of-government” approach may also be necessary to 
address social mobility in a more holistic and effective way, and the study 
group suggests the establishment of a national secretariat (under the Prime 
Minister’s Office) to lead and co-ordinate strategic directions for research 
and policy related to social mobility. 
 
To enhance local-foreigner integration, efforts should be made to promote 
foreigners’ understanding of Singapore’s important laws, values, norms and 
cultures. The study group proposes a wide spectrum of Singapore citizens 
be engaged to conduct both mandatory and voluntary programmes for 
foreigners on different critical aspects of Singapore, with these integration 
programmes conducted early and well before the foreigners are granted PR 
status or citizenship. The government should work with the various 
stakeholders (e.g., employers, religious groups and ethnic-based self-help 
groups) to systematically engage non-PR foreigners to increase their 
sensitivity to local norms and values, with particular focus on promoting 
harmonious relations across different nationalities, races and religious 
groups in Singapore. 
 
Effective communication and crisis management of conflicts are critical for 
integration. The study group proposes that the government work with 
relevant stakeholders in the public, private and people sectors, including the 
online community, to develop effective communication channels and crisis 
management plans that can deal with situations involving issues of local-
foreigner relations and racial or religious harmony. 
 
Having sufficient value-added jobs for Singaporeans is important for 
economic productivity, but it also contributes to social capital by reducing 
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negative outcomes from citizen unemployment and underemployment as 
well as citizen perceptions of disparity and inequity from upward comparison 
with foreigners. The development of a Singaporean core at all levels across 
the major sectors of the economy is critical for security, economic and social 
resilience by avoiding over-reliance on foreign workers. The study group 
therefore proposes the government give top priority to the two goals of 
creating value-added jobs for Singaporeans and developing a Singaporean 
core at both worker and leadership levels. The Tripartite Alliance for Fair 
Employment Practices (TAFEP) should be given more resources and 
authority, including legal powers if needed, to extend its role of promoting 
fairness at work. The government should invest more to improve the work 
conditions and career prospects of community-based professions, so as to 
attract more Singaporeans to take on these jobs (a similar recommendation 
is made by the Social Infrastructure Development study group). 
 
The selection of foreigners for granting PR status and citizenship needs to 
go beyond economic criteria, to explicitly consider the applicant’s integration 
potential, which includes the applicant’s knowledge and respect for the major 
laws, values, norms and cultural practices in Singapore and the foreigner’s 
non-economic contributions to building social capital in Singapore. The 
government should therefore develop multiple valid indicators of integration 
potential to complement the existing criteria for selecting foreigners for 
granting PR status and citizenship. 
 
There is a need to discuss national values within the context of building 
social capital, with a practical set of shared values that Singaporeans can 
agree on and likely to contribute to social capital through sense making, 
amicable resolution of disputes, constructive collective action, and 
development of trust and reciprocity norms. The study group recommends a 
review of Singapore’s shared values that involves a wide spectrum of 
Singaporeans be undertaken. 
 
Citizen well-being is multi-dimensional and a large part of it consists of social 
well-being that goes beyond meeting material needs and wants. A 
comprehensive framework of multiple indicators should be developed to 
assess and track over time various aspects of social capital and social well-
being for the different segments of the population. These indicators will also 
help inform government and citizens as they evaluate policy effectiveness 
with regard to policy intent, discuss policy alternatives, and make decisions 
in trade-off situations.  
 
NS is a powerful site for building social capital and developing citizen 
commitment to the nation. The study group proposes a taskforce be set up 
(that could work with the Committee to Strengthen National Service) to 
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consider a number of initiatives and policy measures to strengthen NS and 
service to the nation, including the possible establishment of a form of “NS-
in-the-community” that could be extended to female citizens and PRs. This 
would permit female citizens and PRs (and naturalised citizens) to 
participate in the social capital and nation-building opportunities from which 
they are currently deprived as they currently excluded from the NS obligation. 
The NS and “NS-in-the-community” could be used as a strong indicator of 
commitment when reviewing applications for PR or citizenship, with PR 
renewals for whole families made contingent upon fulfilling the NS obligation. 
The taskforce should also consider instituting a holistic recognition 
mechanism for those who have served NS that incorporates not just 
monetary rewards but also those that are less explicitly tied to money 
(subsidised healthcare, access to facilities, public housing priority) or are 
non-monetary in nature (opportunities for training, career development). The 
taskforce should also consider if it is possible to shorten the duration of NS 
by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of training in NS and the 
quality of the NS experience. 
 
Social capital is critical to Singapore’s survival and progress, given the 
unique features of the country relating to its people, government and 
environment. It is multi-dimensional and dynamic, and hence a “whole-of-
society” effort is necessary to ensure it develops positively rather than 
negatively. Singapore’s population challenges have added to the complexity, 
consequences and criticality of social capital and its development. Organic 
development of social capital will occur, but it will be policy decisions and 
actions, particularly those in response to the population challenges facing 
us, that will influence the direction in which social capital proceeds. 
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STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The recommendations of each POS2050 study group were made 
independently, albeit with the benefit of the feedback arising from the joint 
plenary session held in February 2013. However, it quickly became clear to 
the IPS Secretariat that there are several cross-cutting themes and policy 
recommendations, with similar points of view and prescriptions that were 
independently formulated by several groups and from their various specialist 
perspectives. 
 
The cross-cutting themes and policy recommendations include: 
 
1) Developing a “whole-of-government” approach to addressing the 
complex and multi-dimensional challenges posed by Singapore’s 
demographic trajectory. 
2) Embedding and locating services, functions and institutions in the 
community, and engaging the community in those functions and 
institutions to enable a “whole-of-society” setting in addressing 
Singapore’s demographic challenges. 
3) Reviewing the state’s role in the provision of welfare. 
4) Placing further importance on health and healthy living. 
5) Reviewing the education system to adapt learning pathways that meet 
the needs of a globalised, knowledge-based economy. 
6) Re-thinking the concept of ageing and considering the elderly as assets 
rather than liabilities. 
7) Developing person- and citizen-centricity in all aspects of policymaking. 
8) Championing the importance of data and data-sharing. 
 
CAPITAL STUDY GROUP  
 
1) Introduce more monetisation options for the majority of older 
Singaporeans who own public housing.  
2) Develop a sizeable pool of rental housing options for a population to 
shift from the accumulation of housing assets to consumption. 
3) For the younger elderly aged 55–64, the government could make up 
for the reduction in employers’ CPF contributions. This could be 
complemented by some of the reforms recommended by the Labour 
study group, including wage insurance, unemployment credit and 
lifelong learning initiatives. 
4) For Singaporeans above 65 who do not meet the CPF Minimum Sum, 
establish a retirement grant that will enable these elderly Singaporeans 
to participate in CPF LIFE. 
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5) Public housing policies to avoid conflating the goal of home ownership 
with that of asset appreciation; to instead emphasise housing 
affordability and price stability. 
6) To ensure affordability, the government could consider keeping the 
price of new HDB Build-To-Order flats at or below three times the 
target group’s annual income. 
7) Avoid shifting the financial burden of health and long-term care to 
individuals or the private sector.  
8) Enhancing the social safety net and redistribute the gains from 
productivity growth to ensure equitable access to good healthcare. 
9) Increase the share of investment returns on national reserves that can 
be used by the government for increased social expenditures — or 
more radically, setting aside part of the reserves for specific 
disadvantaged segments of the elderly population. Consideration for 
such reserves need to be made before tax increases. 
10) Review the use of national reserves in the context of the ageing 
population and rising number of elderly who lack both familial and 
financial support. 
11) Provide relevant and up-to-date information on national reserves and 
their expected future contributions to the national budget, to enable 
more informed debates about Singapore’s fiscal position and whether 
increased social expenditures must be financed with higher taxation. 
12) Raise progressive tax (i.e., capital gains and property taxes), not 
regressive taxes (i.e., consumption tax) in the event that higher taxes 
are needed to finance greater social expenditures. 
 
 
LABOUR STUDY GROUP   
 
1) Set per capita GDP as the broadest key performance indicator, rather 
than overall GDP, as productivity underpins long-run real wages and 
resources per citizen. 
2) Target labour force growth of 0.5–1.0 per cent per annum through 2020 
and by 0.5 per cent per annum thereafter. Reduce reliance on 
naturalisation and immigration, which could result in social and 
economic costs. Take into consideration population limits of around 6 
million by 2030 and 6.5 million by 2050 and beyond (as per IPS 
Population Scenarios 2A). 
3) Set annual naturalisation, immigration and foreign labour quotas that 
are clear, publicly auditable and consistent with desired rates of labour 
force growth and terminal population limits. 
4) When importing labour, rely more on Employment Pass or S Pass 
holders and less on Permanent Residents (the dependents of whom 
compete with citizens for subsidised resources). A shift towards single-
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person immigrants — even at higher skill levels currently associated 
with employment pass or permanent residents, to reduce dependent 
inflows and to give more long-term promotion opportunities to 
experienced locals, should be considered. 
5) Widen efforts to offset the decline in the labour force by boosting 
female and elderly labour participation rates, especially by raising 
retirement ages.  
6) Increase spending on education, increase teacher-pupil ratio and 
focus the education system on developing a median student who can 
better perform in the creative, open-ended problem-solving work 
environment that characterises the knowledge-based economy. 
7) Involve employers in the development of school curricula, thus allowing 
a demand-led approach to human capital formation.  
8) Promote more comprehensively lifelong learning and continuing 
education and training as well as career transitioning to boost the 
adaptability and flexibility of the labour force as well as the productivity 
of older workers.  
9) Develop an efficient and effective unemployment insurance system, 
e.g., wage insurance and employment credit, to reduce job uncertainty 
and employment market friction. 
10) Raise the Workfare Income Supplement markedly to enable the 
working poor to earn a living wage for their families until labour 
productivity enables companies to pay higher wages without losing 
competitiveness. 
11) Ensure minimum retirement adequacy by considering measures like a 
positive real interest rate on CPF savings and a means-tested 
retirement grant for low-income workers. 
12) Reconsider affordability and the social policy framework in public 
housing and healthcare (especially long-term and chronic care), and 
commit to broaden social investments to help prevent a bulge in the 
ranks of the vulnerable as the population ages and as economic 
change quickens. 
13) Help domestic Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) adapt to 
labour scarcity and the new economy; a new agency with the authority, 
resources and focus of EDB could be created to simplify and 
consolidate aid and support to the SMEs’ adjustment, competitiveness 
and long-term industrial capability. 
 
LAND STUDY GROUP 
 
1) Review the manufacturing sector’s land consumption patterns and 
adapt land allocation in line with technological advances, with the 
emphasis on the highest value-added industries with the most efficient 
physical and environmental footprint. 
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2) Consider the redevelopment of golf courses into potential alternative 
uses such as low-rise commercial or residential developments, or other 
industrial uses such as clean storage. 
3) Plan for green spaces to become more multi-functional, such as 
integrating with educational facilities and community uses. Improve the 
use of resources such as the railway corridor for recreational, 
educational, community and other co-located functions. 
4) Develop the southern corridor as intensively as possible in tandem with 
the proposed relocation of the Tanjong Pagar, Keppel and Brani 
container terminals to Tuas, to optimise the existing infrastructure; 
complement the downtown commercial and residential development; 
and lift the developmental pressure from the rest of the island. 
5) Review the operations of the present RSAF airbases in Singapore and 
consolidate the operations to enable the land currently allocated to the 
airbase to be freed up for other uses, and also to remove development 
height restrictions in the flight path over the surrounding areas. 
6) Utilise underground space — where cost and other constraints can be 
overcome — for factories, warehouses, roads and other infrastructure 
such as water storage facilities. 
7) Undertake further studies of floating offshore developments for 
potential land uses such as large-scale storage and other uses that 
require less permanent infrastructure. 
8) Review the distribution of net density across the whole island, and 
ensure an even spread of net density (especially within new towns). 
Only areas with very good accessibility, such as those near MRT 
stations should be built to exceptionally high densities. 
9) Encourage good design that promotes civic qualities and community 
integration, where high density is an element of social integration, with 
educational and community facilities being integrating elements in a 
central nervous system of the town. In this concept, all towns are thus 
considered “school towns”, which are hooked into the community. This 
recommendation ties in well with the school-in-community and 
community-in-school recommendation proposed by the Social 
Infrastructure Development Study Group. 
10) Provide flexibility and modularity in reconfiguring HDB apartments into 
smaller units for smaller households, particularly for the elderly. The 
HDB should consider reintroducing Multi-Generation Flats and Granny 
Flats to promote ageing-in-place. 
11) Explore new planning and design models of new towns to ensure they 
are elderly-friendly, with essential services and amenities in close 
proximity to support residents’ daily needs, and planned on principles 
of accessibility and convenience. Public amenities should not be age-
differentiated to allow for greater social interaction and the 
development of a sense of community. 
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12) Plan adequately for the supply of housing for the transient population. 
The population projections indicate a high proportion of foreign workers 
(of various categories) into the future, and the demand for housing from 
this group will need to be an integral part of the urban planning process. 
The distribution and the impact of this transient population on 
Singapore’s physical infrastructure must be carefully considered as 
part of the planning process. 
13) Employ a holistic planning approach for transportation infrastructure 
development together with other land uses such as schools, hospitals 
and employment places. A concept of “decentralised concentration” is 
proposed as a model to better distribute dense urban nodes across the 
island. 
14) Generate multi-modal programmes to entice private car users to switch 
to public transport. 
15) Develop the concept of liveable streets where the co-existence of 
traffic and pedestrians is seen as a norm rather than a conflict. 
Selectively decreasing traffic speeds in these and other local areas 
would improve their environments and promote walking. 
16) Provide more real-time information on traffic conditions and thereby 
influence travel patterns during peak hours.  
17) Support schemes for tele-working or flexi-working to reduce peak hour 
congestion, and provide incentives for off-peak commuting and car-
pooling. 
18) Consider greater land use-transport integration and flexible work 
arrangements rather than simply building more physical infrastructure, 
given Singapore’s land constraints. 
19) Provide effective and long-lasting legal protection of Singapore’s 
nature reserves, parks, open spaces and heritage areas. 
20) Institute environmental impact assessments to empower the decision-
making process in planning for nature areas, as well as to provide a 
common ground for public engagement in the policy-making process. 
 
MARRIAGE AND CHILD-BEARING STUDY GROUP  
 
1) Review educational policies to ensure that the demands of school work 
and examinations are not overbearing; that parents do not feel that 
additional pressure on their children will be necessary for their future 
success.  
2) Provide sufficient reassurance that there is sufficient support and 
infrastructure for children who can meet the demands of university 
education. 
3) Introduce legislation to ensure that flexi-time arrangements are 
appropriately considered by employers, and where there is a lack of 
      Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 
 
34 
 
expertise in terms of the feasibility of this, hire suitable consultants to 
provide recommendations for such possibilities.  
4) Provide incentives for companies that are able to obtain good 
outcomes through their implementation of work-life harmony practices.  
5) Create schemes for women who exit work for childcare reasons, to re-
enter into employment without losing the value of their prior work 
experience. 
6) Fund or encourage collaboration between businesses and other 
entities to organise events to allow greater mingling among singles to 
form possible relationships. 
7) Develop universal access or well subsidised basic childcare services, 
which are in line with a curriculum shift and does not emphasise 
academic achievement prior to formal learning. 
8) Develop universal access or subsidised elder care facilities. 
9) Increased support for public education by civil society organisations to 
curb unrealistic and unnecessary aspirations that people have about 
parenthood and marriage.  
10) Regularly monitor the cost of raising children and its affordability for 
average Singaporeans and release the results for public education 
purposes. 
11) Discuss broadly within and outside of government the place of 
parenthood outside marriage, especially in view of the likelihood of 
breakthroughs in artificial reproductive technology. 
 
 
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT (SID) STUDY GROUP  
 
Social Infrastructure Development: Cross-cutting Recommendations 
 
1) Establish localised one-stop centres that are not just community-based 
but are in-community, where healthcare, financial assistance, 
employment assistance and other social services are delivered. The 
services in this delivery model must be dynamic, flexible and multi-
disciplinary, requiring skilled workers conversant with community-
centred work and community development with a diverse population 
across different disciplines.  
2) Expand significantly the supply of SID manpower, in part by improving 
the remuneration and status of SID workers, including allied healthcare 
professionals, allied educators and social services 
workers/counsellors.  
3) Ensure rigorous training for all SID personnel in four core 
competencies: ethics, cross-cultural work, integrated care and work 
with the elderly. 
       Study Group Recommendations 
 
35  
 
4) Disperse power and control from the centre to front-line staff, 
volunteers and to the community, so that this community-centric social 
infrastructure can be used to co-create personal and community 
development, recovery and progress. 
5) Share aggregate data more broadly amongst government bodies, 
practitioners and researchers for use in trends projection, service 
planning and programme evaluation. 
6) Consider establishing an umbrella ministry having oversight of the 
social and community-related care responsibilities currently handled 
by separate ministries (health, manpower, community and family). 
7) Embed the levelling-up concept across all of the areas of SID, for 
example by the commitment of resources to level up the weakest 
students and the weakest schools, or with a strong and clear 
commitment to universal basic healthcare with social insurance. 
8) Apply the concept of “many helping hands” more broadly, for example 
by providing financing on less prescriptive bases. 
 
Social and Community Services Recommendations 
 
9) Re-define the concept of self-reliance from one that focuses on 
temporary and minimum help to one that emphasises holistic 
assistance, to enable beneficiaries to gain a foothold towards self-
reliance. 
10) Loosen control of the regulatory and funding framework by reducing 
the specificity of funding uses and reporting requirements. 
11) Review the reporting requirements and resourcing levels provided to 
support agencies in fulfilling these reporting requirements. Resources 
need to be provided to agencies to help with administration and provide 
technical support, and to release case workers for client work. 
12) Establish a professional body, such as a social and community 
services council, to provide ground-up leadership and standards. 
13) Adopt a locality approach to health, education and social care, with a 
single centre established in-community that delivers the various 
programmes that needy individuals and families often require in 
tandem — including finances, employment, training, housing, 
preventive and long-term care, and family counselling. 
14) Expand the job scopes of case and community workers beyond narrow 
confines; these should be expected to be “messy” and to cross 
boundaries. 
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Education System Recommendations 
 
15) Review the introduction of additional and differentiated pathways at the 
primary and lower secondary school levels and of specialised schools. 
16) Introduce classrooms with smaller class sizes and comprising mixed 
types of students, with teachers working together in each class to tailor 
the teaching to each student’s learning needs. 
17) Consider the postponement of streaming to age 16, when students 
choose either Junior College, Polytechnic or an Institute of Technical 
Education. The Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) can be 
retained only as an assessment that students have attained the 
competencies required of a 12-year-old to progress to secondary 
school. 
18) Broaden the spectrum of core competencies taught in primary schools, 
instead of having a largely academic focus that is promoted by the 
current system’s emphasis on the PSLE. 
19) Make “every school a good school” by channelling more resources 
assessed to be the weakest, for example by providing the best 
teachers and support services to disadvantaged schools to help them 
level up. 
20) Within each school and classroom, remedial help should be prioritised 
towards the weakest students with the support of allied educators, 
teacher assistants and even peer teachers. 
21) Put in place regulations governing the differences in facilities and 
resources between schools. 
22) Develop the school-in-community and community-in-school concepts 
where the relationship is bi-directional. The composition of school 
boards can be expanded to include not only political leaders and 
alumni members, but also members of the community where the 
school is located, to boost the integration of the community in the 
school and vice versa. 
23) Re-design the regulatory and management framework of schools, 
principals and teachers to one that encompasses broad developmental 
goals, with more rewards for gains in building character, helping 
weaker students and fostering co-operation rather than academic 
attainment. Develop an accountability structure that relies less on 
market principles, and based more on collaboration and mutual trust 
between the Ministry of Education and the schools. 
24) Elevate the remuneration and status of allied educators and school 
counsellors, where more administrative support should be provided so 
that teachers can focus on teaching. 
25) Review the expansion of tertiary education to increase access for 
students of poorer families, and in ways that do not create different 
elite and stigmatised paths.  
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26) Match the rate of expansion of tertiary education with the actual 
demand for degree holders from employers. 
27) Reverse the trend of the hollowing out of vocational occupations (e.g., 
electricians, plumbers, carpenters, and others) by continuing to invest 
in technical education. Raise the professional image and standards in 
sectors such as social work, counselling and nursing, as these 
professions provide vital services to the public; require government 
intervention to educate the public on the value of these jobs; and set 
remuneration benchmarks that better match other professions. 
28) Complement Singapore’s strong Continuing Education and Training 
system with post-secondary institutions to: 
 Build and strengthen pathways between the post-secondary 
educational institutions 
 Broaden pathways by allowing for multiple entry points based on 
different certifications, experience and job skills 
 Defer decision points by allowing people to take time off for 
internships, flexibility for gap years, etc. 
 Lengthen education pathways, allowing for return to study by 
working adults through work-study arrangements, or on the job 
training through employer-school partnerships 
 
Healthcare System Recommendations 
 
29) Clearly define the state’s universal healthcare coverage commitment, 
by establishing what the state would pay for, what it would subsidise 
and what it would not. 
30) Introduce a basic and compulsory universal social health insurance 
scheme which is low-cost and with no opt-outs, in order to maximise 
the benefits of risk-pooling and to reduce the effects of adverse 
selection. 
31) Broaden the coverage of Medisave, MediShield and Medifund. For 
example, individuals should be permitted to use Medisave and 
Medifund for a much wider range of physical as well as mental health 
treatments. Whilst MediShield coverage should remain primarily for 
catastrophic diseases, coverage could be extended to non-fatal but 
high-cost, high-impact conditions such as cleft lips or autistic spectrum 
disorders. 
32) Implement inflation-indexation for means-testing criteria, co-payment 
schedules and MediShield/Eldershield benefits so as to ensure that 
rapid rises in medical costs do not diminish affordability over time. 
33) Introduce co-payment caps for at-risk groups, where co-payment 
requirements should be lifted completely for selected cost-effective 
preventive health measures such as mammography and pap smears. 
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34) Safety-net eligibility should be made more transparent, to provide 
further assurance to segments of the population that do not have the 
necessary medical savings buffers. 
35) Establish a person-centric health system by shifting the value 
orientation from professional-centric (specialist doctors and 
administrators) to patient-centric; from a remedial focus to a preventive 
and primary care-driven approach; and from an institution-based to a 
community-based delivery model. 
36) Develop a localised community health model, where the relationship 
between health services and the community could be characterised in 
both directions.  
37) Foster the co-location of healthcare and other services by shifting the 
unit of healthcare provision away from the hospital to the locality in 
which all the different types of social, community, educational and 
health services are built and organised. In such a model, services are 
co-located, e.g., a health clinic and a community library in a school. 
38) Introduce an outcomes-based healthcare regulatory framework that is 
agnostic about the means of achieving health. Under this framework, 
public hospitals and clinics can be financed based on national health 
statistics, and private health centres are held accountable by requiring 
the publication of their health statistics. 
39) Broaden primary care financing through the increased portability and 
eligibility of the subsidies and services available under the Community 
Health Assist Scheme (CHAS).  
40) Develop health and long-term care manpower capability with 
increased training and development programmes for the whole range 
of health and long-term care professionals. 
41) Prioritise the National Electronic Health Records (NEHR) initiative by 
introducing incentives and penalties for all service providers and 
stakeholders to utilise and participate in the system. A comprehensive 
NEHR system would allow the system to move towards a patient-
centric model and allow more reliable measurement and monitoring of 
health outcomes and costs. 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDY GROUP 
 
1) Ensure a “whole-of-government” approach to social capital 
development by enhancing the integration of policies and co-ordination 
of initiatives between the Ministry of Social and Family Development 
(MSF) and the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY), in 
the areas of family and social capital; and between these two ministries 
with the Ministry of Health on issues of active ageing and 
intergenerational relations. 
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2) Undertake more research on trans-national marriages to facilitate 
these marriages to become sites of positive rather than negative social 
capital. 
3) Review policies on rights and privileges for singles and non-traditional 
family forms. 
4) Develop mixed-use infrastructure and facilities to promote family and 
intergenerational relations, such as a cluster of childcare, senior 
activity centres, libraries and social enterprises that are tailored to the 
specific needs of communities. 
5) Conduct early and targeted health screening and promotion, as good 
healthy functioning is a fundamental pillar for developing social capital. 
6) Consider the creation of alternative care arrangements for the elderly, 
for example, allowing the formation of a quasi-family unit where elderly 
Singaporeans are allowed to live together in the same housing unit and 
care for one another with legally recognised rights and responsibilities. 
7) Systematically engage non-Permanent Resident foreigners on issues 
of harmonious relations across different nationalities, races and 
religions. 
8) Conduct citizen-led mandatory and voluntary programmes to help 
suitable foreigners better understand Singapore before they become 
PRs and new citizens. 
9) Review regulatory safeguards and barriers to entry for social and 
community services provided by racial and religious groups. 
10) Involve social enterprises and non-profit organisations in businesses, 
job creation and skill development for Singaporeans. 
11) Prioritise the creation of value-added jobs for Singaporeans and the 
development of a Singaporean core at worker and leadership levels. 
12) Extend the role of the Tripartite Alliance for Fair Employment Practices 
(TAFEP) in promoting fairness at work to include the full range of 
functions such as education, engagement, arbitration, regulation, 
accreditation, enforcement and deterrence. 
13) Enhance the “whole-of-government” approach to address social 
mobility, by developing alternative measures for assessing income 
inequality and social mobility; undertaking more data on households 
that will allow longitudinal tracking to assess relevant economic and 
socio-psychological variables over time; and integrating policies 
concerning education, family and social development, manpower 
planning, immigration policies, economic development and 
restructuring. 
14) Establish a national secretariat at the Prime Minister’s Office to lead 
and co-ordinate strategic directions for research and policy related to 
social mobility. 
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15) Develop multiple indicators of integration potential to complement the 
existing criteria for selecting foreigners and granting permanent 
residency status and citizenship. 
16) Revisit Singapore Shared Values and National Education by involving 
a wide spectrum of Singaporeans in a review of Singapore’s shared 
values, which is linked to the National Education framework. 
17) Promote social interactions through intensification of land use and 
integrated living to create a high-quality physical environment that is 
conducive to promoting social interactions and therefore social capital. 
18) Monitor multiple indicators of social capital and social well-being for the 
different segments of the population and provide continuous input to 
population policies. 
19) Develop effective communication and crisis management plans to 
address conflicts that threaten social cohesion. 
20) Recognise National Service (NS) beyond monetary rewards, by 
introducing a holistic recognition system for those serving or have 
served NS, with a focus on benefits that are non-monetary in nature 
(opportunities for training, social recognition) or are less explicitly tied 
to money (such as subsidised healthcare, access to facilities, priority 
in housing). 
21) Consider a form of NS for female citizens that could incorporate 
meaningful aspects of community-based work (“NS-in-the-
community”). 
22) Use of NS and “NS-in-the-community” as a strong indicator of 
commitment when reviewing applications for PR status or citizenship, 
and make PR renewals for the family contingent on fulfilling the NS 
obligation. 
23) Shorten the duration and increase the quality of NS, by increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of training in NS, and the quality of the NS 
experience. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 CONCEPTION OF POS2050 
 
Singapore’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has been below the replacement level 
of 2.1 births per woman for more than three decades, with an “ultra-low” level 
of less than 1.3 births per woman since 2003. The implications of such low 
TFRs and extended life expectancy are that the population will age, and in 
time rapidly decline. This could in turn have important economic, social and 
political implications for the country. 
 
In 2007, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) embarked on a project to 
generate scenarios of Singapore’s future population growth, size and age 
structures under various assumptions of fertility, mortality and migration 
trends over the period 2005–2050. The results show that under conditions 
of zero net in-migration and moderately rising life expectancy, if the TFR 
remains at the ultra-low level of 1.24 births per woman from 2005 onwards, 
Singapore’s resident population would begin to decline around 2020–2025, 
and the median age of the population reach 55 years in 2050. Raising the 
TFR would modestly delay population decline and slow the rate of ageing, 
but demographic momentum would mean that Singapore would still 
experience adverse challenges for the population over the next four decades. 
 
Singapore’s recent experiences with raising the TFR and increasing 
immigration have shown that whilst the former is difficult to achieve, the latter 
has also its drawbacks. Although these challenges are not unique to 
Singapore, the consequences of demographic change are likely more keenly 
felt here than elsewhere due to Singapore’s small size and high density 
urban living environment. In addition, there are likely to be unique issues that 
Singapore needs to address due to its status as a city-state and the socio-
political contexts associated with population policies. 
 
In June 2012, having extended the population projections analysis to 
encompass the total population (including non-permanent resident 
foreigners) and the labour force, IPS convened the Population Outcomes: 
Singapore 2050 (POS2050) project to consider and analyse public policy 
issues arising from Singapore’s demographic challenges through 2050, and 
offer possible solutions to address them. The project work was undertaken 
by six study groups comprising 55 persons with relevant expertise drawn 
from academia and the public, private and people sectors. This report is the 
result of the study groups’ eight-month discussion and work, which drew on 
their knowledge and expertise from their respective fields. 
 
1.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE AND REVIEW PROCESS 
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The six study groups studied the demographic scenarios generated by the 
IPS, discussed their implications and identified policy recommendations in 
the following substantive areas: 
 
 Capital (the economic impact, including public sector 
expenditure, savings and taxation) 
 
 Labour (workforce, output and productivity) 
 
 Land and physical infrastructure development 
 
 Marriage and child-bearing 
 
 Social infrastructure development 
 
 Social capital and development 
 
The objective of the POS2050 project was to (1) undertake a holistic, multi-
disciplinary review of the economic, social and political implications of the 
projected demographic scenarios for Singapore over the next 40 years, and 
(2) identify the policy options available to respond to demographic trends. 
The ultimate goal is to identify balanced and flexible policies that can ensure 
that Singapore’s future generations will be able to live, work and play in a 
good environment, and in a sustainable manner. The terms of reference 
were first formulated by the IPS, taking into account what was viewed as the 
most critical aspects of the demographic challenges in the respective areas, 
and subsequently revised by the study groups upon further extensive 
discussions with consensus from the IPS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic diagram of the POS2050 study groups and their 
areas of focus 
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In June 2012, the six study groups’ leaders were invited by IPS to put 
together their groups comprising individuals with relevant expertise who 
could contribute to the deliberations of their respective groups (the list of 
study group members is set out in Appendix 1). Each study group undertook 
their discussions independently, and in February 2013 the groups came 
together at a plenary session where key issues were deliberated amongst 
the members who were present. After the feedback from the plenary session, 
the groups then refined their arguments and produced their individual draft 
reports. The study groups’ summary reports are presented as separate 
chapters in this report. 
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1.3 POPULATION PROJECTIONS USED IN POS2050 
 
The study groups were asked to consider public policy issues within their 
areas of focus (see later section on “Guiding principles for POS2050”) in the 
context of IPS’ Population and Labour Force Scenarios set out below. 
 
Three scenarios of the resident population were provided to the study groups: 
 
 Scenario 1: TFR remains constant at 1.24 births per woman from 
2005 onwards and there is zero net addition of citizens and 
permanent residents (PRs) throughout the projection period of 2005–
2050. 
 
 Scenario 2: TFR remains constant at 1.24 births per woman from 
2005 and there is a 30,000 net addition of citizens and PRs annually 
throughout the projection period of 2005–2050. 
 
 Scenario 3: TFR rises gradually from 1.24 to 1.85 births per woman 
by 2015 before stabilising at this level and there is zero net addition 
of citizens and PRs throughout the projection period of 2005–2050. 
 
Mortality assumptions were held constant in all scenarios, with life 
expectancy at birth increasing from 77.4 years in 2005 to 79.7 years in 2050 
for males, and from 81.3 to 84.6 years over the same period for females. 
The base population was the resident population in 2005. 
 
From the base resident population in Scenario 2 above, three scenarios 
were further derived to project the total population, on differing assumptions 
of mix of non-resident foreigner to resident population as below: 
 
 Scenario 2A: Non-resident foreigners make up 25% of the total 
population (i.e., one in four of the total population is a non-resident 
foreigner) 
 
 Scenario 2B: Non-resident foreigners decline from 25% in 2010 to 
20% of the total population in 2020 and remaining constant at this 
level thereafter (i.e., one in five of the total population is a non-
resident foreigner) 
 
 Scenario 2C: Non-resident foreigners rises from 25% in 2010 to 33% 
of the total population by 2020 and remaining constant thereafter 
(one in three of the total population is a non-resident foreigner) 
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The labour force was projected in each of the Scenarios 2A–C above, on the 
assumption that 2010 age-specific resident labour force participation rates 
apply throughout the projection period and the ratio of working to non-
working non-resident foreigners is 4:1.  
 
The results of the projections are presented below.  Scenarios 1 and 3 
indicate resident population sizes in 2050 that are lower than that in 2010, 
whilst with Scenario 2 (with 30,000 net addition of citizens and PRs annually) 
the resident population would grow to 4.9 million in 2050 (Figure 1.2).  
Scenarios 2A–C result in projected total population numbers in 2050 ranging 
from 6.1 million to 7.3 million (Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2 Resident population projections: Scenarios 1–3, and Total 
population projections: Scenarios 2A–C 
 
 
  
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Scenario 1 3,622 3,661 3,676 3,665 3,615 3,516 3,374 3,205 3,026
Scenario 2 3,782 3,999 4,209 4,400 4,561 4,680 4,767 4,834 4,894
Scenario 3 3,622 3,670 3,695 3,720 3,733 3,690 3,602 3,488 3,373
Scenario 2A 5,043 5,332 5,612 5,867 6,081 6,240 6,355 6,445 6,525
Scenario 2B 5,043 5,160 5,261 5,501 5,701 5,850 5,958 6,042 6,118
Scenario 2C 5,043 5,633 6,282 6,568 6,807 6,985 7,114 7,214 7,305
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The proportion of the resident population in the age group 15-64 years 
declines from about 74% in 2010 to 57-63% in 2050 in Scenarios 1–3, whilst 
the proportion of the total population in this age group would fall less sharply 
from about 79% in 2010 to 69-73% in 2050 in Scenarios 2A–C (Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3 Proportion of resident population in ages 15–64: Scenarios 
1–3, and proportion of total population in ages 15–64: Scenarios 2A–C 
 
 
 
The proportion of persons aged 65 years and older in the resident population 
would rise from 9–10% in 2010 to 23–34% in 2050 in Scenarios 1–3, whilst 
the proportion of this age group in the total population would rise from 8% in 
2010 to 16–19% in 2050 in Scenarios 2A–C (Figure 1.4). 
 
  
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Scenario 1 74.0 73.7 71.4 67.2 63.1 60.3 58.2 57.5 57.3
Scenario 2 73.9 73.3 70.8 67.7 65.1 63.8 63.2 63.3 63.3
Scenario 3 74.0 73.5 71.0 66.2 61.4 57.9 56.0 56.2 56.6
Scenario 2A 78.5 78.1 76.3 73.9 71.9 71.0 70.6 70.6 70.7
Scenario 2B 78.5 77.6 75.2 72.7 70.6 69.6 69.1 69.2 69.2
Scenario 2C 78.5 78.9 78.0 75.9 74.1 73.3 72.9 73.0 73.0
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Figure 1.4 Proportion of resident population aged 65 years and above: 
Scenarios 1–3, and proportion of total population aged 65 years and 
above: Scenarios 2A–C 
 
 
The labour force projections presented in Figure 1.5 below show similar 
trajectories as that for the total population. The resident labour force in 
Scenario 2 would rise from 2.076 million in 2010 to 2.424 million in 2050, 
whilst the total labour force would rise from 3.122 million in 2010 to a range 
of 3.452–4.402 million in Scenarios 2A–C (Figure 1.5). In Scenario 2A, non-
permanent resident foreigners would constitute 37% of the total labour force 
in 2050, up from 34% in 2010. In Scenario 2C, non-permanent resident 
foreigners would constitute 45% of the total labour force in 2050. 
  
  
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Scenario 1 9.6 12.6 16.4 20.9 25.4 28.8 31.7 33.1 33.6
Scenario 2 9.3 11.5 14.3 17.5 20.3 21.9 23.1 23.3 23.4
Scenario 3 9.6 12.5 16.3 20.6 24.6 27.4 29.7 30.5 30.2
Scenario 2A 7.6 9.3 11.4 13.8 15.9 17.1 18.0 18.2 18.2
Scenario 2B 7.6 9.5 12.0 14.5 16.7 18.1 19.0 19.2 19.2
Scenario 2C 7.6 9.0 10.5 12.6 14.5 15.6 16.4 16.5 16.5
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Figure 1.5 Resident and total labour force: S1, S2, S2A–C compared 
 
 
The compound annual growth rates in the total labour force in 10-year 
intervals and for the four decades from 2010 to 2050 are shown in Table 1.1 
below.  
 
Table 1.1 Compound annual growth rate in total labour force (CAGR %) 
  Scenario 2A Scenario 2B Scenario 2C 
2010–2020 1.04 0.14 2.47 
2020–2030 0.44 0.37 0.46 
2030–2040 0.29 0.26 0.30 
2040–2050 0.25 0.24 0.25 
2010–2050 0.51 0.25 0.86 
 
1.4 SINGAPORE’S DEMOGRAPHIC ISSUES 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Scenario 1 1,989 2,018 1,998 1,925 1,814 1,694 1,586 1,489 1,395
Scenario 2 2,075 2,201 2,282 2,316 2,327 2,341 2,369 2,400 2,424
Scenario 2A 3,121 3,316 3,463 3,558 3,620 3,672 3,727 3,780 3,823
Scenario 2B 3,121 3,169 3,166 3,240 3,285 3,324 3,370 3,415 3,452
Scenario 2C 3,121 3,547 3,982 4,094 4,170 4,232 4,295 4,353 4,401
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As indicated above, Singapore’s ultra-low fertility rates and increasing 
longevity are contributing to one of the most rapidly ageing populations in 
the region. According to the United Nations’ World Population Prospects: 
The 2012 Revision, the proportion of the Singaporean population aged 65 
years and older will rise more than three-fold from 9% in 2010 to 28.9% in 
the next four decades, an increase only exceeded by Hong Kong SAR in the 
Asia region (Figure 1.6). 
 
Figure 1.6 Selected Asian countries: Proportion of population aged 65 
years and above 
 
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World 
Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. 
http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_indicators.htm (accessed 19 July 2013). 
The UN projection for the proportion of population aged 65 years and above 
in Singapore differs from IPS’ estimates from 2010-2050 (see Figure 1.4 
above) mainly in migration assumptions utilised. 
 
In 2010, the age-profile of the resident population was such that the numbers 
of people that can be expected to enter the working ages of 20–64 years 
over the next five years were double those exiting, with 237,700 persons in 
the age group 15–19 years as compared to 114,400 persons at age 60–64 
years (Figure 1.7). By 2030, however, the situation would have reversed, 
with greater numbers of people passing beyond as compared to those 
entering the working ages, with 294,300 persons projected to be of age 60–
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64 years as compared to only 158,000 persons aged 15–19 years (Figure 
1.8). 
 
Figure 1.7 Singapore: Resident population entering and exiting 
working ages in 2010, Scenario 1 
 
 
Note: Adapted from charts referenced in Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee 
Hean’s Committee of Supply speech 1 March 2012 
 
Figure 1.8 Singapore: Resident population entering and exiting 
working ages in 2030, Scenario 1 
 
 
Note: Adapted from charts referenced in Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee 
Hean’s Committee of Supply speech 1 March 2012 
 
This shrinking of the working-age resident population would contribute to a 
decline in the resident labour force. If labour force participation rates of the 
resident population are not increased (especially for older persons and for 
women), potential growth in the total labour force (from in-migration) would 
      Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 
 
52 
 
reach a tipping point (more people exceeding working age than entering) 
sometime between 2015 and 2020, based on IPS’ population projections.   
 
There would still be a steady deterioration in the resident old-age 
dependency ratio1 even if the TFR were to rise to 1.85 (as described earlier 
in Scenario 3). 
 
Table 1.2 Resident population old-age dependency ratios: Scenarios 1 
and 3 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Scenario 1 13.0 17.1 22.9 31.1 40.2 47.8 54.6 57.7 58.7 
Scenario 3 13.0 17.1 22.9 31.1 40.0 47.3 53.1 54.2 53.4 
 
The rapid pace of ageing would be accompanied by a shrinking resident 
population, even when assuming improved mortality rates. In the absence 
of in-migration, and assuming TFR remains at 1.24 (Scenario 1), 
Singapore’s resident population is projected to decline between 2020 and 
2025. In the event that TFR rises to 1.85 (Scenario 3), the point at which the 
population would begin to decline is projected to be delayed to between 
2030 and 2035 (Figure 1.9). 
 
Figure 1.9 Resident population: Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 
 
                                            
1. The old-age dependency ratio is the number of persons at 65 years and above 
per 100 persons at age 15–64 years. 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Scenario 1 3,622 3,660 3,676 3,664 3,615 3,515 3,374 3,205 3,025
Scenario 2 3,781 3,999 4,208 4,400 4,561 4,679 4,766 4,833 4,894
Scenario 3 3,622 3,670 3,695 3,719 3,733 3,690 3,601 3,488 3,372
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This decline in the resident population, assuming no increase in the TFR, 
can be offset by in-migration. On IPS’ population projections, a 30,000 per 
annum net intake of new residents would allow the resident population to 
continue to grow — albeit at an ever-slowing rate to almost zero population 
growth towards the end of the projection period in 2050 (Scenario 2). 
 
The old-age dependency ratio in Scenario 2 would be improved as 
compared with Scenario 1 (Table 1.3).  The old-age dependency ratio would 
be improved further once the non-permanent foreigner population was taken 
into account (at various resident-foreigner population mixes in Scenarios 2A 
to 2C as described earlier). It is worth noting that the difference in the old-
age dependency ratio is relatively modest in all three scenarios throughout 
the projection period.  
 
Table 1.3 Old-age dependency ratios: Scenarios 1, 2, 2A–C and 3 
  2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Scenario 1 13.0 17.1 22.9 31.1 40.2 47.8 54.6 57.7 58.7 
Scenario 2 12.5 15.7 20.3 25.9 31.1 34.4 36.6 36.8 36.9 
Scenario 2A 9.3 11.6 14.6 18.3 21.7 23.8 25.2 25.4 25.4 
Scenario 2B 9.3 12.0 15.7 19.7 23.4 25.7 27.3 27.5 27.5 
Scenario 2C 9.3 11.0 13.0 16.2 19.0 20.8 22.0 22.2 22.2 
Scenario 3 13.0 17.1 22.9 31.1 40.0 47.3 53.1 54.2 53.4 
 
Several commentators, including the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) Population Division in a paper 
published in 2000,2 have pointed out that massive in-migration would be 
needed to offset population decline and reductions in the proportion of the 
population in the working ages (referred to as “replacement migration”) and 
the social, economic and political repercussions that could arise therefrom.  
These commentators noted that a re-assessment of a country’s basic 
policies on a broad range of issues would be required.  Bermingham (2001) 
in particular highlighted the following issues that would need consideration: 
 
 Percentages of the working-age population actually working 
 Appropriate ages for retirement 
 Levels and types of retirement and healthcare benefits for the elderly 
 Sources of funds to support these programmes 
 
 The need for increases in economic productivity 
                                            
2. See UNDESA (2000), Espenshade (2001), Meyerson (2001) and Bermingham 
(2001). 
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 Policies and programmes related to migration, including integration 
 
1.5 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR POS2050 
 
The POS2050 study groups were provided with the IPS Population 
Projections, and a number of inter-related issues were posed for their 
consideration. These issues were set out in three areas:  
 
 
 Society and Family 
 Will the changing demographics and generational mix create 
new dynamics for the family unit and divisions between young 
and old? 
 While in-migration can offset the ageing and shrinking of the 
population to some extent, could it introduce social and 
economic tensions between foreigners and locals? 
 
 Economy 
 Will Singapore’s growth model have to be adjusted to ensure 
sustained economic growth and prosperity without inequity? 
 How will the country’s economic performance and resilience 
be affected by its immigration policies? 
 
 Quality of Life 
 
 While the economy may be more vibrant with higher levels of 
in-migration, will the quality of life be affected by increased 
population density and the consequent pressures on the 
country’s infrastructure?  
 
The distinction of the POS2050 project lies in the multi-disciplinary nature 
and holistic thinking capabilities of the six study groups and their members. 
The study groups were encouraged to consider matters related to 
Singapore’s demographic challenges outside their immediate 
specialisations, and to cross-reference the work of the other study groups 
where applicable. In practice, we found that there was considerable overlap 
and inter-relationships in many of the discussions held by the study groups, 
with the each of the study groups dealing with the issues in all three areas 
(Figure 1.10). 
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Figure 1.10 Schematic diagram of inter-linkages in issues discussed 
by POS2050 study groups 
 
 
 
 
1.6 OVERALL CROSS-CUTTING OBSERVATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The recommendations of each POS2050 study group were made 
independently, albeit with the benefit of the feedback arising from the joint 
plenary session held in February 2013. However, it quickly became clear to 
the IPS Secretariat co-ordinating the study groups’ work that there are 
several cross-cutting themes and policy recommendations, with similar 
points of view and prescriptions having been formulated by several of the 
groups independently from their various specialist perspectives. We 
highlight below the major cross-cutting recommendations. 
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Adopt “Whole-Of-Government” Approach to Addressing Complex 
and Multi-dimensional Challenges in Singapore’s Demographic 
Trajectory 
 
Singapore’s population challenges reach into many aspects of living and 
working in a small and modern global city-state. The complex and multi-
dimensional nature of the issues — ranging from population ageing and 
productivity growth to ensuring good jobs whilst enhancing work-life balance 
— requires an integrated and co-ordinated approach across different 
ministries and government agencies. For example, as highlighted by the 
Social Capital and Development study group, to tackle the development of 
family relationships and inter-generational ties, there needs to be policy 
integration between the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) 
and the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY). Whilst the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) and the MSF have restructured their departments 
and certain agencies that deal with the elderly, the development of a wider 
and more effective social safety net may require stronger and closer co-
ordination between the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and some of its 
agencies such as the Central Provident Fund (CPF) with the aforementioned 
ministries. A number of the recommendations of the study groups may 
require action or steps to be taken by multiple agencies and ministries, many 
in co-ordination with one another for these to be effective. 
 
Embed and Locate Services, Functions, Institutions in the Community 
and the Community into those Functions and Institutions 
 
The development of social capital is multi-dimensional and requires the 
government to work in tandem with the people and the environment for 
solutions that are truly integrative. In addition to the “whole-of-government” 
approach mooted above, we suggest the development of a “whole-of-
society” effort as well, by embedding and locating services, functions, 
institutions within the community, and integrating the community within the 
provision of such services and in decision-making by those institutions. An 
example provided by the Social Infrastructure Development study group is 
the school-in-community / community-in-school concept. The development 
of this “whole-of-society” philosophy will require greater trust between the 
state and the people — a necessary pre-condition to activate the 
multiplicative effects of the solutions recommended to address Singapore’s 
demographic challenges. 
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Review Role of the State in the Provision of Welfare 
 
There was recognition amongst the study groups that the challenges arising 
from the country’s demographic trajectory should prompt a significant review 
of the social compact. The Social Infrastructure Development study group 
noted that the current blend of limited government funding and demanding 
government control in many domains might have resulted in a culture of 
dependency on the state, notwithstanding the pre-dominant narrative of self-
reliance. In a number of domains — spanning manpower, healthcare, 
community development and marriage and child-bearing — the study groups 
highlighted areas where they felt government intervention needed to 
increase to improve societal well-being as well as others where the 
government needed to take a reduced role. A comprehensive review of the 
role of the state in the provision of welfare is necessary, therefore, in order 
to ensure coherence and consistency in social policymaking in the complex 
landscape of the next four decades. 
 
Emphasise Importance of Health and Healthy Living 
 
Several study groups focused on the link between health and economic 
productivity as well as between healthy living and societal well-being. A 
healthy workforce would be more productive and capable of working longer, 
increasing labour force participation across all ages, but notably amongst 
older workers. The Social Capital and Development study group highlighted 
that good healthy functioning is a fundamental pillar for developing social 
capital, with many social interactions and relationships presupposing a basic 
level of health amongst the people. Healthcare expenditure should be seen 
as less of a necessary evil than an investment that can enhance not only 
individual well-being, which can also generate significant positive 
externalities across society and over time. The government should therefore 
increase its emphasis on low-cost but high-impact interventions in 
healthcare, especially in situations of great uncertainty where individuals 
have the greatest difficulty in making adequate choices, or where people are 
required to make sacrifices in the short-term for the prospect of a gain in the 
long-term. 
 
Review Education System to Adopt Learning Pathways that Address 
Needs of a Globalised, Knowledge-based Economy 
 
The central role of education in national and community building as well as 
for individual development and well-being was reinforced in the 
recommendations made by the study groups. The Labour study group 
emphasised the view that the education system is oriented towards 
standardised examinations and assessments, which tend to produce 
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workers that are better at academic, hierarchical and specialised thinking 
but who are more risk-averse. The state’s considerable investments in 
education have been suited more to an earlier pre-“knowledge economy” era 
when industry needs were more structured and predictable, and less 
towards producing the adaptable, flexible workforce required by an open, 
globalised knowledge-based economy. Both the Marriage and Child-bearing 
and Social Infrastructure Development study groups highlighted the high 
levels of stressful competition in the system that may deter couples from 
having children (thus reducing the TFR) and contributing to, instead of 
dampening, inequality and social immobility. There was broad agreement 
that the education system could be strengthened by building, broadening 
and lengthening learning pathways and by deepening the collaboration of 
employers with the education system in terms of developing curricula that 
best suit their needs.  
 
Re-think Concept of Ageing and Consider the Elderly as Assets rather 
than Liabilities 
 
The concept of old-age dependency was discussed extensively amongst the 
study groups. The threshold age of 65 years is used in almost all studies on 
ageing (and indeed in the definition of the dependency ratio) as the point at 
which people are no longer able to contribute and become a burden on the 
younger generation. There was consensus amongst the study groups that 
this arbitrary conceptualisation of old-age dependency frames ageing in 
unambiguously negative terms, with older persons viewed as liabilities and 
associated with decline. Across the groups there was recognition that, at the 
national, community and individual levels, older persons possess not only 
economic capital but also significant human and social capital that could be 
harnessed for the good of all of society. In policymaking terms, therefore, 
this might mean considering older persons as assets that can be part of a 
policy solution and reframing social expenditure on older persons as a 
continuous investment in human capital in cost-benefit analyses. 
 
Develop Person- and Citizen-centricity in All Aspects of Policymaking 
 
The policy-making emphasis on nation building in the past 48 years has 
served Singapore well, facilitating the country’s rapid economic development 
over that time and vastly improving the well-being of its population. 
Singapore’s robust growth over the past four decades coincided with a 
period of very favourable demographic trends, with rapid increases in the 
working-age population, complementing significant educational expansion 
and health improvements to maximise the returns to its human capital. The 
transition to a slower economic growth trajectory is accompanied by the 
demographic challenges resulting from ultra-low fertility and increased 
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longevity: a rapidly ageing and shrinking resident population. In the view of 
the POS2050 study groups, this economic and demographic transition 
requires a shift in the public policy focus towards person- and citizen-centric 
models of policymaking. For example, this may entail a change in the key 
measures used to assess economic performance, from aggregate Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) to GDP per capita or growth in median incomes. 
Indicators related to the state of social cohesion, inclusiveness, trust, 
commitment, rootedness and social mobility should be developed and used 
as the fundamental benchmarks against which the analyses and decisions 
in policy-making are made. 
  
Champion the Importance of Data and Data-sharing 
 
The multi-dimensionality of the demographic challenges places a premium 
on reliable data on which to base policy decisions. The study groups 
emphasised the importance of information and reliable data in devising 
efficient and sustainable policies, especially when issues span ministerial or 
agency lines of responsibility. The study groups are of the view that data is 
often collected and stored in departmental, agency or ministerial silos, which 
prevents cross-referencing and the development of richer data-sets from 
which more informed analysis can be conducted. Whilst recognising that the 
government has made efforts to improve the provision of data, the study 
groups recommend that the government adopt a “make available” default for 
the data it collects, subject to privacy and national security provisos. 
 
  
      Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 
 
60 
 
1.7 REFERENCES 
 
Bermingham, J. R. 2001. “Immigration: Not a Solution to Problems of 
Population Decline and Aging”, Population and Environment 22(4): 
355–63. 
 
Espenshade, T. J. 2001. “‘Replacement Migration’ from the Perspective of 
Equilibrium Stationary Populations”, Population and Environment 
22(4): 383–89. 
 
Meyerson, F. A. 2001. “Replacement Migration: A Questionable Tactic for 
Delaying the Inevitable Effects of Fertility”, Population and 
Environment 22(4): 401–9. 
  
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). 
2000. Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing 
populations? New York: United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division. 
       Chapter 2: Capital 
 
61  
 
  
Capital 
Chapter 2 
      Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 
 
62 
 
CHAPTER 2: CAPITAL 
 
2.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
This chapter considers the overall economic impact of an ageing and 
shrinking resident population on public sector expenditures, the nature of 
savings and national reserves, pension schemes and taxation, with the 
objective of making specific policy recommendations on these issues.  
 
2.2 BACKGROUND  
 
Policymakers in Singapore have focused on avoiding or mitigating an ageing 
and shrinking population. This underpins the government’s efforts to raise 
the fertility rate and maintain relatively high levels of immigrants and foreign 
workers to make up for the expected shortfall of workers. This emphasis is 
based on two assumptions: 
 
1) Demographic trends affect economic growth, with the age structure 
of the population playing a central role (Bloom and Canning 2008). 
Economic needs and contributions vary considerably over the life 
course. The young tend to be net consumers while people of working 
age tend to be net producers and savers, and the elderly falling 
somewhere in between. The age structure of a population is 
therefore quite consequential for its economic performance, as 
measured by income per capita. Large youth and elderly cohorts 
slow economic growth while large working-age cohorts speed it. 
 
2) The accounting effects of population ageing slow economic growth. 
In developed countries, an ageing population is likely to have a large 
and adverse effect on income per capita mainly through the fall in 
labour supply per capita that will accompany a fall in the share of the 
working-age population. An ageing population also reduces the 
national savings rate, reducing the availability of resources for 
investments.  
 
Singapore’s focus on mitigation, however, overlooks the need for adaptation. 
Policy and institutional changes could encourage people to behave 
differently and help our economy and society adjust successfully to an 
ageing population. The mitigation approach is unrealistic also because the 
government cannot dictate reproduction. Mass immigration, moreover, is 
economically undesirable and politically unpopular.  
 
Social norms play a bigger role than financial incentives in encouraging 
people to bear children but are hard to change. In the northern European 
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countries that have managed to increase their total fertility rates (TFRs), 
norms of egalitarianism, gender equality and solidarity underpin support for 
child-bearing, alongside strong social protection, heavily subsidised 
healthcare and public pensions. These countries raised fertility rates by 
offering paid maternity and paternity leave and heavily subsidised and 
excellent childcare. 
The norms that underpin social support in the northern European countries 
are mostly missing in Singapore, which explain why the government’s 
financial incentives have had limited impact on fertility rates. There are 
relatively low levels of spending on social safety nets, public pensions are 
absent, and the emphasis instead is on individual and family responsibility. 
In Singapore’s context, it may be economically rational for a household to 
have fewer or no children even if this decision is collectively irrational at the 
national level. 
 
Liberal foreign labour policies may be economically undesirable because the 
benefits of agglomeration (i.e. the gains in productivity as more skilled 
people work close together and knowledge spreads) may be limited to skills- 
and knowledge-intensive industries and offset by the negative externalities 
caused by a large foreign worker population (e.g., depressed wages). 
 
Large-scale immigration is politically sensitive because citizens bear the 
costs of the population increase and do not necessarily see how immigration 
benefits them. For citizens, the increased competition for jobs may depress 
wages and reduce incentives for employers to raise labour productivity. 
Another effect of high levels of labour immigration is its impact on identity, 
culture and the provision of public goods. 
 
The mitigation approach also overlooks how people might change their 
behaviour as the population ages, diminishing the accounting effects. For 
instance, the labour supply is unlikely to contract as sharply as demographic 
trends suggest because the future elderly are likely to live and stay in good 
health for a longer time. 
   
The ageing trend in Singapore’s population need not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the number of years lost due to poor health or disability. 
Increases in life expectancy over the last two centuries have been 
associated with reductions in the age-specific incidence of disease, disability 
and morbidity (Costa 1998; Fogel 1994 and 1997). Mathers et al. (2001) 
show that health-adjusted life expectancy increases in tandem with life 
expectancy across countries. This suggests that the length of ill health at the 
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end of life appears to be constant and that as life expectancy rises, the years 
spent in good health increases by just as much.1  
 
With better health and increased longevity, individuals can work longer, 
stemming a decline in the labour supply per capita. The theoretically optimal 
response to rising life expectancy is to increase the number of working years 
and the number of years in retirement proportionately, without changing 
period-specific saving behaviour.2 
 
The impact of an ageing population on the labour supply may be softened 
by a higher labour market participation rate. As the share of the workforce in 
the population shrinks, rising wages will raise labour market participation, 
particularly among women and the younger elderly. If the supply of labour is 
sufficiently elastic, the required rise in wages need not be large. 
 
The elderly too contribute to society, rather than drain resources as the term 
old age “dependency” implies. At the national level, governments tax middle-
aged, productive workers and transfer benefits to the young and the old. But 
at the household level, elderly households make significant transfers to 
younger and middle-aged members, undoing some of the effects of 
government policy. The “dependency” burden that is often invoked to raise 
alarm about population ageing is more a function of the tax-and-transfer 
systems that are in place rather than an immutable state of affairs (Bloom 
and Canning 2008). Singapore’s relatively low levels of social (and public) 
spending (Figure 2.1), coupled with the fact that the state does not provide 
any tax-financed pensions or much by way of social transfers to older 
persons,3 suggests that it has significant adaptive potential in public policies, 
                                            
1. This “compression in morbidity” — in relative if not in absolute terms — does not 
mean that healthcare spending as a share of income will not rise as the population 
ages. It almost certainly will, simply because there will be many more elderly people. 
2. In many OECD countries, this theoretical response has not been observed. In 
most OECD countries, labour participation among those above 60 has, until 
recently, decreased rather than increased in spite of improvements in life 
expectancy over the last several decades. Experts argue that this divergence 
between theory and how people actually behave is due mainly to the incentives for 
earlier retirement in many of these countries’ social security systems. As shown in 
Gruber and Wise (1998), most social security programmes in OECD countries 
feature several direct and indirect incentives for individuals to retire early rather than 
continue working. In some countries, retirement is mandatory in order to receive 
pension benefits; in others, pension rates are kept flat or adjusted in a way that is 
not actuarially fair, so additional years of contribution are given only partial credit or 
no credit at all. This experience internationally suggests that it is not wise to 
(inadvertently) create disincentives against older Singaporeans working longer. 
3. Social transfers constitute a very small part of the Singapore government’s total 
outlay, while in most other developed countries they comprise a significant share of 
       Chapter 2: Capital 
 
65  
 
institutions and norms. If society and its policies can adapt, there may then 
be less of a need to worry about the fiscal or dependency burden of the 
ageing population. 
 
Figure 2.1. Public spending as share of GDP in selected countries, 2010 
 
Sources: OECD 2011; Ministry of Finance, Singapore 
 
Even if ageing did lead to lower levels of income per capita, this does not 
necessarily imply a decline in economic well-being. Well-being depends 
primarily on consumption, not income. Typically, household income falls at 
retirement, while consumption remains relatively high. An older population 
with a lower per capita income may be able to sustain a similar level of 
consumption — and therefore similar levels of well-being — as compared 
with a younger population with higher per capita income. Ageing-induced 
decline in income per capita may not necessarily result in a decline in well-
being, particularly if accumulated savings can be deployed to offset lower 
income. Furthermore, at retirement, older people may begin to contribute as 
                                            
public spending. For instance, Sweden and France devote about 30% of their GDP 
to social transfers alone, while Denmark, Finland and Germany spend about a 
quarter. Even the United States directs about 16% of its national income this way 
(OECD 2010). 
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volunteers or help with family tasks — activities that are not accounted as 
part of a country’s income. This highlights the inadequacy of using GDP (or 
GDP per capita) as a measure of economic well-being. 
 
Adapting Policies and Institutions to Ageing  
 
Behavioural changes in response to demographic trends may be amplified 
or dampened, facilitated or hampered by institutions and policies.  
 
Singapore’s economic history reflects its demographic development over 
time. The baby boom from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, combined with 
falling child mortality rates, produced a demographic dividend that boosted 
the economy. As the baby boomer generation entered the workforce from 
the late 1960s, labour supply significantly expanded at a time of rapid 
industrialisation. This expansion in the working-age population as a share of 
the total population helped the country to achieve rapid economic growth. At 
the same time, a high savings rate made possible by the low dependency 
ratio and enabling policies (such as the increase in CPF rates over time) 
provided the resources for significant increases in investments. It also 
allowed the state to build up sizeable financial reserves, especially from the 
late 1980s. According to some studies, as much as one-third of the East 
Asian economic miracle can be accounted for by the demographic dividend 
(Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom, Canning and Malaney 2000; Mason 
2001). 
 
The experience internationally, however, does not support demographic 
determinism because complementary policies and institutions are needed to 
reap the demographic dividend. A large working-age population requires a 
corresponding increase in the demand for labour. Without appropriate 
policies, the surge in the working-age population could result in 
unemployment and underemployment, higher levels of crime, erosion of 
trust and social capital, and political instability.  
 
Among the key policies needed to turn the baby boom into a demographic 
dividend, economists have highlighted the importance of open economies 
that keep large cohorts of workers productively employed; flexible labour 
markets and unrestrictive labour laws that support employment creation to 
absorb the surge of workers; and efficient financial intermediaries to mobilise 
the savings of baby boomers and channel them to productive investments. 
2.3 ANALYSIS 
 
Does Singapore’s current institutional framework facilitate or impede 
adaptation to an ageing population? The four main pillars of Singapore’s 
current institutional framework are:  
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 Central Provident Fund (CPF) for retirement security 
 Home ownership to boost assets and generate retirement security 
 Individual responsibility in meeting health and long-term care expenses 
 Safeguarding and growing national reserves 
 
Central Provident Fund (CPF)  
Unlike the pay-as-you-go systems with high replacement rates found in 
many OECD countries, the CPF system in Singapore is a fully-funded 
defined contribution system that, in theory at least, encourages older 
workers to work for as long as they can and want to. With the exception of 
the recently introduced CPF LIFE, which is an annuity scheme, the current 
CPF system relies almost entirely on the principle of individual savings. 
While this comes with many advantages, chief among which is the fact that 
an ageing population does not create unfunded liabilities for the state, 
Singaporeans are almost entirely reliant on their own or their family’s 
resources to deal with retirement and other episodes of income instability 
(MSF 2013; Yap 2009). 
While self-reliance is a good principle in general, it may neither be efficient 
nor just if taken to extremes. The government should consider how the social 
security system could strike better balance between individual savings, 
social insurance, and direct subsidies financed by general taxation.  
  
The current CPF system may deter the elderly from working because 
employer contributions are significantly reduced for workers above age 55 
(Table 2.1). This aims to encourage employers to continue hiring older 
workers. However, it may also have the unintended effect of pushing older 
workers into retirement since the reduction in the employer’s contributions 
represents a reduction in wages. On the other hand, raising employer 
contribution rates for older workers from current levels may discourage 
employers from hiring older workers in the first place. The experience 
internationally suggests that it is important not to inadvertently create 
disincentives against older Singaporeans working longer — a behavioural 
change that is necessary to counteract the fall in labour supply.  
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Table 2.1. CPF contribution rates by age 
Employee 
Age 
(Years) 
Contribution Rate 
(for monthly wages ≥ $750) 
Credited into 
Contribution 
by 
Employer
(% of wage)
Contribution 
by 
Employee
(% of wage)
Total 
Contribution
(% of wage)
Ordinary 
Account
(% of 
wage) 
Special 
Account 
(% of 
wage) 
Medisave 
Account 
(% of 
wage) 
35 & 
below 16 20 36 23 6 7 
35–45 16 20 36 21 7 8 
45–50 16 20 36 19 8 9 
50–55 14 18.5 32.5 13.5 9.5 9.5 
55–60 10.5 13 23.5 12 2 9.5 
60–65 7 7.5 14.5 3.5 1.5 9.5 
Above 65 6.5 5 11.5 1 1 9.5 
Source: Central Provident Fund Board website on contribution rates, 
http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Con-Rates 
 
Many Singaporean baby-boomer retirees may lack sufficient retirement 
security because their retirement assets are tied up in housing or their 
incomes are too low to have generated enough savings (MSF 2013). 
  
Despite Singapore having one of the world's highest savings rates and 
highest social security contribution rates, just over a third (37.5%) of active 
CPF members who reached 55 years old in 2009 had met the required CPF 
Minimum Sum, a benchmark for retirement adequacy, with both cash and a 
property pledge. Only 20% could meet the CPF Minimum Sum wholly in cash. 
This means that four out of every five active CPF members who turned 55 
in 2009 would not have sufficient cash to meet their basic needs in old age 
if they did not have other sources of financial support besides their CPF 
savings. 
 
Lower-middle and middle income Singaporeans may lack retirement security 
because much of their CPF savings are locked up in housing. While housing 
represents a store of value that can be unlocked for retirement needs, this 
presumes that monetisation incurs relatively low transaction costs and 
house prices are relatively stable (a highly questionable assumption). 
Households that need to unlock their housing assets may be in the wrong 
part of the property cycle. 
 
Lower-income Singaporeans in the bottom three or four deciles of the 
income distribution may lack retirement adequacy because their wages are 
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low relative to basic needs such that they are unable to accumulate sufficient 
savings for retirement over their working lives. 
 
Home Ownership 
Singapore’s housing policy has been geared towards promoting home 
ownership. The benefits of home ownership include giving citizens a sense 
of belonging in the country and promoting socio-political stability, as well as 
offering citizens an asset for retirement. Especially when the population was 
young and incomes were rising across the board, public housing was also 
an efficient and incentive-compatible way of spreading the fruits of economic 
growth.  
 
With the coming wave of baby-boomer retirees who may need to monetise 
their homes for income and with rising income inequalities, the focus on 
home ownership may create challenges for retirement adequacy, macro-
economic stability and the work ethic. 
 
The exposure to market volatility and a shortage of options to monetise 
housing assets in old age make it difficult and risky for Singaporeans, 
especially the retiring baby boomers, to rely on housing for retirement 
adequacy. 
 
Home ownership exposes retirees who may rely on their homes to generate 
incomes after retirement to risks in a volatile market prone to crises, as the 
collapse of the US housing bubble in 2007 showed. Housing is inefficient 
and inappropriate as a hedge against inflation or as a substitute for social 
protection against the risks of old age, ill health and unemployment. 
  
Despite efforts to help the elderly monetise their housing assets, such as the 
lease buyback scheme, the policy emphasis remains on home ownership. 
The rapid ageing of the population suggests that the focus of government 
policy has to shift from enabling asset accumulation to helping Singaporeans 
unlock and monetise their housing assets. For older households, moreover, 
housing is increasingly a form of consumption, not investment.  
 
Policies to support home ownership, combined with high inequality and 
historically low interest rates, can become a source of financial and 
economic instability. Rajan (2010) argues that the main governmental 
response to rising inequality in the United States (US) was to expand lending 
to households, especially low-income households. He suggests that 
promoting home ownership became a convenient substitute for the policies 
that really address inequality, such as improving access to quality education 
and strengthening social safety nets. While politically expedient, the 
government’s home ownership objective drove financial deregulation and 
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fuelled increasing leverage, sowing the seeds for the collapse of the housing 
bubble and the financial crisis. 
 
As housing price gains outstrip wage growth, as has happened in recent 
years, Singaporeans may increasingly invest in housing rather than work or 
pursue careers as a means to grow their incomes. This could erode society’s 
work ethic and thus reduce the potential supply of much-needed labour. It 
would also mean a diversion of society’s resources from productive activities 
to less productive and potentially destabilising ones. 
 
Health and Long-term Care Expenses 
Most of Singapore’s policy measures in healthcare have focused on 
individual responsibility. Health policies have emphasised “getting the 
incentives right” in the financing system, preventing moral hazard and over-
consumption by patients and preventing over-servicing by providers. In this 
regard, Singapore’s healthcare spending is relatively low by developed 
country standards. 
 
The emphasis on “getting the incentives right,” however, is unlikely to curb 
the growth in national expenditure on health and long-term care spending as 
the population ages and the incidence of chronic illnesses in our population 
rises. Health and long-term care costs tend to outpace inflation, regardless 
of incentive structures, because healthcare consumption tends to increase 
in absolute terms and as a share of their incomes as incomes rise. Rising 
healthcare cost is also likely to hurt the poor more than the rich. 
 
The health and long-term care sectors require a high degree of human 
interaction, making it hard to standardise and automate tasks, raise labour 
productivity and reduce unit costs. Consequently, increases in labour 
productivity in these industries are slower than average productivity growth. 
Yet at the same time, wages in these “stagnant” industries have to increase 
as quickly as in the rest of the economy so that they can continue to attract 
workers. As the costs of production in these stagnant sectors rise, prices will 
also have to rise. This is known as the “cost disease” or the Baumol Effect.  
 
Historical data confirm that this “cost disease” is real. Since the 1980s, the 
price of university education in the United States has risen by 440% and the 
cost of medical care by 250%. For the economy as a whole, the average 
price and wage increases were only 110% and 150%, respectively (Baumol 
2012). In Japan, healthcare spending per person rose by 5.7% between 
1960 and 2006; in Britain, it rose by 3.5% — in both instances exceeding the 
average inflation rate. The cost disease can be mitigated to some extent, 
such as by reducing waste in healthcare or by pursuing innovations that rely 
less on human contact, such as tele-medicine and mobile health. However, 
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in health and long-term care, there will always be a significant part (probably 
a majority) of services that cannot be standardised, digitised or automated. 
Slower productivity growth in the health and long-term care industry will 
mean rising costs and prices, suggesting that such expenditures will take up 
an ever larger part of our incomes. 
  
Even with increasing income per capita, growth is likely to be unevenly 
distributed. In the context of wage stagnation for lower-income citizens, the 
risk is that wages will not rise sufficiently fast for them to afford the rising 
costs of healthcare (and other essential services that are afflicted by the cost 
disease). To ensure equitable access to good healthcare, Singapore’s old 
mantras of individual responsibility and the reliance on individual savings 
and family support to meet healthcare expenses will have to be seriously re-
evaluated.  
 
Use of Reserves 
The government has highlighted the need to raise taxes at some stage to 
finance the needs of a much larger elderly population and the greater 
demands for social spending. Such a framing is incomplete. It implicitly 
assumes that our current fiscal position is optimal and has little “slack” or 
redundancy. This ignores Singapore’s considerable fiscal reserves, which 
give the state plenty of room for fiscal manoeuvre. 
  
In particular, Singapore could consider how its reserves can be deployed to 
help cope with an ageing society and promote intergenerational equity. 
Under existing rules for the protection of reserves, the current government 
can use up to half the expected net investment returns (NIR) from the 
country’s reserves. This rule is intended to preserve and, if possible, 
increase the real value of the reserves. 
  
A fiscal policy favouring higher taxation as the default option rather than 
tapping on the reserves raises the issue of intergenerational equity. Such a 
policy bias may be considered unfair to the baby-boomer generation that 
built the reserves, given that many retiring baby boomers may lack 
retirement security. A significant part of the reserves are the result of fiscal 
surpluses generated in the 1980s and 1990s — the period when the baby-
boomer generation was economically the most productive. Indeed, the 
reserves accumulated are a net transfer of savings from the baby-boomer 
generation to the state. Now that the generation that contributed the most to 
the reserves is entering retirement, it is only fair from an intergenerational 
perspective that the state reverses (at least a part of) that wealth transfer. 
  
Imposing the fiscal burden of looking after the needs of the baby boomers 
onto subsequent generations — in the form of higher taxes while continuing 
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to accumulate reserves — could be considered not only inequitable but also 
inefficient. A strategy of growing the reserves regardless of context may be 
considered economically inefficient as it implies a negative reinvestment rate, 
i.e., that we favour the interests of a future generation (one that is likely to 
be smaller and richer in per capita terms) more than the interests of the 
current generation of baby boomers that has immediate needs. Rather than 
raise tax rates, the government should first consider whether accumulating 
reserves and investing the nation’s savings abroad would yield superior 
long-term returns compared to domestic re-investment, e.g., in Singapore’s 
social and physical infrastructure.  
 
2.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To finance an ageing population, Singapore ought to reconsider its 
institutional framework that comprises four pillars: (a) the CPF system; (b) 
home ownership for retirement adequacy; (c) individual responsibility in 
health and long-term care, and (d) preservation and growth of reserves. 
  
These pillars suited an era of baby boomers and rapid economic growth, but 
are less suitable for an era of population ageing, slowing economic growth 
and widening income disparities. The majority of recent retirees will lack 
retirement adequacy, as the cost of health and long-term care spirals upward. 
Their retirement savings are also subject to the vagaries of a volatile housing 
market. The rest of the population may be called upon to fund the ageing 
population through higher taxes. 
All this suggests the need for the Singapore government to pursue more 
redistributive policies and to maintain a high level of investment in public 
goods (e.g., affordable housing and healthcare, better social protection 
against retirement and loss of income, investments in education and 
infrastructure). Only by remaking the social compact in a more egalitarian 
and inclusive fashion would all Singaporeans share in the benefits of 
economic growth. A remaking of the social compact could also moderate 
citizen opposition to immigrants and foreign workers. 
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CPF: Retirement Top-ups and Grants 
Among lower-income Singaporeans (those in the bottom three or four 
deciles), the lack of retirement adequacy arises from the fact that their wages 
are quite low relative to cost of basic needs such that they are unable to 
accumulate sufficient savings for retirement over their working lives. For this 
group of older Singaporeans, policy will have to be finely balanced between 
providing more financial support and creating incentives for those who can 
work longer to do so. This requires a two-pronged approach. 
  
First, for the “younger elderly” aged 55–65, the government could make up 
for part of the reduction in the employers’ CPF contributions. This will have 
the effect of encouraging older workers to continue working without raising 
costs on employers. This policy could be complemented by reform to make 
labour markets more flexible, which would encourage more working-age 
people to join the labour force. 
 
Second, for Singaporeans above 65 who do not meet the CPF Minimum 
Sum, the study group proposes establishing a retirement grant that will 
enable these Singaporeans to participate in CPF LIFE. This grant could be 
pegged, for instance, at half the difference between the individual’s CPF 
savings and the Minimum Sum. This retirement grant will not create large 
unfunded liabilities, as it is likely that a higher proportion among future 
cohorts of retirees would attain the Minimum Sum. The fiscal costs of this 
grant could also be contained by limiting eligibility to the current elderly 
without the requisite retirement savings, thus building in a natural sunset 
provision on the grant. Both these factors help to ensure that fiscal burden 
of a basic retirement grant does not rise over time. The risks of moral hazard 
arising from such a retirement grant are also minimal since it is unlikely that 
working-age adults today would work less (and forego CPF savings) simply 
to qualify for the grant at retirement. 
 
Retirement Adequacy: Increase Options to Monetise Housing 
To help elderly Singaporeans meet their retirement needs, the government 
could create options to help unlock the value of housing assets, encourage 
the poor elderly to stay employed and help them boost retirement savings. 
 
As the population ages, policies to encourage home ownership will have to 
be adjusted to enable Singaporeans to “decumulate”. At a minimum, the 
government should develop more monetisation options for the majority of 
older Singaporeans who own public housing. Developing a sizeable pool of 
rental options also makes more economic sense for a population that will 
shift from accumulating (housing) assets to consuming those assets. 
 
Housing: Ensure Affordability and Housing Market Stability 
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Rather than conflate the goal of home ownership with that of asset 
appreciation, housing policy ought to emphasise housing affordability and 
price stability, in addition to offering options for households to consume 
housing, as outlined above. 
 
The HDB should continue to provide affordable housing for the majority of 
Singaporeans as its primary mission. While improvements in the design of 
HDB flats are desirable, they should not come at the expense of affordability. 
To ensure affordability, the government should strive to keep the price of 
new HDB built-to-order (BTO) flats at or below three times the target group’s 
annual income, and closely monitor income trends amongst the target 
groups. The group acknowledges that the HDB has focused on affordability 
as it has ramped up the supply of BTO flats in the past two years. 
 
Health and Long-term Care: Balance Health and Long-term Care 
Funding and Focus on Productivity-led Growth 
Singapore needs to sustain economic growth that is driven primarily by 
productivity improvements in order to cope with the escalation of costs for 
health and long-term care. Productivity-led growth, as opposed to labour 
force-driven growth, is the only sustainable way of raising incomes per capita. 
Only by raising incomes per capita can we afford the inexorably rising costs 
in healthcare without reducing our consumption of other goods and services. 
Baumol (2012), for instance, predicts that even though healthcare costs may 
rise alarmingly, they will remain affordable as long as labour productivity 
continues to grow at its historical rate of 2%. This productivity growth will 
mean that there would be much more to spend on everything else even if 
healthcare really did take up a bigger share of income. 
 
Singapore also needs to guard against the possible knee-jerk policy 
reactions to escalating costs of health and long-term care. As healthcare 
costs rise, governments may respond by shifting more of the costs to 
patients, providers or private insurance in the hope that this would impose 
greater cost discipline in the system. Baumol argues this shifting of costs is 
misguided, as it will not cure the underlying disease. Even if public spending 
in healthcare is “unsustainable”, it is unclear how passing the costs and risks 
to citizens or providers makes it more sustainable. It is more likely that 
citizens, facing higher risk exposure, will cut back on necessary healthcare 
expenditure. Excessive rationing by the state could result in poorer health 
outcomes or more unequal access to good healthcare. 
 
National Reserves: Review Constitutional Rules on Use of Reserves 
To fund an ageing population and promote intergenerational equity, 
Singapore could increase the share of the investment returns on reserves 
that can be used by the current government — or more radically, set aside 
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part of our reserves for the baby-boomer generation. This change would 
alleviate the fiscal burden on the working-age population for the next 20 
years, allowing them to consider parenthood decisions with less worry about 
supporting their own elderly parents. Equally important, it also provides a 
degree of certainty for the state, taxpayers, investors and retirees, allowing 
them to make their future consumption and investment decisions with 
greater confidence. 
 
A likely objection to setting aside part of the reserves to fund the needs of 
the elderly is that this represents a raid on the reserves, which the current 
Constitutional rules on the protection for reserves are designed to forbid. 
This objection, however, ignores the fact that the rules on the use of reserves 
were formulated in the early 1990s, when Singapore was still generating 
large fiscal surpluses. The concern then was how to set aside sufficient 
resources to deal with future contingencies. It is timely and necessary for the 
government to review how the rules on the use of reserves should be 
adapted for a radically different context. In particular, the government should 
consider raising the share of investment returns that can be used by the 
current government before it contemplates tax increases. 
  
In addition, the question of whether we need higher taxes cannot be properly 
addressed until the public has better information on national reserves and 
their expected future contributions to the national budget. While citizens 
probably do not need to know the exact amount of reserves that state holds, 
the government should minimally inform the public of whether it is utilising 
the full 50% of NIR that it is entitled to, as well as what it expects future NIR 
and the NIR contribution rate to be. Only with such information can citizens 
have an informed debate about whether increasing spending must be 
financed by higher taxes.  
 
Fiscal Policy: Maintain Progressive Tax System and Introduce Efficient 
Taxes that do not Reduce Work Incentives 
Certain groups are likely to bear the brunt of the impact of an ageing 
population, such as retirees without enough income or the poor who cannot 
afford rising healthcare costs. At a time when housing subsidies are likely to 
be insufficient as a redistribution tool, the government ought to consider 
addressing equity concerns by enhancing social safety nets. 
 
Even if taxes have to be increased to finance an ageing population, rather 
than optimising the use of reserves, it is not apparent at all that the burden 
of tax increases should fall on citizens in the form of further GST increases. 
In the context of rising inequality and the fact that the very rich have been 
the main beneficiaries of income growth in the last decade (Figure 2.2), it 
would be equitable to raise progressive taxes rather than raise regressive 
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consumption taxes. Raising progressive taxes could take the form of 
introducing a capital gains tax, which is also an efficient tax since it does not 
reduce work incentives; having a more progressive property tax system; or 
raising the top marginal tax rate on personal incomes. 
 
Figure 2.2. Shares of total income by decile, 2000 and 2010  
  
Source: Key Household Income Trends 2012, Department of Statistics, 
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/Publications/publications_and_papers/househol
d_income_and_expenditure/pp-s19.pdf. 
 
The rising costs of healthcare are likely to hit the poor harder than the rich, 
offering yet another reason for more vigorous redistribution by the state. If 
the poor indeed cannot afford health and long-term care, it is incumbent on 
the state to redistribute the gains of productivity growth more aggressively 
so that there is equitable access to good healthcare.  
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CHAPTER 3: LABOUR 
 
3.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
Within the context of an ageing and shrinking resident population and 
workforce, this chapter considers:  
 
 Relevant human capital policies for good job growth and prosperity; 
 Ways in which labour force productivity and real wages could be 
raised;  
 Optimal level of immigration, or foreign worker inflow, and total 
population size in 2050, given a shrinking domestic population; 
 Ways in which negative externalities of a growth strategy that relies 
on foreign worker inflows and immigration could be lowered; 
 Policies to balance the need for migrants and foreign workers against 
inequality, job competition and a shrinking population; 
 Appropriate mix of skills for development as a knowledge-based 
economy, given negative population trends; 
 Appropriate social policies for the future, given negative population 
and economic trends. 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Three forces will buffet the Singapore labour force, i.e., the number of people 
who seek jobs:  
1) The population will age and population policies can only slow or hasten 
ageing (as can be seen in Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 of IPS’ population 
projections). 
 
2) Even with modest workforce growth rates relative to history, Singapore’s 
total population could easily reach levels that threaten social well-being, 
cohesion and national identity (the Prime Minister’s call for a long-term 
population level of “significantly below 6.9 million”1 thus seems like an 
appropriate long-term population limit). 
 
3) Economic volatility and income inequality will rise in Singapore from the 
effects of globalisation and technological change.  
 
Besides a shrinking labour force, these factors could also result in a higher 
rate of structural and cyclical unemployment, financial hardship for ageing 
low-income workers, and major adjustment difficulties for domestic small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
                                            
1. Singapore Parliamentary Reports, 8 February 2013. Vol 90, Session 1, Sitting 6. 
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Population Ageing 
 
The elderly will form a bigger share of the population even if Singapore were 
to raise fertility, increase naturalisation rates and let in more foreign workers. 
Population policy changes can only hasten or slow this trend. The IPS 
population scenarios show that the number of citizens and Permanent 
Residents will start to fall from 2020, and the share of elderly in the resident 
population will rise further. Both trends will shrink the labour force and leave 
fewer people of working age to support more old people. 
 
Furthermore, in the coming decades, the elderly poor will be those baby 
boomers (particularly the early baby boomers) who have had low wages 
most of their working lives and limited education. Retirement adequacy and 
the affordability of medical and long-term elderly care for this vulnerable 
population cohort will become increasingly critical issues.  
 
Economic Volatility and Income Inequality 
 
These adverse demographic trends will coincide with more frequent 
economic boom-and-bust cycles, as a result of global economic imbalances. 
As technological changes and globalisation impact Singapore’s economy, 
wage growth in certain income segments may continue to be constrained 
whilst income inequality widens. Indian and Chinese workers have joined 
the world labour market, depressing median wages in developed countries. 
Technology has made repetitive mid-level jobs redundant, such as clerical 
work and professional jobs that can be outsourced.  
 
Economic Restructuring 
 
Due to globalisation and technological change, Singapore will have to 
restructure its economy and move away from labour-intensive growth 
towards higher levels of productivity and wages, especially in blue-collar 
occupations. After two decades of liberal unskilled and semi-skilled 
immigration, real wages and productivity growth have lagged developed 
country averages. Economic restructuring will involve a much lower rate of 
labour-force growth and immigration over the coming decades, which will re-
allocate labour away from labour-intensive activities towards more capital-, 
skill- and technology-intensive activities. This will involve a sustained 
process of “creative destruction”, i.e., re-organisation, relocation or closure 
of existing firms and the birth and consolidation of new firms and industries. 
 
Joblessness, Vulnerability and Business Difficulties  
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These forces are likely to result in a higher on-going rate of structural, 
cyclical and transitional unemployment, economic and financial hardship for 
ageing low-income workers as well as major adjustment difficulties and 
challenges for SMEs. Singapore thus needs to:  
 
1) Balance immigration by having sufficient immigrants to maintain the 
labour force and economic growth on the one hand, but not so many as 
to threaten social and national well-being. This challenge entails 
recalibrating immigration and population policy in order to hit an optimal 
rate of labour force growth and a reasonable terminal population size. 
 
2) Strengthen manpower, education and industrial policy to ensure 
economic restructuring. To facilitate restructuring, Singapore needs to 
increase the productivity and adaptability of the labour force; raise the 
capability of domestic businesses in employing the labour force; and 
revamp the educational and continuing education system to provide for 
innovation-centred and life-long learning. 
 
3) Strengthen social policy to soften the impact of higher economic volatility 
and the inevitable labour force disruptions from restructuring. A stronger 
social policy involves strengthening and enhancing safety nets for the 
aged and the vulnerable in the labour force. 
 
3.3 ANALYSIS 
 
An ageing population, combined with a total fertility rate (TFR) that is 
markedly below the replacement level, will ultimately result in a shrinking 
labour force. It will leave fewer economically active people to pay taxes and 
support the elderly.  
 
How can the size of the labour force be maintained? The labour force is 
determined by the size of the working-age population and the percentage of 
it seeking jobs. Singapore can therefore maintain the labour force through 
two major routes: 1) encourage a higher percentage of working-age people 
to seek jobs (increasing the labour force participation rate), or 2) raise the 
size of the labour force by raising the retirement age, raising the TFR, or 
raising immigration and naturalisation and/or by importing foreign labour. 
 
Singapore has relied on immigration, naturalisation and importing foreign 
labour (or foreign manpower) in the past two decades to mitigate the impact 
of the ageing population. In the coming decades, the core challenge will be 
to strike a balance among the four tools to curb the labour force decline, 
rather than rely excessively on in-migration, which can create unintended 
social costs. 
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One way to maintain the labour force is to encourage more working-age 
people to obtain employment. The participation of women in the labour force 
in Singapore merits attention: Singaporean women are increasingly better 
educated, but many stop working after giving birth; by contrast, women in 
other developed economies often return to work after raising children. Since 
the labour force participation rate for men is already high and Singaporean 
workers work long hours, there are limits to how much overall labour force 
participation rates could rise. Still, some 120,000 additional workers could 
potentially participate in the labour force in the next 10 years. Singapore 
should encourage women to re-enter the labour force, while recognising the 
non-pecuniary benefits of bearing and raising children. 
 
Although it is hard to raise the TFR, it is not impossible. Countries like France 
and some of the Nordic countries have raised the TFR by 0.3–0.5 
percentage points over a decade, through concerted pro-natal and family-
friendly policies. These policies include high-quality and affordable state-
provided childcare facilities, higher hourly real wages and adequate part-
time work arrangements for women. They are eminently possible over the 
medium to long term. 
 
The literature is more optimistic with respect to the retirement age. Leading 
Austrian demographer Wolfgang Lutz has shown in detailed empirical 
studies that in ageing populations in Northern Europe where education 
levels are high, there is a natural extension of retirement ages by the better 
educated towards 65–70 years. This trend could make a sizeable difference 
in increasing the skilled labour force available for economic growth without 
having to resort to excessive skilled immigration (Lutz 2013).2 
 
Higher in-migration and naturalisation can slow the rate of population ageing 
and the decline in the labour force, but could also in turn lead to higher social, 
economic and political costs.  Social costs include higher property prices; 
crowdedness in education, health and public recreational facilities; reduced 
social well-being amongst residents; weaker social cohesion and national 
identity; or even a rise in social conflict and xenophobia (see Chapter 7). 
Current rates of in-migration and naturalisation are reaching social and 
political limits. 
A liberal and un-calibrated policy of foreign labour intake can also depress 
wages and productivity across various occupations. The intake of more than 
one million work permit and S pass holders relative to a domestic labour 
force of two million over the last 20 years have contributed to a dampening 
effect on real wages for the bottom 20% of income earners.  
                                            
2. For a more complete study, see A. Prskawetz et al (2005). 
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Real wages in Singapore for blue-collar occupations are lower than in other 
developed countries like Australia, Hong Kong and the United States (US). 
Between 1987 and 2010, the estimated real monthly income of the bottom 
20% of employed residents fell around 8%. This was combined with 
widening income inequality. The average monthly household income from 
work per household member among the bottom 10% of resident households 
by income rose at an average annual rate of 1.9% between 2000 and 2010, 
as compared with 5.5% average annual growth for the top 10% of resident 
households by income in the same period (Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. Average monthly household income from work per 
household member among resident employed households, by deciles 
and excluding employer CPF contributions, 2000–2012 
 
Source: Key Household Income Trends, 2012. Department of Statistics, 
2013 
 
Massive immigration and naturalisation could in turn hurt the returns on 
education for citizens, potentially reducing investment in domestic human 
capital, reducing social mobility for citizens and fuelling further social 
dissatisfaction among citizens.  
 
The huge increase in the population over the last 20 years, moreover, has 
created a larger base that can magnify the impact of a low labour force 
growth rate. Even if the labour force grows at an average rate of 1.3% yearly 
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from 2010–2050 (significantly slower than 3.5% yearly over the last 20 
years), the total population could rise to 7.3 million by 2050 (under the 
assumptions used in Scenario 2C in IPS’ population projections). On the 
other hand, more modest growth rates of say 0.7% per annum, if sustained, 
could result in a total population size of 6.5 million by 2050 (in Scenario 2A, 
Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2. Total population projections to 2050 at different labour force 
growth rates (with constant LFPR, TFR and naturalisation rates) 
 
Note: LFPR = Labour force participation rate 
Source: IPS Population Projections Scenarios 2A-C. 
 
Growth of the labour force through the importation of foreign labour has 
tended to outpace expectations and targets because: 
1) The rate of such foreign labour migration is currently determined largely 
by industry demand, subject to taxes on foreign labour and ratios of 
locals to foreigners hired. A rapid, sustained expansion in labour-
intensive final demand, like construction or hospitality, can lead to an 
unexpected surge in immigration, as in the latter-half of the 2000s. 
2) Governments have a tendency to “go for growth” in the short term by 
allowing more immigrants and labour supply to satisfy the cyclical 
demand for prosperity, but fail to consider the much longer-term 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Scenario 2A 5,042 5,332 5,611 5,867 6,081 6,239 6,355 6,444 6,525
Scenario 2B 5,042 5,160 5,260 5,500 5,701 5,849 5,958 6,041 6,117
Scenario 2C 5,042 5,632 6,281 6,567 6,807 6,984 7,114 7,214 7,304
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structural impact of a significantly higher population on well-being, social 
cohesion and national identity. 
3) Policy has focused on immigration and naturalisation, which allows new 
citizens and PRs to bring along dependents and expand the population. 
By contrast, single-person immigrants, e.g., S pass or employment pass 
holders, are either unable to or less likely to bring along dependents. A 
shift towards single-person immigrants, even at higher skill levels 
currently associated with employment pass or permanent residency, 
who eventually leave Singapore, can help experienced locals rise to 
senior positions when immigrants leave. 
 
As elaborated further in this section, labour productivity — the determinant 
of long-term real wages and economic growth — could grow 2–3% as labour 
force growth slows to 0.5–1.0% a year through 2020. Labour productivity 
could still rise 2% yearly with labour force growth of 0.0–0.5% in the following 
10 years. These rates reflect the mixed impact of labour force growth on 
labour productivity and the experience of the US and Europe. 
 
The impact of labour force growth on labour productivity has been mixed. 
On the one hand, macroeconomic studies often show that productivity 
growth is inversely related to labour force growth. Labour shortages lead to 
higher wages and prompt businesses to boost productivity through 
mechanisation, technology, re-organisation and shifting towards higher 
value-added products or services. This trend was the experience of middle-
income countries that became advanced economies. On the other hand, 
more recent studies from the US and Europe have shown that modest 
immigration augmentation could boost total factor productivity and 
innovation by increasing specialisation, especially for highly skilled labour in 
science and engineering.  
 
The US experience also tends to show that immigration lowers wages for 
native workers who compete with immigrants for jobs and lowers the price 
of labour intensive services. Both sets of studies suggest slower or faster 
growth of the labour force itself need not imply slower or faster productivity 
growth. Therefore, the type of immigration matters (Cavelaars 2004; Hanson 
2011). 
 
The experience of the US and Europe suggest moderate productivity growth 
is possible as labour force growth slows. From the 1970s till the mid-1990s, 
yearly labour force growth in Europe averaged around 0–0.5%, whereas 
productivity growth averaged 1.5–2%. From 1990 to 2005 in the US, yearly 
labour force growth was around 1% as productivity growth, powered by the 
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info-communications revolution, and averaged 2–2.5% (Jorgenson et al. 
2004). 
 
Productivity in Singapore could outpace what Europe and the United States 
experienced for three reasons. First, labour and product markets in 
Singapore are more flexible than in Europe during the 1970s. Second, 
Singapore benefits from being an economic hub with network externalities, 
effective information and communication, active promotion of research and 
development (R&D) and unusually high rates of foreign investment. Third, 
Singapore has considerable room for catch-up through 2020, given 
productivity levels in construction, services and manufacturing in Singapore 
are around 38%, 58% and 62% of the US averages, respectively, despite a 
higher GDP per capita. Slower labour force growth rate in Singapore, around 
the pace of the US and Europe, would entail lower immigration rates. It would 
force businesses to “get off steroids” and stop relying on cheap foreign 
workers, while maintaining comparable rates of productivity growth 
(Thangavelu 2012).3 
 
Labour force growth of around 1% till 2020 and 0.5% till 2030 is likely to 
result in a total population of around six million by 2030. By then, the resident 
labour force would be declining, but the adverse effects of a smaller working-
age resident population could be mitigated by a calibrated immigration and 
naturalisation policy as well as higher TFR, LFPR and retirement age. The 
combined effect may be to stabilise to population between 6–6.5 million by 
2050. 
 
The study group understands that a period of transition from historically 
higher rates of labour force growth may be necessary to allow domestic 
SMEs to adapt to lower rates of foreign labour intake. This transition matters 
because SMEs employ nine out of 10 workers in Singapore and are the 
backbone of domestic industrial capacity. It also matters because the 
mismatch between the types of workers available and the types businesses 
need is more likely in Singapore, given the small size of the country. The 
transition period is also intended to mitigate the risk of spiralling inflation as 
labour supply slows markedly.  
 
More Productive and Adaptive Labour Force 
 
                                            
3. Thangavelu (2012) provides a model for the relationship between the capital 
stock, immigration and productivity growth with empirical analysis indicating 
excessive immigration lowers the capital labour ratio and long term potential growth 
rate in Singapore. 
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Singapore needs to boost the productivity of its labour force. Economic 
resources measured by GDP per capita, real wages and social well-being 
can still grow even if the labour force shrinks but becomes more productive.4 
The need for productivity will grow as Singapore faces stiffer competition 
from major Asian economies moving up the middle- to high-income ladder. 
Long-run labour productivity and maintaining Singapore’s comparative 
advantage as a knowledge-based business and industrial hub will depend 
critically on the type of education and training that median members of the 
domestic labour force have. 
 
Singapore’s status as a high valued-added Asian regional hub confers 
advantages that raise overall productivity in the context of a platform 
servicing a varied and rapidly growing Asia. Singapore’s position as a 
regional or global hub creates significant positive network externalities that 
are based on knowledge, connectivity and human capital. It is imperative for 
Singapore to protect and reinforce its hub status, and an adequate supply of 
highly educated and skilled manpower is probably one of the single most 
important ingredients in maintaining and growing this Asian hub status. 
 
Singapore also needs a more adaptive labour force to cope with rapid 
structural changes. Industries in Singapore, for instance, could shift towards 
financial services away from hard-disk manufacturing, or use robots to 
replace assembly workers and personal productivity software to replace 
secretaries. As these changes occur more frequently, an adaptive labour 
force will be able to perform new tasks that generate more value more 
efficiently, boosting productivity.  
 
Although Singapore students often top global charts for science and 
mathematics achievement, and local universities have climbed the 
international rankings, there is anecdotal evidence of a mismatch between 
what businesses seek in their employees and what Singapore’s labour force 
offers. This gulf is likely to widen in a knowledge-intensive and fast-changing 
economy, which will prize adaptive workers who can anticipate and solve 
problems, have the confidence, training and ability to promote fresh ideas 
and offer differentiated thinking. By contrast, the Singapore education 
system nurtures high test scorers who are risk-averse and conventional.5  
 
                                            
4. Germany, for instance, has the oldest population among developed countries. 
Its population has been shrinking, but it remains the most dynamic high value-
added exporting economy in the world with one of the most productive labour 
forces and one of the highest standards of living in Europe. 
5. See Lim (2013) on competitive labour market dynamics and education, and Ng 
(2007) for a survey of the impact of educational streaming on social mobility. 
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Table 3.1. Mismatch between what employers value and what 
Singapore employees offer 
 
Employers will seek people 
who… 
Labour force offers people 
who…  
Can identify, frame and solve 
problems 
Can execute if told the problem 
and solution 
Are enterprising and innovative  Are risk-averse and conventional 
Are open-minded and culturally 
flexible 
Are provincial and think in silos 
Are street smart and practical Are book-smart and excel in tests 
Source: POS2050 Labour Study Group  
 
This mismatch helps explain why several major employers say they need to 
hire foreigners, rather than Singaporeans, because the latter fall short of 
global standards. In the local or global job market, Singaporeans with better 
grades and learned competencies may lose out to foreigners with inferior 
paper qualifications. The latter may end up being better workers than more 
academically oriented Singaporean workers as they may be more “savvy” 
and “street-smart”, and may have more entrepreneurial mind-sets. 
 
This gap has developed due to several reasons:  
1) The education system is oriented towards standardised examinations 
and results, so it tends to produce workers better at academic, 
hierarchical, specialised thinking and who are more risk-averse. For 
example, economics graduates from the Singapore Management 
University who are trained with more participative teaching methods and 
evaluation systems command a premium over their counterparts from 
the Nanyang Technological University and National University of 
Singapore. Similarly, headhunters regularly report higher premiums 
offered to foreign executives compared to locals of equivalent 
experience, and managers in knowledge-based industries complain that 
local graduates are not as able to perform as well as foreign graduates. 
 
2) Nearly all employers who mention Singaporeans’ uniformity/conformity 
of thought (compared with other nationalities in the labour market) 
attribute it to “the educational system”, which is (a) heavily focused on 
narrow “teaching-to-the-test” skills from a very young age; (b) highly 
tiered, with screening of students for academic ability beginning with the 
Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) at ages 11–12 and 
continuing through the teenage years; (c) heavily dependent on private 
tuition which many schoolchildren undertake; and (d) increasingly 
ineffective as a channel of upward social and economic mobility (given 
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“streaming” by ability, unequal distribution of state and private resources, 
and the varied cost of tuition). 
 
3) The government has made considerable investments into the education 
system. However, these investments in education are mainly suited to 
an earlier “pre-knowledge” economy era, where industry needs were 
more structured and predictable. A low teacher-pupil ratio and a highly 
streamed education system with exacting examination standards have 
produced a massive shadow education system — tuition centres that 
focus on teaching students to do well in examinations rather than to solve 
problems or learn, raising issues of both relevance to performance in a 
knowledge-based economy as well as social mobility and equity. To 
move up international rankings, the universities in Singapore have 
increasingly focused on research that, by nature, is specialised. This 
focus on research may not necessarily benefit students, who need broad 
knowledge and the capacity to gain and apply new skills.  
 
Beyond the education and training of new workers, the stock of workers in 
the labour force needs to be systematically enhanced by continuing 
education and training as well as life-long learning programmes that make it 
convenient and affordable for workers to upgrade their skills or deepen 
training and development. 
 
Domestic Business Capability  
 
Besides making the labour force more productive, Singapore can also 
prepare for an ageing population and intensified change by raising overall 
corporate productivity. It must encourage businesses to expand into 
segments that generate more value, and reinforce Singapore’s status as a 
regional hub — a status that confers durable comparative advantage in trade 
and business opportunities. 
 
Although Singapore is generally business-friendly, its support for SMEs may 
be inadequate to permit SMEs to cope with many current challenges, 
including those arising from tightened labour supply. This takes the form of 
numerous disparate and uncoordinated programmes that require too much 
time and effort for SMEs to access. While there are many agencies and 
government programmes established to help the SME sector, there are gaps 
between the various agencies functions through which many SMEs may fall. 
 
These shortcomings will hinder SMEs in making the move up the value chain 
— to go from relying heavily on cheap labour to provide low-value goods and 
services to delivering greater value in innovative products and services. As 
labour becomes scarce, SMEs will tend to be hollowed out relative to foreign 
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and larger firms that are better equipped in bidding for and retaining labour. 
The government should thus strengthen and improve assistance to SMEs to 
make these important transitions and preserve our strategically important 
domestic business capability. 
 
Vulnerable Social Groups 
 
Despite efforts to create a more adaptive labour force and smoothen 
business transitions, certain groups that are less able to adept are likely to 
become vulnerable, as the population ages and the economy becomes more 
volatile. More frequent economic restructuring and business cycles imply 
that both cyclical and structural unemployment are likely to rise in the future. 
In the region, after Hong Kong, Singapore will age most rapidly from now till 
2050 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population 
Division 2012). The old-age dependency ratio will rise from 13.0 to 58.7 
(Scenario 1). By 2050, three out of every 10 residents will be over the age 
of 65 even in IPS’ most optimistic assumptions for resident TFR (Scenario 
3). 
 
Since a significant number of the near-elderly — the post-war baby boomers 
— are less educated and earn below-average incomes, many may not be 
able to meet their health and retirement needs in the coming decades, 
especially if they lose their jobs in coming years amid continual economic 
restructuring. In Singapore, 300,000 to 400,000 such older, less educated 
low-income workers risk losing jobs, because they will likely take more time 
to learn new skills for new industries as old industries move elsewhere.6 
Women in this age group are likely to be vulnerable, get lower retirement 
income because many stopped working to raise children, and therefore have 
lower CPF savings. They are also likely to outlive their husbands. The baby 
boomers and elderly women are thus likely to form a group of particularly 
vulnerable people who, for social justice reasons, cannot be ignored.  
 
Other countries have confronted the deterioration in old-age dependency 
ratios and potential support ratios over longer time-frames and have had 
more time to adapt. Many advanced economies with potential support ratios7 
of around 3.5-4.5 in 2010 are preparing for significant ageing of their 
populations and further declines in the potential support ratios to around 2.0–
2.2 by 2050, according to World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision 
(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population 
                                            
6. For empirical research on vulnerable older population groups and their key 
characteristics, see Yeoh et al (2010). 
7. The potential support ratio is the number of persons aged 15 to 64 per every 
person aged 65 or older. 
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Division 2012). For Singapore, the key question is which new institutional 
arrangements in the labour market and social safety net or social security 
policy can most effectively deal with such a natural population ageing 
process. 
 
 
3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Singapore needs to cope with and take advantage of the forces of change—
population ageing, rising economic volatility and the growing need for 
economic restructuring. The study group proposes that Singapore: 
 
 Focuses on improving social well-being — the well-being of citizens 
— by using per capita GDP, real wage, family income and 
productivity growth (rather than GDP growth) as its main 
performance indicators.  
 
 Mitigates the trend of a declining labour force and targets labour 
force growth of 1% a year till 2020 and 0.5% a year thereafter. 
 
 Meets the labour force growth target using a range of tools, including 
raising the TFR, the retirement age and women’s participation in the 
labour, rather than rely too heavily on naturalisation and immigration.  
 
 Raises the productivity and adaptability of its median worker by 
investing more money and restructuring the formal education system 
and by promoting lifelong learning, in order to benefit from 
technological change and the rise of Asia. 
 
 Simplifies aid, which a new agency with the resources, influence and 
inter-agency co-ordination ability of the Economic Development 
Board could co-ordinate, to help domestic SMEs adapt to labour 
scarcity and the new economy, and considers direct financing of 
promising SMEs. 
 
 Strengthens its social safety net, including introducing 
unemployment insurance, raising Workfare Income Supplement 
markedly to help the increasing number of ageing, unskilled and 
relatively poor workers who will need to find more jobs and fund 
retirements in the coming wave of baby-boomer retirees. This would 
help them with saving and living costs. Grants should be offered to 
poor retirees. Key social policies like public housing, healthcare and 
retirement adequacy also need to be strengthened (see 
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recommendations by the Social Infrastructure Development and 
Capital study groups). 
 
These recommendations are elaborated further below: 
 
Set Productivity and Social Well-being as Main Goals 
 
To sharpen the focus on productivity, Singapore ought to use per capita GDP 
as the broadest key performance indicator, rather than on GDP itself, 
because productivity drives and reflects per capita GDP growth in the long 
run. Per capita GDP is also a better reflection of quality of life as well as 
productive resources per citizen. Ultimately it is productivity growth that 
drives real standards of living, enables real wage growth and underpins 
competitiveness and innovation. 
 
Target Labour Force Growth of 0.5–1.0% through 2020, and 0.5% After 
 
Singapore ought to set a target of expanding the labour force by 0.5–1% 
yearly through 2020 and by 0.5% or lower thereafter. The faster growth rate 
through 2020 is intended to give local SMEs time to adjust, thus preventing 
a hollowing out of domestic business capability. The slower growth rate after 
2020 is in line with that in Europe and the US.  
 
Such a labour force growth trajectory, if combined with TFR and labour force 
participation rate (LFPR) improvements could put the total population on a 
trajectory to around 6 million by 2030 and 6.5 million by 2050, from 5.3 
million now. Such long-term population levels should be taken as serious 
target limits for policy. 
 
Recalibrate Naturalisation, Foreign Manpower and Population 
Policies 
 
To meet this labour force growth target, Singapore needs to use the full set 
of policy tools, shifting away from its current reliance on labour importation 
and naturalisation. Besides the above, this toolbox also includes redoubled 
efforts to raise the TFR, the LFPR (especially for women) and the retirement 
age. Progress in each area will be gradual and limited. Cumulatively they 
could make a significant difference in slowing the labour force decline.  
 
In foreign manpower and naturalisation, moreover, Singapore could mitigate 
the tendency to overshoot targets, which raises the risk of undesired 
population growth given population size is sensitive to labour force growth. 
Singapore could also shift foreign manpower policy away from naturalisation. 
In short, the study group proposes that Singapore: 
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 Adopts a framework of setting the rate of foreign manpower (or 
labour migration) and naturalisation through clear, relatively fixed 
and publicly auditable annual quotas. These quotas ought to be 
consistent with reasonable rates of labour force growth and optimal 
population size, as in most OECD countries — even those, like the 
US, Canada and Australia, with relatively liberal immigration policies. 
This revamp would replace the current framework, which is driven by 
industry demand. Immigration and naturalisation tends to overshoot 
targets substantially under the current framework. 
 
 Reviews the inflow and stock of permanent residents (PRs), because 
PRs bring with them dependents, whereas single-person immigrant 
passes like S pass holders do not. The dependents of PRs compete 
with citizens for subsidised healthcare, education and housing. 
Single-person immigrant passes should be considered more widely 
even for higher skill and income levels, whilst PR and new citizenship 
applications should be approved less freely and only after many 
years of naturalisation and proven value to the local economy and 
society. 
 
 Regularly reviews the annual intake of new citizens in conjunction 
with measures of social cohesion and integration rather than as a 
result of economic imperatives, with priority given to the foreign 
spouses of Singaporean citizens. 
 
 
 
Invest in Education for a Productive and Adaptive Labour Force  
 
To benefit from technological change and the rise of Asia, Singapore should 
raise the productivity and adaptive capacity of its median worker by investing 
more money and more broadly in the formal education system and by 
promoting lifelong learning. The study group proposes that: 
 
 The education system refocuses on developing a median student 
who can better perform in the creative, open-ended problem-solving 
work environment that characterises the knowledge-based economy. 
This shift away from rote learning for examinations will help 
Singaporeans find jobs in new industries as old industries close or 
move elsewhere. It will strengthen the long-term fundamentals to 
boost the productivity of the labour force and to maintain Singapore’s 
key status as a dynamic knowledge-based hub economy in Asia. 
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 The government invests more in education as Singapore moves into 
a knowledge economy. By providing more funds and cutting the 
teacher-to-pupil ratio, the government will enable each teacher to 
cater to different students and improve learning. It may be argued 
that better teachers — not more teachers — improve learning, but 
when the quality of teachers is constant, an increase in the number 
of teachers is likely to improve learning significantly, especially in 
students’ abilities in framing and solving problems.8  
 
 Singapore re-examines streaming. Which kind of school system will 
enable Singaporeans to continually learn new skills: one that 
categorises students into different vocations at an early age or one 
that emphasises general education for all? Finland exemplifies an 
emphasis on general education: It offers comprehensive education 
for all students until 16 years old, because it wishes to nurture in 
citizens the capacity to learn new skills and cope with accelerating 
change. Although Germany streams students, it does so later than 
Singapore (at 14 years) and allows vocational students to become 
highly qualified experts, e.g., master carpenters, helping vocational 
students to earn high wages and supporting its economic model, 
such as engineering excellence, best-in-niche SMEs, etc.9  
 
Besides changes to the formal school system, the government 
should continue enhancing incentives and support for lifelong 
learning so workers can continually meet industry needs. In this 
respect, the study group proposes that it could: 
 
 Intersperse formal learning throughout life, to promote lifelong 
learning and adaptability. Singaporeans now go to school till they are 
25 years old (for men) and 23 years old (for women), then work for 
the rest of their lives. Instead, they should be given opportunities 
return to school over the course of their longer working careers to 
pick up new skills and knowledge after starting work, with customised 
                                            
8. See Fredriksson et al (2013), which evaluates the long-term effects of class size 
in primary school. It uses rich data from Sweden and exploited variations in class 
size created by a maximum class size rule. Smaller classes in the last three years 
of primary school (ages 10 to 13) are beneficial for cognitive and non-cognitive ability 
at age 13, and improve achievement at age 16. Most important, the study finds 
smaller classes have positive effects on completed education, wages, and earnings 
at ages 27 to 42. The estimated wage effect was large enough to pass a cost-benefit 
test. 
9. See Estevez-Abe (2012) for a comparison of Finnish and German education 
systems and their long-term impact on productivity and wages in a globalised 
knowledge economy. 
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and flexible cycling through the formal or informal education system 
at various points of their working life depending on the needs of both 
employees and employers.  
 
 Encourage companies based in Singapore to send local employees 
to work in the region and pick up familiarity with regional cultures. 
Regional companies could send staff from the region to work 
temporarily in Singapore, so local staff develop familiarity with the 
region. Both moves would nurture the human capital to buttress 
Singapore’s hub status. 
 
 Re-evaluate continuing professional education. The need for 
continuing education is great for people currently in their late 40s or 
50s, because many of them did not go to university. As the 
educational profile of the population improves, it may help more to 
offer alternative career training and education and develop 
employment insurance, by lubricating the transition between jobs in 
different industries. When complemented by greater public provision 
of services, such as childcare, professional education programmes 
can also encourage women to return to the labour force. The study 
group also supports the Social Infrastructure Development study 
group’s recommendations to strengthen the Continuing Education 
and Training (CET) system by building, broadening and lengthening 
educational pathways as described by Raffe (2003). 
 
Employers also have a role to play in nurturing human capital. In Germany, 
for instance, unions help develop school curricula. Although companies 
ought to nurture in staff the capacity to learn, they may also fear losing 
trained staff. In Singapore’s case, government-linked companies could 
spearhead developing skills and talent; even if they lose their trained staff, 
such skills development would nevertheless benefit Singaporeans’ human 
capital.  
 
Strengthen Support for SMEs in Transition 
 
To help domestic SMEs adapt to labour scarcity and the new economy, 
Singapore ought to simplify aid, which a new agency similar to the Economic 
Development Board could coordinate, and to consider direct financing of 
promising SMEs. The study group therefore recommends that: 
 
 To help SMEs cope with faster and more frequent economic 
restructuring, Singapore ought to simplify and co-ordinate 
government support for SMEs to prevent them from falling 
through the cracks of uncoordinated programmes. In particular, 
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the government could aggregate various upgrading support 
services, including human resources, regulatory support and 
accounting. SMEs cannot afford and do not have the necessary 
corporate and administrative functions compared with MNCs or 
larger firms, and this is one area where the government could 
help to relieve the burden. It could also set up or encourage the 
establishment of virtual or physical centres to provide back-office 
functions such as accounting, IT support and staff training to a 
cluster of domestic SMEs.  
 
 To further help grow the next generation of SMEs needed to 
develop domestic capability, Singapore should consider 
supporting SMEs at various stages during the entire SME 
financing cycle from start-up to venture and growth capital, 
including moves to a private equity-like model with financing 
through loans and working capital funding as well as assistance 
on management upgrading. Business solutions that can be 
provided by the private sector should not be the domain of the 
state, but they can be seeded with state support that is willing to 
take some capital risks. State sponsorship for gaps in R&D, start 
up and venture funding should be carefully studied and expanded. 
 
 Given the massive, sustained upgrading needed over the next 
decade, an agency with the size, clout, inter-agency co-
ordination ability and resources of the EDB is needed to support 
SME upgrading and development of long-term industrial 
capability. This includes areas like much better access to 
financing, technology and business re-organisation, including 
relocation and marketing. Capital allowances for upgrading, 
industry-based technology and best management practice 
extension centres all need to be much better organised and 
resourced to meet the huge, secular upgrading effort that 
Singapore’s SMEs will face. 
 
Strengthen Safety Nets and Social Policy 
 
To help the increasing number of workers who will need to adapt to a 
complex and possibly uncertain employment market and the coming wave 
of baby-boomer retirees, Singapore ought to strengthen its social safety net, 
including adopting unemployment insurance and offering grants to poor 
retirees. It ought to reconsider its overall social policy, helping prevent a 
bulge in the ranks of the vulnerable as Singapore deals with technological 
change and globalisation. 
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Because the economy’s sector composition is likely to change more often in 
the future, structural unemployment may rise and cyclical unemployment 
could occur more frequently. Singapore could introduce a wage-insurance 
and unemployment-credit programme to give people breathing room to find 
a new job quickly in a new industry, thus enabling the labour market to 
become more flexible. Under this proposal, the government will help people 
tide over spates of unemployment by allowing those who have recently lost 
jobs to borrow from their CPF savings for three to six months and pay back 
to the CPF account after they have found new jobs.10 If the new salary is 
lower than the previous salary, a government organised insurance scheme 
could provide a subsidy for a limited time, encouraging people to accept new 
but lower-paying jobs more quickly. 
 
To help the groups that are likely to become vulnerable as the economy 
becomes more volatile and as the population ages, Singapore ought to 
expand and invest more money in social safety nets through supplements 
for income, retirement savings and health insurance. The study group further 
proposes that: 
 
 To raise incomes for the poor, the government could raise the 
Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) to two to three times the current 
level. The increased supplement will enable the working poor to earn 
a living wage for their families until labour productivity gradually 
enables companies to pay higher wages without losing 
competitiveness.11 The enhanced WIS needs to be complemented 
by tighter immigration to encourage companies to bid for scarce 
labour and set appropriate minimum wages for sectors to prevent 
employers from cutting wages due to the larger WIS payouts. 
 
 Given the vulnerability of the old and less educated, the government 
could help them meet retirement needs by giving means-tested 
inflation indexed grants to the poor (as Hong Kong practises) and by 
increasing the inflation-adjusted interest rate on CPF savings so that 
younger workers can improve retirement adequacy, and by 
increasing health and transport subsidies for the old. 
 
                                            
10 . For a discussion of proposed Unemployment Credit and Wage Insurance 
System as well as means-tested pension benefits for Singapore, see Yeoh et al 
(2010). 
11. The government introduced the WIS in 2007, which gives subsidies to workers 
with incomes below $1,700 a month to help them meet basic needs and build 
retirement savings. 
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 To help people cope with rising health and long-term care costs as 
the population ages, the government needs to expand MediShield by 
providing life coverage, not just till 85 years old; risk-pool across all 
age groups (not just within age-groups) to facilitate whole-life 
coverage and curb sharp rise in premium past 80 years old; cover 
services outside hospitals especially long term and chronic care; 
make such medical insurance mandatory for all to prevent adverse 
selection; and use the expanded WIS to subsidise premiums for the 
poor.12  
 
The government should also increase subsidies13 for public clinics so people 
prevent and control chronic illnesses; otherwise, people may skimp on 
preventive and early care, but spend more on late-stage treatment. 
Government spending on health, as a share of GDP, is much lower in 
Singapore than in other rich nations. This amounts to a shift towards more 
fully socially insured and better government funded universal insurance, 
which is needed as the population ages and dependency ratios plunge. 
Beyond targeted assistance, the government also ought to rethink its social 
policy framework, which assumes that rising incomes enables people to 
support themselves and their families. Besides recent laudable efforts to “de-
link” HDB built-to-order (BTO) prices from resale prices and reduce them by 
over 30% in non-core estates, subsidised rental flats need to be made more 
freely available (as in Hong Kong). Such broader social investments will help 
prevent a bulge in the ranks of the vulnerable as the population ages and as 
economic change quickens.  
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CHAPTER 4: LAND AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
4.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 
  
With the objective of formulating appropriate recommendations for short and 
long-range planning and development policies in Singapore, this chapter 
considers the following issues in the context of Singapore’s demographic 
trends arising from IPS’ population projections: 
 
 The impacts of different demographic scenarios on land use and physical 
environment 
 The current thinking and potential strategic responses in relation to land 
use, transport, green and open spaces, housing and related issues  
 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Carrying Capacity 
The concept of carrying capacity is well established in the biological 
sciences, and is usually defined as the maximum population of a given 
species that can be supported indefinitely in a defined habitat without 
permanently impairing the productivity of that habitat (Rees and 
Wackernagel 1996). It is known that certain species or populations will 
perish if the conditions that support their survival such as food and water are 
depleted as a result of over-grazing, or if the conditions are degraded to the 
extent that they can no longer support the essential functions of food and 
habitat. 
 
However, the applicability of this concept to human settlements has been 
widely debated. Scholars have observed that people seem to be capable of 
continuously increasing the carrying capacity of their resources by importing 
locally scarce resources and through technology, and there is a notion 
amongst some economists and planners that carrying capacity can be 
indefinitely expandable and is therefore irrelevant (Daly 1986). Ecologists, 
however, have also argued that despite technological advancement, 
humankind remains in a state of “obligate dependence” on the productivity 
and life support services of the ecosphere (Rees 1992). From an ecological 
perspective, adequate land and associated productive natural capital are still 
regarded as fundamental and could limit the prospects for continued civilised 
existence on earth (Rees 1996).  
 
The general understanding today is that carrying capacity is not necessarily 
determined by natural constraints and local resources alone but also 
contingent on a dynamic range of interactions with geo-politics, consumption 
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patterns, adaptive capabilities, international trade and technologies,1 and 
innovations. Ultimately, it is contingent on the choices people make for the 
future and the trade-offs they are prepared to accept.  
 
In the context of this study that focuses on land as a key resource, this 
chapter seeks to examine the choices that are available to support adaptive 
responses that could stretch a country’s carrying capacity. The discussion 
should contribute to the consideration of potential social and economic 
trajectories associated with different scenarios of population increase and 
urban change for the immediate and longer-term future. 
 
Historical Trends on Population and Land 
Since the 1960s, the population of Singapore has grown more than three 
times to 5,183,700 in 2011. GDP has expanded 14 times (Singapore 
Statistics 2010, at 2005 market prices). To support such population and 
economic growth, land needed for various social and economic functions 
related to urban expansion has been increasing year to year. From Figure 
4.1, it can be seen that the period from 1970 to 2000 was a phase of 
intensive urban development, and the rate of increase of built-up areas 
outstripped the population growth rate. Since then, the extent of built-up 
areas has been increasing at almost the same rate as population growth. 
 
Figure 4.1. Land consumption and population growth (1960–2010) 
 
Source: Computed from Singapore Yearbook of Statistics (various years) 
                                            
1. Trade and technology are often cited as reasons for rejecting the concept of 
human carrying capacity as free trade is considered to be invariably good, resulting 
in improved living standards and increased aggregate productivity and efficiency, 
and overall, increased carrying capacity, through comparative advantage (Rees 
1996). 
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As the demand for land increased, Singapore’s land area has been 
continuously augmented through coastal reclamation. In 2011, total land 
area stands at 714.3 sq km. However, there are geo-political and 
technological limits to further future reclamation. In the Concept Plan Review 
of 1991, the ultimate land area has been projected to be 759 sq km. This 
figure has since been revised upwards. 
 
Figure 4.2 summarises the land consumption pattern in the last 40 years. 
Land-take per person has increased gradually since 1960, peaking in the 
1980s. Since then, average land consumption rate has been on a downward 
trend, coming down from the peak of 132 sq m per person in 1985 to 80 sq 
m per person in 2000. This downward trend is quite remarkable, considering 
that Singapore’s annual GDP growth rate over the past decades has been 
on a steady upward trend, averaging 8% yearly. It shows that planners have 
been extremely stringent in managing land, and their efforts to optimise land 
use would seem to have borne fruit. The questions we ask are: Can this 
downward trend be sustained in the coming years with continued population 
pressures and new economic demands? What would be a sustainable land 
consumption pattern? How much of land should be conserved for future 
generation?  
 
Figure 4.2. Land consumption pattern in Singapore (1960–2000) 
 
Source: Computed from Singapore Yearbook of Statistics (various years) 
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Population Density 
The conscious effort to conserve land is also apparent in the changes in 
urban densities. Since the 1960s, gross population density2 for the city-state 
has gradually increased, doubling from 3,000 persons per sq km to 7,257 
persons per sq km today (Figure 4.3). More significantly, net urban density 
(i.e., population in the built-up area) has also been on a somewhat steeper 
upward climb, from its lowest point of 9,000 persons per sq km in 1980, to 
around 12,400 persons per sq km today. This trend is also a manifestation 
of a guarded attitude towards land consumption on the part of government 
planners in the face of a growing economy and population.  
 
Figure 4.3. Population densities (1960–2000) 
 
Source: Computed from Singapore Yearbook of Statistics, various years 
  
Land Use Change 
The shift in land use pattern over the years as a response to development 
activities is largely in the nature of more land for urban activities and less for 
farming and related purposes. In 1960, Singapore had about 24% of its 581 
sq km of land in agriculture and farming use, and this has gradually whittled 
down to a negligible amount of today (Figure 4.4). In the year 2000, built-up 
                                            
2. We define gross density as the total population over the total land area; while net 
density is the total population over the built-up land area. 
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or developed land was computed to be about 48% of the total land area of 
682 sq km. For today’s population of 5.2 million, if we assume the land 
consumption rate of 80.4 sq m per person from 2000 (as shown in Figure 
4.3) and that the net density remains steady, the amount of built-up or 
developed land as a proportion of total land is estimated to be around 60% 
or slightly more. If we project this linearly to a future population of 6.5 million, 
the proportion of built-up area could be increased to around 70% or more. 
This would most likely be at the expense of land currently found in the 
category known as “others” (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4. Land use distribution and change 
 
Source: Compiled from Singapore Yearbook of Statistics (various years); 
figures for the last two columns are computed 
 
The category known as “others” (shown in light green in Figure 4.4) includes 
inland water areas, natural open spaces, cemeteries, land for special use, 
etc., which can be collectively regarded as the “greenfield” of Singapore. For 
the future, we need to ask if Singapore as a country can afford to have its 
greenfield further depleted. 
 
We surmise that it is neither desirable nor possible for Singapore to keep 
drawing down its greenfield areas for development activities. Singapore is a 
city and also a country. Therefore, the need for land would go beyond 
supporting conventional city functions for homes, jobs, mobility, recreation, 
etc., but also would have to include reservoirs and water catchment, military 
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training and defence installations as well as large-scale infrastructure such 
as airports and seaports and industries to diversify its economic base. Other 
cities such as Hong Kong, New York and London do not need to make these 
provisions. 
 
In the last few decades, there have been conscious efforts on the part of 
Singapore’s urban planners to conserve land, while maintaining the quality 
of the living environment. The strategies adopted are demonstrated in each 
review of the strategic Concept Plan.  
 
It is undeniable that the economic value of land is of paramount importance 
when making strategic plans. However, land that is not developed is also 
widely acknowledged as having potential to contribute to ecological services 
and other values. The size and proportion of undeveloped or less developed 
land can have a significant impact on the quality of the living environment in 
terms of its physical characteristics as well as the positive social, 
psychological and health-enhancing values it confers. Indeed, Singapore’s 
attractive cityscape and liveable environment today can in part be attributed 
to its large tracks of wooded areas, reservoir areas and vast open spaces 
that are interwoven into its urban landscapes. These qualities must not be 
compromised. 
 
Therefore, the important questions are: How would the country respond to 
the increasing pressure on land with anticipated population growth and 
expanded economic activities in the future without further depleting its green 
spaces? What are the options and trade-offs? If urban density were to be 
increased, how would this affect the living and working environments?  
 
4.3 ANALYSIS 
  
IPS’ population projections (Figure 1.2) present several scenarios of 
Singapore’s resident and total population through 2050. Assuming a net 
intake of 30,000 new citizens and permanent residents (PRs) per annum 
and various proportions of foreign-to-resident population, the IPS Population 
Projections indicate a total population size of between 6.1 and 7.3 million in 
2050, with “Scenario 2A” projecting a total population of 6.5 million in 2050 
(in which one in four persons is a non-PR foreigner).  
 
This presents many challenges, including land limitation; higher densities; 
an ageing population; a large pool of migrant workers who would require 
provision in terms of accommodation, transport, healthcare and other 
amenities; the need to maintain liveable living and working environments, 
nature and heritage conservation and open spaces, providing adequate 
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infrastructure, particularly improving the transport system, enhancing social 
amenities, and responding to changing aspirations.  
The recent “Our Singapore Conversation” series of discussions highlighted 
five major concerns of Singaporeans, namely, cost of living, healthcare, 
housing, education, elderly issues and social values (CNA 2013). These 
must be addressed, in addition to the important aspects of quality of life 
identified in the 2009 URA Lifestyle Survey, which included public transport 
facilities, food establishments, healthcare services, green spaces and 
educational facilities (URA 2010). 
 
The challenge for planners is to offer a range of responses to cater to the 
wide-ranging expectations and to define these in tangible spatial planning 
and land-use terms. While the current provisions of housing, education and 
open spaces are based on known typologies and tested planning standards, 
future responses would require more nuanced understanding and deeper 
appreciation, to provide finer differentiation of physical spaces that satisfies 
a more diverse population base, as well an expansion of social and 
intellectual spaces. This requires not only greater sensitivity to what people 
want, but, more importantly, an enlightened planning regime that is open to 
active participatory involvement of people who are affected.  
 
Housing and Density 
Today, over 80% of Singapore residents live in HDB apartments in well-
planned new towns. Considering the changing demographics, particularly in 
terms of the larger pool of ageing population and the more diverse population 
profile, what will be the model of the new town of the future? How would 
existing towns be retrofitted? What would be the projected space needs, in 
response to the various scenarios of the ageing living with their families 
(requiring large apartments); by themselves (requiring separate housing 
provisions); downsizing (moving to smaller apartments); sharing 
accommodation, etc. The challenge appears not to be only in terms of size, 
typologies and location, but also in understanding the values, preferences, 
expectations and social needs of this diverse population base.  
 
There are currently 23 HDB new towns in Singapore occupying 182 sq km, 
or about 26% of the total land area. The current average density in HDB new 
towns is about 17,000 persons per sq km, while the net average density 
(based on residential land within the HDB towns) is much higher at 43,000 
persons per sq km (figures based on HDB Annual Report 2010/2011). It is 
clear that while the gross density for Singapore was 7,257 persons per sq 
km in 2011 (according to the Department of Statistics’ Population Trends 
2012), and the net urban density (population in the built-up area) around 
12,400 persons per sq km today, the density within HDB new towns is a lot 
higher. Would the future additional population aggravate this unevenness in 
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density distribution? This has to be addressed, for it is usually these localised 
extremes of density that is the cause of residents’ perception of 
overcrowding and experiences of urban stress and unhappiness. 
 
Urban Greenery and Environment 
Urban spaces and parks are important social assets that can help mitigate 
many of the negative impacts of high-density living. They are also great 
social levellers, since they are available for all to use. Singapore currently 
enjoys a high level of quality urban space and greenery, and a major 
challenge is to maintain the amount, quality, type and distribution of these 
spaces. With future pressure on land, the prospects for large-scale increase 
in green areas relative to population growth would be very limited. The 
challenge is to look for new opportunities (apart from roofs, walls, car parks, 
etc.) and innovative greening typologies that are both aesthetically and 
ecologically appropriate, in the context of limited land and competing uses.  
 
The question of what type of “green” do Singaporeans really want would 
require further study as there seems to be a perception that “manicured” 
spaces that contribute little to ecological systems may not be adequate at 
all. There is now greater awareness of the more wide-ranging benefits such 
as scientific, educational, heritage, psychological and health-related values 
from having more natural areas. 
 
Increasingly, the rise of environmental activism would become a major 
challenge in decision-making. The question of how to effectively engage 
stakeholders’ interest without jeopardising the essential decision-making 
machinery in the country is going to be an important one.  
 
Urban Transport Planning 
Transport stress is one of the most aggravating of urban woes. Urban 
mobility is an important indicator of a city’s liveability, and the high economic, 
social and health-related costs of traffic congestion, delays, long waiting 
times and stoppages must be recognised.  
 
In Singapore, notwithstanding strong measures to deter car ownership, the 
total motor vehicle population has continued to rise. On the roads, the 
number of vehicles in relation to road length has also increased, and the 
intense competition for road space where private vehicle users are pitched 
against buses, taxis, cyclists and other road users has become all too 
apparent. In the past, large-scale investment in road expansion projects may 
have helped to moderate the vehicle density, but with road space already 
taking up around 12% of the land area in the city-state, can continued 
infrastructure expansion be sustained in the future? A related question is 
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whether we should devote limited land resources to provide better mobility 
that benefit mainly the car-owning segment of the population.  
 
With a close to 60:40 modal split between public and private transport usage, 
Singapore is already a society dependent on public transport. Public 
transport patronage has continued to increase despite relatively long 
travelling times. In the last 16 years, the average daily ridership of 
Singapore’s Mass Rail Transit (MRT) has increased at a compound annual 
growth rate of more than 7%. In future, the travel demand will continue to 
grow, and much of this would have to be met by augmentation of the public 
transport system. However, rail system investments are capital-intensive 
undertakings and have a long gestation period; other alternative and 
appropriate solutions must be explored.  
 
4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Prior to the release of the 2013 Population White Paper, three discussion 
sessions were held to consider the above issues and challenges. The 
discussion group focused its attention on the land and environment aspects 
of population growth. It noted the importance of keeping options opened 
since mistakes made on hardware issues would be difficult to correct and 
could be a blight on Singapore’s urban landscape for a long time to come.  
 
Integrated solutions that do not rely solely on physical planning would be 
necessary. Since land as a resource is in fixed supply, we need to look for 
ways to achieve economic objectives that have least land requirements. 
Although we envisage that Singapore’s economy would move to become 
more service-oriented, it cannot be denied that manufacturing would still be 
a crucial component of the economy. The manufacturing sector’s land 
consumption patterns can and should be changed with advancement in 
technology. Concurrently, the economy must be developed increasingly 
through creative talents, innovative methods and a highly productive 
workforce, with a focus on high value-added industries.  
 
Parallel attention is needed to address both the supply and demand side of 
land requirements for a growing population. On the supply side, we envisage 
a multi-prong approach to explore all possible ways to expand sea, air and 
underground spaces.  
 
Expanding Land Capacity 
The potential total area of Singapore is 1,385 sq km including its sea space 
of 680 sq km. There have already been various research on floating offshore 
developments, which include floating platforms for military purposes, floating 
shipping container terminal, floating green cities (such as one 
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conceptualised by the Japanese), etc. These ideas should be further studied, 
particularly for land uses such as large-scale storage and other uses that 
require less permanent infrastructure (the floating platform at Marina Bay is 
a good example).  
 
With the proposed future relocation of the Tanjong Pagar, Keppel and Brani 
container terminals to Tuas, substantial land would be freed up, and this 
southern corridor must be developed as intensively as possible to optimise 
the current infrastructure, complement the downtown commercial and 
residential development, and most importantly, lift the development pressure 
from the rest of the island.  
 
The present five military airbases in Singapore, which take up substantial 
land and impose constraints for optimising surrounding land uses (due to the 
requirements of flight safety), should be reviewed. By 2050, at least one of 
them — potentially, the Paya Lebar Airbase — should be discontinued and 
its operations consolidated with the other airbases, so that substantial land 
can be freed up for other purposes.  
 
Underground space should be used wherever feasible to free up surface 
land. The rock structures in various parts of the island support deep cavern 
excavation. Where cost and other constraints can be overcome, land uses 
such as factories, warehouses, roads and other infrastructure should go 
underground. Localised flooding problems could potentially be addressed 
with underground drains and large-scale water storage facilities. 
 
High-density Housing 
High density does not necessarily mean poor environment if we have a good 
understanding of physical and environmental impacts and have good design 
solutions. It is important not to look only at gross density across the whole 
island, but instead look at the distribution of net density particularly within 
new towns. If we were to continue to introduce additional housing into 
existing new towns through en bloc redevelopment, the resultant net density 
could be very high and would put a strain on existing infrastructure. A more 
even spread of moderately high density would be desirable, and only areas 
with very good accessibility, such as those near MRT stations, should be 
built to exceptionally high densities.  
 
There would be sufficient land for housing in the future, but we need to 
manage the density well. High density is not good or bad in itself, but it must 
embrace good synergy of land uses, have well-conceived urban design and 
enhance accessibility to amenities and jobs. The perception of 
“crowdedness” in a city like Tokyo could be very different from Singapore as 
the residential areas there are designed to be walkable with safe narrow 
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streets. Creative and “happy” design could help to ease the feeling of 
crowdedness.  
 
Good design must promote civic qualities and community integration. High 
density can be mitigated with well-designed housing units of good internal 
layouts and attractive design, adequate size and if possible, adequate 
external views, natural day lighting and ventilation. In rethinking housing 
design, we can look for fairly liveable building forms and typologies such as 
those in Paris or Prague, where the building heights are lower but overall 
density still high. They are well integrated and functional.  
 
Juxtaposition of public and private housing is desirable for better social 
integration. Bishan is a good example. Educational and community facilities 
can be the integrative elements. One idea to bring vibrancy into towns is 
through careful insertion of educational facilities as the “central nervous 
system” of towns, so that all towns are “school towns”3 and hooked into 
community network. The new urban form must be supported by a new local 
economy, potentially centred on learning and its associated functions. 
 
Given the rapidly ageing population, public housing must provide for the 
older population with smaller housing units, to promote ageing-in-place. To 
prepare for the future, there could be built-in flexibility and modularity for 
reconfiguring HDB apartments into smaller units for smaller households. 
Larger units are still needed for young families in newer towns. The HDB 
could also consider bringing back Multi-Generation Flats (1987) which are 
4/5-room flats with adjoining studio apartments; a shared foyer that leads to 
the studio unit and the standard unit, and Granny Flats (1991) which are a 
mix of both studio and standard units in the same block of flats, providing 
privacy comparable to the dual key concept in private housing. 
  
We need to explore new planning and design models of new towns to ensure 
that they are elderly-friendly. The essential services and amenities must be 
in close proximity to support residents’ daily needs; their design and 
distribution should be planned primarily on principles of accessibility and 
convenience. Where appropriate, public amenities should not be age 
differentiated (e.g., old-age corners) to allow for greater social interaction 
and development of a sense of community.  
 
 
Transient Population 
The issue of housing supply for the transient population must be addressed. 
Given the projected high proportion of foreign workers, the demand for 
                                            
3. Drawing upon the concept of “university towns”. 
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housing of this group should be an integral part of housing development 
planning for the future. Early planning is important to avoid a situation where 
such housing is perceived as an intrusion into existing housing environments, 
giving rise to residents’ unhappiness (as was seen in the Serangoon 
Gardens case). 
 
Table 4.1. Potential housing needs of Singapore’s transient workers 
Transient 
population status 
Current 
proportion of 
transient 
groups (of total 
transient 
population)4 
Estimated 
number of 
transient 
workers5 
Proposal for 
housing supply 
Employment pass 
holders (EPs) 
12% 300,000 Rented private or 
HDB apartments 
S pass holders 9% 225,000 Shared 
accommodation 
or rented rooms 
in HDB 
apartments 
Work Permit holders 
(excl. Foreign 
Domestic Workers) 
46% 1,150,000 Dormitories or 
other forms of 
shared 
accommodation 
Foreign Domestic 
Workers 
13% 325,000 Housed with 
employers 
Long term social 
visit pass holders 
(as dependents of 
PRs, EPs, SP) 
15% 375,000 Rented rooms in 
HDB apartments 
Students 6% 150000 Hostels or rented 
rooms in HDB 
apartments 
Source of percentages: Population White Paper 2013 (figures are 
calculated) 
 
Table 4.1 above estimates the potential housing needs of various groups of 
transient workers, and suggests that there is a need to include projections 
for workers’ dormitories, hostels as well as additional apartments (HDB and 
private) for these in future land-use plans. Their distribution and locations 
                                            
4. Source of percentages: Population White Paper 2013. 
5. These estimated numbers are calculated based on current proportion (column 2) 
of the projected 2.5 million transient population by 2030 according to the Population 
White Paper 2013, assuming that the proportion remains the same as present. 
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must be carefully considered as part of the planning process, and judicious 
integration into existing housing estates is recommended.  
 
Transport 
Planning for transport must be integrated with other land uses such as 
schools, hospitals, etc., as well as employment places. The concept of 
“decentralised concentration” is suggested as a better model as it means 
better distribution of dense urban nodes and compactness across the island. 
It would promote better accessibility and less travel.  
 
Transport by car takes up not just road space but also requires parking and 
related spaces. Given limited road space, the more people use cars, the 
slower would be bus and car trips, and the greater would be the congestion 
impact on other road users such as cyclists and pedestrians. We need a 
multi-mode response to entice private car users to switch to public transport, 
and for this, immediate and long-term planning should include planning of 
the bus networks, light rail and even PRTs (Personal Rapid Transport) 
systems. For shorter trips, non-motorised transport, such as bicycles and 
walking should be encouraged with provision for safety, appropriate 
amenities and convenience. 
 
Transport policies and trends impact the liveability of the city. We should 
consider what is needed to get people back to streets, which must be safe 
and conducive for walking. Liveable streets are those like Little India and 
Geylang Serai, where the co-existence of traffic and pedestrians is seen as 
a norm rather than a conflict. Selectively decreasing traffic speed in these 
and other local areas would improve their environments and promote 
walking.  
 
With the use of technology, it is possible to provide real-time information on 
traffic conditions, and thus influence travel patterns during peak hours. 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) must be harnessed as 
they can have a real impact on transport demand and mobility by influencing 
their volume and distribution in time and space. 
  
In the URA Lifestyle Survey 2009, it was also reported that 23% of 
Singaporeans have telecommuted or worked from home before, with “73% 
of them having done so at least once a week”. To promote more tele-working 
or flexi-working, government employers could take the lead. There should 
be strong support for schemes and incentives for off-peak commuting and 
carpooling. 
 
Today, land for transportation infrastructure makes up 12% of total land use, 
the bulk of which is taken up by expressways and arterial roads. In the future, 
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there would be new and different modes of transportation and different 
modes of working such that the need for land space to support mobility would 
be very different. The questions of how we would commute, what 
technologies are available, and indeed, why we have to commute are 
important considerations. For the present, greater land-use and transport 
integration (e.g., more mixed uses) as well as flexible work arrangements 
(why do we need to move “from one computer terminal to another”?) would 
be the key to improving the current conditions. These are preferred solutions 
than building more infrastructures since space is a constraint. 
 
Open Spaces, Urban Greenery and Heritage Sites 
As Singapore’s population and economy grows, there will be greater 
pressure to draw upon land that is currently not developed. Singaporeans 
do have a deep desire for keeping greenery and we need to take strong 
measures to protect nature reserves, parks, open spaces and heritage areas. 
Those that are not currently protected must be accorded legal protection.  
 
One of the key concerns highlighted in the recent “Our Singapore 
Conversation” exercise is the unequivocal call for more citizen consultation 
on issues of public interest, including the conservation of heritage and green 
spaces. However, consultation is a two-way process. Where stakeholders 
are involved in decision-making, they must be open to alternatives and 
trade-offs. In some instances, to protect nature areas could imply higher 
development density in certain areas or maybe even less road space or 
longer travel time.  
 
Instituting environmental impact assessments, whether formally or 
informally, would be a positive step forward to empower the people with the 
information or basis for decision-making, and provide a common ground for 
public engagement in the policymaking process. We need a combination of 
top-down and bottom-up approaches in planning for nature areas. 
Consulting the public at an early stage will provide greater opportunity for 
dialogue and allow time for responding to people’s concerns as well as better 
understanding of government decisions. 
 
Golf courses take up much land that could be used for other purposes. 
Moreover, they are generally not open to the general public. A survey by the 
Nature Society has shown that only 3% of Singaporeans support golf 
courses. Although golf courses are currently said to be built mainly in areas 
with height restrictions or as part of reservoir catchments, it will still be 
necessary to review their numbers relative to population and land size, and 
to consider potential alternative uses such as low-rise development, “clean” 
storage, etc. 
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Green spaces must increasingly become more multi-functional, such as 
integrating with educational facilities and community uses. We should also 
consider their ecological values. Better use of resources should be made, 
such as the now disused railway corridor, which presents opportunities for 
recreational, educational, community and a host of other co-located 
functions.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This report is only able to consider a limited number of areas relating land 
and environment in the context of the demographic trends highlighted in IPS’ 
population projections for 2050. Nonetheless, it hopes to have highlighted 
the key areas of public interest and pointed to areas for potential review by 
policymakers. 
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CHAPTER 5: MARRIAGE AND CHILD-BEARING 
 
5.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
This chapter considers the impact of existing incentives and policies to 
encourage marriage and child-birth, and other direct and indirect ways to 
raise the total fertility rate (TFR).1 
 
5.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Singapore's resident TFR has been below the replacement level (generally 
considered to be about 2.1) since 1977. Together with Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, Singapore ranks amongst countries in the world 
with the lowest fertility rates.  
 
The TFR has remained ultra-low despite Singapore’s pro-natalist policy 
stance, adopted since 1987. Marriage and Parenthood packages 
announced by the government in 2001, 2004, 2008 and again in 2013 
include financial incentives such as baby bonuses and parenthood tax 
rebates, and various forms of support for parents to balance work 
commitments with their family. 
 
As reported in Population in Brief 2011,2 the primary causes of ultra-low 
fertility in Singapore arise from various contributing and inter-related factors, 
including: 
 
 More people remaining single 
 More people getting married later in life 
 More people having children later in life, and having fewer children 
or no children at all 
 
Figure 5.1 shows how age-specific female marriage rates have changed 
over the past four decades since 1980. Overall marriage rates have declined 
over time for all age groups, but most sharply among females in the 20–29 
age group, with only a modest rise recorded in 2010 for females in the 30–
34 age group. This is confirmed by the steadily rising average age at first 
marriage (Figure 5.2). In 2010, for males, age at first marriage had risen to 
30 years from 28 years in 1990. For females, this figure had increased to 
27.7 years from 25.3 in 1990. 
                                            
1. The average number of children a woman would bear over the course of her 
lifetime if current age-specific fertility rates remained constant throughout her child-
bearing years (normally between the ages of 15 and 49). 
2. National Population and Talent Division, Prime Minister’s Office. 
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Figure 5.1. Age-specific female marriage rates, 1980–2010 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Population Trends 2011 
 
Figure 5.2. Median age at first marriage for males and females, 1980–
2010 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Population Trends 2011 
 
Singlehood rates for women and men in their late 30s have remained quite 
steady at relatively high levels since the 1990s (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1. Proportions of singles by age and sex (%) 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Age group Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
25–29 67 41 64 40 71 46 75 54 
30–34 34 20 31 20 34 22 37 25 
35–39 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 17 
40–44 12 13 15 14 15 14 15 14 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Population Trends 2011 and 
2006  
 
Table 5.2. Proportion of singles by age, sex and educational attainment 
(%) 
Age Below Secondary Secondary Post-secondary University 
Group 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Males         
20–24 88 89 92 93 96 97 96 99 
25–29 62 64 58 64 70 72 69 76 
30–34 40 39 29 38 28 39 28 38 
35–39 28 29 18 25 15 23 13 19 
40–44 21 23 14 18 9 16 7 12 
         
Females         
20–24 53 55 71 73 86 88 91 93 
25–29 21 23 30 35 43 45 54 55 
30–34 13 13 17 18 23 24 27 28 
35–39 10 9 14 13 20 17 23 19 
40–44 9 9 15 12 20 14 22 17 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Population in Brief 2011 and 
2006 reports 
 
Age-specific fertility rates show a similar trend as with marriage rates, with 
fertility rates for women in the peak child-bearing ages (the 20–34 age 
groups) declining significantly over the past four decades. The median age 
at first birth for citizen mothers has increased by 1.2 years over the past 10 
years, and the number of higher order births, especially second and third 
order births have declined.  
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FACTORS INFLUENCING MARRIAGE  
 
The decline in marriage rates across East Asian countries does not mean 
that there is little interest among young adults in the region to tie the knot. 
Polls regularly show that marriage is an important goal in all these societies 
where 80 to 90% of those surveyed indicate such an opinion (Chan 2001; 
Kaneko et al. 2008; Lee 2006; Quah 2009). The most recent large-scale 
government survey in Singapore of singles shows that 84% are interested 
in marriage whilst the latest Perceptions of Policies in Singapore survey 
conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies showed that of 2,000 
Singaporean singles aged 21–39 years studied, 69% were definitely 
desirous of marriage (IPS 2013). 
 
The disjuncture between desire and actual marriage is based on a variety of 
reasons, many which arise from the complex interplay between 
empowerment of women, restructuring of work in the modern economy and 
the change in marriage ideology. 
 
Economics of Marriage and Household Formation 
Quah (2009) notes that countries that scored higher on the United Nations’ 
Human Development Index (HDI) were also more likely to be those that have 
higher ages at first marriage. She suggests that the socio-economic factors 
represented in the HDI play an important role in the timing of first marriage. 
Countries that have high HDI scores offer more and higher quality technical 
and tertiary education opportunities to their young people, which in turn lead 
to greater employment options. They may thus postpone marriage in favour 
of career advancement. Although marriage is still a crucial personal life goal 
as attested by many attitudinal surveys on marriage (Koh 2011; MCYS 2004 
and 2007), completing tertiary education, getting onto a fast-track career 
path and having enough savings to purchase a home have become 
important pre-marriage milestones. Young people are essentially serious 
about marriage decisions and think carefully about the responsibilities that 
are part of such a commitment.  
 
Rising costs associated with the marriage ceremony, housing and raising 
children have also been cited as reasons for delaying marriage or staying 
single. Jones (2011) finds that economic stability is considered a pre-
condition of marriage, and traditional gender-role expectations of men as 
providers and women as homemakers tend to cause single women to be 
increasingly cautious about marrying a man with poor earnings prospects. 
Economic activity is considered crucial in Singapore for material as well as 
emotional well-being, and so women are similarly motivated to pursue career 
success as their male partners, rather than engage purely in domestic duties. 
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This then means that both genders are inordinately focused on work 
concerns, often leaving the concerns for family formation to “another day”. 
 
Homogamy or Distortions in the Marriage Market 
Jones (2011) points to a “marriage squeeze” in Singapore for less educated 
men and better educated women, resulting from increases in the number of 
women completing upper secondary and tertiary education coupled with 
conventions about educational differences between spouses and 
appropriate marital partners. In general, Singaporean men tend to marry a 
woman with lower education and lower income than themselves. Tertiary-
educated women prefer to marry those with similar educational qualifications. 
This effect has resulted in a sizeable proportion of singles amongst the most 
highly educated women and lowest-educated men (Table 5.2).  
 
New Ideals of Marriage 
Expectations of marriage have also shifted from a pragmatic perspective of 
economic exchange to one that is embedded in ideals of romantic love, 
companionship and commitment (see Amato et al. 2007; Cherlin 2004; 
Coontz 2004; Gillis 2004). While most of the literature demonstrating this 
shift has been based on the realities of Western population, Singaporean 
scholars similarly highlight this trend (Straughan, 2011, Quah, 2009). The 
new ideals of marriage seek to provide self-fulfilment. Individual needs are 
increasingly the focus of a social institution that has traditionally favoured 
family commitments. The search for the perfect partner in the new ideal of 
marriage is a time-consuming and challenging activity, which causes many 
to delay marriage, sometimes indefinitely (Straughan 2011).  
 
The rise in the number of singles in the population also reduces the social 
pressure to get married. Straughan (2011) highlighted the view of many 
singles that they did not perceive any pressure to get married as there were 
many singles within their social networks. Kotkin et al. (2012) have noted 
that the growing number of singles in society could form a powerful social 
trend. Since singles are more mobile — more willing to travel and relocate 
for work — and give more time and commitment to their work, they would 
become elites in society. The increasing norm of singlehood and its obvious 
material rewards and personal freedoms may create a cycle of behaviour 
that could diminish society’s perceptions towards marriage. 
 
FACTORS INFLUENCING MARITAL FERTILITY AND CHILD-BEARING 
 
Female Employment and Child-bearing 
Rising female employment is a commonly cited reason for the sharp decline 
in fertility to below-replacement levels in developed economies. This is 
especially so for Singapore where industrialisation was a strong motivator 
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for many females to continue their education and pursue labour market 
options (McDonald 2009; Yap 2009; Jones 2011).  
 
While female participation in the labour force increased, the lag in social 
provision of care translated to individuals facing difficulties on how to be a 
parent and walk the tightrope between work and care (McDowell et al. 2005; 
Teo 2013). Changes in the work sphere necessitate dynamic negotiations 
over the division of labour within the family, central to which is childcare 
(McDowell 2001; Sullivan 2000).  
 
Costs of starting a family, having a place to call their own, putting their 
careers on hold while they have a baby — these are some of the major 
deterrents to starting a family (Kye 2008; Onishi 2005). This is further 
exacerbated by “eroding job security”, “inflexible employment practices and 
a work culture that tends to be incompatible with family life” (Westley et al. 
2010, 6).  
 
Availability and Cost of Childcare 
The lack of childcare arrangements is seen as an important deterrent to 
having children. This is because the amount of time entailed in bringing up 
a child translates to work-family imbalance being a defining characteristic of 
parenthood for many (Tausig and Fenwick 2001).  
 
The burden of raising a child often falls disproportionately upon women, 
translating to possible resentment by mothers who have passed up 
opportunities in the work sphere (Ciscel et al. 2000; Cohen and Bianchi 1999; 
Hill et al. 2004). This is exacerbated by the fact that women who are used to 
structuring their own leisure time are now forced to commit valuable time 
and money to meet the physical and emotional needs of their offspring 
(Jones 2007, 465). While it is possible for women attempting to juggle both 
domestic and productive spheres to “outsource” childcare, cultural values 
often make this option undesirable. One way by which mothers attempt to 
balance the tensions that arise is to focus on the quality and not quantity of 
time given to their children. They also expect the availability of high-quality 
childcare where their child will be well nurtured and kept from any 
psychological or physical harm.  
 
Even with additional support, gender ideologies in East Asian societies 
burden women with ensuring that adequate care for their children is in place. 
The well-being and education of the child seems to be situated on the mother 
with considerably less effort placed on fathers. While there has been an 
interest in equalising the “second shift” between the genders, women 
continue to feel more responsible for domestic tasks. 
Intensification of Parenthood and the Sacred Child 
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Straughan (2011 and 2012) highlights the “ideology of the child” which 
prescribes intensive parenting commitment and the commodification of 
childhood. Exacerbated by strong societal pressures of raising the 
“successful” child in a highly meritocratic, exam-based education system, 
parents are determined to ensure the child receives a head-start in life, 
leading to a positional “arms race” amongst parents to invest in educational 
resources and enrichment classes that are considered necessary for the 
child’s success. Such intensive parenting commitment unsurprisingly 
reduces fertility rates as couples concentrate scarce resources on fewer 
children. 
 
Social Policy and Raising the TFR 
Raising the TFR is a challenge, not just for Singapore but for many 
developed countries globally. The experience of other developed countries 
seems to suggest that substantial effort has to be placed for a moderate 
change in fertility behaviour. Oftentimes, new tools are insufficient to effect 
this change; rather, a whole machinery needs to be in place. At the heart of 
such a machinery is the emphasis that the concerns of family are taken 
seriously and put on par with other important economic considerations. 
Social policies to improve fertility risks work best when they reduce the 
disadvantages that parenthood and having more children can have for any 
one family.  
 
5.3 ANALYSIS 
 
The study group for this chapter was of the opinion that the current measures 
laid out in the enhanced Marriage and Parenthood package announced in 
2013, while certainly helpful, did not address many of the underlying 
concerns that may have an effect on future fertility. 
 
Some group members did not believe that it was likely that the TFR would 
significantly rise in the years ahead. Worldwide trends indicate that the 
proportion of eligible singles entering into marriage will go down with 
increased educational attainment. Marriage, while still highly desirable, is no 
longer considered as a necessity in the pursuit of the good life since there 
are other alternatives for experiencing fulfilment in life. Considering the 
general aversion in Asian societies for out-of-wedlock births, it is unlikely that 
any major changes will occur to normalise parenthood outside the confines 
of marriage. Therefore it is to be expected that fertility will not increase 
substantially since an increasing proportion of singles are not likely to marry. 
 
A group member was also of the opinion that focusing on the TFR as a 
problem often resulted in policymakers finding “quick-fix” solutions to the 
supposed population problem. Often, these solutions do not address the 
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underlying reasons for why couples hesitate having children. Instead, if the 
low TFR could be seen as symptomatic of the concerns faced by younger 
generations of Singaporeans, more systemic changes could be initiated that 
may ultimately resolve the problem of the low TFR. 
 
Current Concerns that Act Against Increased Fertility 
Group members were in unanimous agreement that there were some 
realities in Singapore that would dampen young couples’ aspirations to 
consider marriage and parenthood. These factors did not work in a simple 
causal relationship. Rather they worked together to shape perceptions that 
starting a family in Singapore is a highly burdensome activity considering the 
many obligations that it imposes and the lack of easily available resources 
to make this task easier. These reasons are spelt out here. Although they 
have been part of public discourse for a while, they are worth repeating. 
 
Narrow Definitions of Success 
Currently success is conceptualised by excellent performance in academics 
and job achievements. This narrow definition of success ignores other 
equally important areas of success that individuals can experience. 
Parenting should increasingly become part of society’s conception of the 
successful individual and should be celebrated rather than left to the private 
realm.  
 
Pressures of the Educational System 
The current educational system with its many competitive exams early in the 
life of the student was a concern to all group members. The inability of 
children to enter into prestigious schools and pursue particular academic 
tracks weigh heavily on many parents’ minds because of how this failure is 
perceived to greatly impact children’s subsequent success.  
 
Parents, in their pursuit to ensure good outcomes for their children, feel 
pressured to devote substantial financial and time investment, failing which 
they fear that their children would not be adequately prepared for the rigours 
of competitive examinations and streaming systems. It is well known that 
much of the preoccupation in families with school-going children revolves 
around their children’s academic attainment, leaving substantially less time 
to experience the joys of family life.  
 
 
 
Human Resource Practice 
Group members noted the current emphasis placed on the individual’s early 
career phase in determining subsequent career potential. Workers who 
excel in the first few years of work are often fast-tracked and earmarked for 
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more senior positions. Such selection schemes mean that there is little 
chance for those who are not high performers early in their careers to 
subsequently gain access to more desirable career options. This human 
resource practice has the effect of deferring marriage plans among young 
adults so that they can concentrate on making career success. This probably 
accounts for why approximately 65% in the 25–29 age group remain 
unmarried, often postponing marriage to their 30s. Many young people want 
to ensure career stability before they form families. Women find it particularly 
challenging to exit temporarily from work for child-bearing, considering its 
impact on their career trajectory, especially if their line of work is not 
accommodating to work-life considerations. 
 
Lack of Family-friendly Work Culture 
Group members noted the lack of a family-friendly work culture in many 
business settings. This is apparent considering the difficulty Singaporeans 
seem to have in asking their employers for flexi-time arrangements; there is 
general concern about taking time off to attend to their children’s concerns 
or care for various exigencies in their families, which could be felt as 
signalling a lack of commitment to the job. A Happiness Survey3 conducted 
among 6,000 members of the NTUC labour movement in 2012 emphasises 
this fact with only about three in 10 of the respondents indicating that their 
employers were supportive of flexible work arrangements. Less than half of 
the respondents’ colleagues were perceived to be supportive if there were a 
need for such flexible time arrangements. In essence the survey showed 
that only half of the respondents felt that they spend enough time with their 
families. 
 
While the study showed that employees hoped for greater work-life balance, 
it also found that employers found it difficult to accommodate this desire for 
flexibility with current work practices. According to another study4 in 2013 by 
NTUC that obtained feedback from employers, the labour movement noted 
that although two-thirds of Singaporean employers have provision for flexible 
time arrangements, about half of them acknowledged that it was a challenge 
measuring their staff members’ performance when they took on such 
                                            
3. Summary of survey can be found at 
http://www.ntuc.org.sg/wps/portal/up2/home/ 
aboutntuc/newsroom/mediareleases/mediareleasesdetails?WCM_GLOBAL_CON
TEXT=/content_library/ntuc/home/about+ntuc/newsroom/media+releases/615c6c0
04ec3e226bdeabf093c42a226. 
4. Media statement on the study can be found at 
http://www.ntuc.org.sg/wps/portal/up2/home/ 
aboutntuc/newsroom/mediareleases/mediareleasesdetails?WCM_GLOBAL_CON
TEXT=/content_library/ntuc/home/about+ntuc/newsroom/media+releases/74302de
1-8c86-41d3-8075-1d182dc126e0. 
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arrangements. The absence of clear systems ultimately made such 
arrangements unfeasible especially when workers were concerned about 
the remuneration they would receive. 
 
High Cost of Living and Aspirations 
Group members noted the high cost of living in Singapore and the cost of 
raising children. An estimate of the direct costs of raising a child in Singapore 
by online magazine theAsianParent.com5 was around S$340,000, including 
medical fees incurred during pregnancy and delivery, infant care, childcare, 
enrichment activities, education costs from preschool to university level, 
basic food and shopping, without provisions for inflation. Other estimates 
place this figure at half a million dollars. Estimates vary based on social class 
– the type of enrichment activities, whether education was provided by public 
or private institutions and the expectations of vacations all have bearing on 
the final quantum of raising a child. Among young couples there is 
sometimes the concern that this cost will continue to rise. This then has an 
effect when they calculate their financial ability to marry and have children. 
In fact the recent Marriage and Parenthood Survey 20126 showed that single 
respondents placed financial constraints as the third most important reason 
why they were not married, after the reasons of not having met a suitable 
life partner and needing to commit to work and study responsibilities. When 
the same question was asked back in 2007, financial constraints were 
ranked as the fifth concern.  
 
Group members also noted the high costs associated with weddings and 
setting up a home. The security of a suitable home seems to be important 
for young couples as they make plans to have children. Costs of what are 
perceived as necessary for good quality childcare, healthcare and education 
have a strong bearing in the calculation of young couples before they embark 
on starting a family. 
 
What Could be Done? — The Limits and Utility of State Involvement 
Group members were divided about the extent to which the state should 
intervene in correcting the low TFR. 
Previous attempts by the state to aggressively promote marriage and 
parenthood through campaigns, such as “Romancing Singapore”, and the 
matchmaking initiatives of the Social Development Unit were not well 
received by the population. These initiatives, seen as overly paternalistic, 
                                            
5. See details at http://sg.theasianparent.com/the-price-tag-of-raising-a-child-in-
singapore/. 
6. National Population and Talent Division website at: 
http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/news/_ 
jcr_content/par_content/download_90/file.res/mp-study-2012-press-release.pdf. 
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were resisted by the young who did not want to cede greater control to state 
authorities for such intimate aspects of their lives.  
 
Group members believed that the approach adopted by the state in recent 
years where it performed an enabler function was more appropriate. 
Establishing generous funding schemes would allow the people and private 
sectors to champion marriage and family initiatives. Dating services, which 
currently are not well endorsed by the majority of singles because of their 
negative connotations, will greatly benefit from increased state support for 
businesses to re-brand and market such services. 
 
The state also has the ability to legislate or incentivise behaviour, particularly 
those of businesses. Considering the concerns of nearly half the single 
population, especially the issue of not having adequate time to date, it 
becomes imperative that the state embarks on further measures to ensure 
that young singles are given sufficient time to find suitable partners. One way 
could be to incentivise businesses to allow their singles time-off for 
networking sessions which allow them to get to know other singles who work 
in close proximity to their offices. Additional help of this kind is especially 
warranted for singles who have to perform shift work where opportunities for 
interacting with prospective partners is more difficult. 
 
Most study group members were of the opinion that if Singapore were to be 
a nation and not merely an economy, the state would have to assume a 
greater social welfare function. Group members however differed in their 
opinions about the extent to which a higher taxation regime was realistic. 
They also differed as to the extent to which children should be deemed a 
public good and therefore the target of greater state expenditure. 
 
Childcare and Healthcare Provisions 
Some study group members were of the opinion that universal high-quality 
childcare and healthcare should be provided since these are essential needs 
of families. Healthcare bills for childhood diseases can be exorbitant; while 
there are recent provisions for insurance schemes to cover congenital 
diseases, such coverage only extends to hospital treatment and not the 
many other health-related costs for child-related illnesses. If the state could 
make such provisions to reduce the risks to parents if their child falls ill, it 
may allay some fears that couples have about child-bearing and the potential 
risks. 
 
While most group members believed that high-quality childcare should be 
made available at minimum costs since this is a large proportion of the cost 
for young parents, others felt that more basic subsidised childcare should be 
provided. Basic childcare that ensures children are able to experience play 
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rather than be subjected to formal learning should be emphasised. Some 
were concerned that the preschool system is being modified to suit the 
current educational curriculum, which seems to expect that children would 
have gained literacy and numeracy skills prior to formal schooling. If the 
school system were to avoid such expectations, perhaps the majority of 
parents would be satisfied with basic childcare and preschool provision, 
which would ultimately reduce the cost of providing such services. 
 
Other suggestions about childcare provision are for the state to provide an 
allowance for parents who use baby-sitters, similar to the grants that parents 
receive when they place their children in childcare centres. Baby-sitters who 
provide such services can be trained and audited to ensure basic standards 
of care and safety in the living environment. Such schemes may in fact be 
suitable employment options for older workers or women with young children 
who choose not to return to the labour force. 
 
One group member felt that in addition to universal childcare, universal 
eldercare should be provided. This was especially important for sandwiched 
families and would allow young parents to concentrate on their role in 
nurturing a future generation rather than be overly burdened with the task of 
elder care. 
 
Regulation of Work-life Balance 
Group members were unanimous on the state’s role in regulating 
businesses and ensuring work-life balance. Recommendations include 
legislating that businesses provide a well-considered response to their staff’s 
request for flexible work arrangements and incentivising companies that 
report greater use of work-life balance measures. Legislating the right for 
workers to ask for flexible arrangements may normalise such requests rather 
than the current situation where workers are concerned that such requests 
may be viewed negatively by management and colleagues. 
 
Promotion of Marriage, Parenthood and Family Life through Civil 
Society 
There was also the view among some group members that the government 
should empower more civil society agencies to champion the value of 
children and marriage, and engage in public education attempts to promote 
healthy marriages and families. Curbing unrealistic aspirations and 
expectations are important to ensure that young people do not form the 
mindset that raising children is financially burdening.  
Ensuring that sufficient programmes allow existing parents to better manage 
their many demands is also important as how they successfully navigate 
through the demands of parenting inform those not already having children 
to realise it is a manageable task.  
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Providing greater emphasis for premarital preparation programmes and 
other marital strengthening and enrichment endeavours will better allow 
couples to find lasting relationships, which in turn will encourage the 
unmarried to pursue marriage. 
 
Civil society groups could also find avenues for families to engage in 
common activities together. One such way was through sports clubs to 
which the entire family feels a sense of loyalty and thus a common bond. 
Voluntary welfare organisations and other cultural groups could similarly find 
activities that could get entire families joining together in support of a cause 
or activity. 
 
Non-discrimination of Child-bearing outside the confines of 
traditional marriage 
One group member believed it was important for the state to ensure that 
policies do not discriminate against single parents. This could increasingly 
be a reality especially with the anticipated progress in fertility treatments, 
which will allow greater ease in fertilisation and pregnancy. For the sake of 
the child, subsidies and benefits of equal levels should be provided to the 
parents and children from such family types. Closely related, another 
member felt that whether pregnancies that arise from cohabiting couples are 
given equal recognition compared to those from stable marriages will also 
affect fertility growth. Cohabitation, as a prelude to marriage is likely to rise 
as it has in many Western societies where pregnancies from such 
relationships account for a significant proportion of child-births. Other group 
members were concerned that policies should not be misread to condone 
the bearing and nurturing of children outside the traditional confines of a 
stable marital union since the stability accorded through marriage seemingly 
provided a better environment for child development.  
 
 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The study group proposes the following recommendations on the part of the 
government: 
 Continued review of educational policies to ensure that the demands of 
school work and examinations are not overwhelming; that parents do not 
feel that additional pressure to their children will be necessary for their 
future success.  
 Providing sufficient reassurance for parents that there are enough places 
at the university level for their children who qualify 
 Incentivising or legislating employers to ensure that flexible time 
arrangements are appropriately considered and, where there is a lack of 
      Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 
 
132 
 
expertise in terms of the feasibility, suitable consultants provide 
recommendation for such possibilities.  
 Provide incentives for companies that are able to obtain good outcomes 
in terms of their employees’ well-being through their implementation of 
work-life balance practices.  
 Create schemes for women who leave work for childcare reasons to re-
enter employment without losing too much of the value of their prior work 
experience. 
 Foster collaboration or assistance with funding by government agencies 
for businesses and other entities to organise events to allow greater 
mingling among singles to form possible relationships. 
 Offer greater financial support for dating agencies to re-brand online and 
other forms of matchmaking services 
 Ensure either universal access to or offering well-subsidised basic 
childcare services that are in line with a curriculum shift that does not 
emphasise academic achievement prior to formal learning. 
 Provide universal access or subsidised eldercare facilities so that young 
singles and couples do not have to be overly burdened by eldercare 
responsibilities. 
 Give increased support for public education by civil society organisations 
to curb unrealistic and unnecessary aspirations that people have about 
parenthood and marriage.  
 Offer support to civil society groups to find activities and causes that can 
unite the entire family so that family formation continues to be a 
meaningful pursuit. 
 Monitor regularly the cost of raising children and its affordability for 
average Singaporeans, and the results to be released regularly for public 
education purposes. 
 Enable robust discussions in and outside government on the place of 
parenthood outside marriage especially in view of the likelihood of 
breakthroughs in artificial reproductive technology. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
 
6.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
This chapter considers the following issues with the objective of making 
specific recommendations, within the context of building a sustainable and 
inclusive society, and given Singapore’s demographic trends arising from 
the IPS’ population projections: 
 
 Will Singapore’s public-private-people hybrid of social infrastructure 
systems come under increased stress with rapid population ageing 
and decline? 
 Can the goals of efficiency, equity, quality and sustainability be 
achieved in the systems? 
 What policies are necessary to attain an optimum balance in 
providing, financing and regulating healthcare, social and community 
services, and education? 
 
6.2 BACKGROUND  
 
The IPS Population Projections show that if the fertility rate in Singapore 
continues its ultra-low trend, Singapore’s rapidly ageing population will result 
in an old-age dependency ratio1 of 36.9 in 2050 (from the current level of 
13.0), if immigration is capped at 30,000 new residents per year (in Scenario 
2).  
 
Solving the problem of a stagnating and ageing population numerically by 
open immigration could bring with it new challenges, which include widening 
income and social inequalities and an eroding social fabric. These problems 
have already surfaced and are compounded by the problems of low 
productivity and inflation. Unless strategically resolved, these issues could 
become more acute in the next 40 years. 
 
Taking a demographic perspective as the starting point is important to 
ensuring Singapore’s sustainability as a nation, and not just as an economy. 
This demographic starting point puts the social (instead of economic) 
participation of citizenry at the centre of attention, and in turn the social 
infrastructure of the nation becomes crucial in building a sustainable society.  
 
Developmental welfare was used to describe the welfare systems in the East 
Asian economies, where strong social development in these countries 
                                            
1. Defined as the number of people aged 65 and above as a percentage of the 
number of people aged 15 to 64.  
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supports economic development (Goodman et al. 1998). In recent years, 
however, in the face of greater challenges in uplifting the vulnerable in 
society, South Korea and Taiwan have become more inclusive, for instance 
by greatly expanding social welfare through national health insurance and 
unemployment assistance.  
 
Singapore, by contrast, has in the past stuck mainly to the developmental 
welfare state model of emphasising economic development (Kwon 2007). 
As Singapore experiences the onset of social challenges that could unravel 
economic progress, social development will have to take greater priority, and 
as an end in itself instead of a means to meeting economic goals. Social 
safety nets and social services will have to be strengthened and expanded. 
By 2050, social well-being should match our status as a mature and 
developed nation.  
 
This report offers some suggestions and rationale for the way forward in 
developing a strong social infrastructure, which have been scoped into three 
main sectors: social and community services, education and health. In 
addition to projecting the social infrastructure needs of the population by 
demographic distribution, the report also makes recommendations for the 
reduction of social inequality and the fostering of social cohesion, in 
response to the challenges of rising inequality and social tensions. 
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6.3 SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 
 
6.3.1 Background  
 
Social and community services, or SCS, “takes care of the welfare of the 
aged and the disadvantaged, providing counselling and promoting 
volunteerism, helping to ensure social progress along with economic 
progress” (MSF 2009). The SCS sector in Singapore is a unique eco-system 
comprising a diverse mix of organisations (Cheng 2009). The system 
involves many parties including voluntary welfare organisations (VWOs), 
ethnic self-help groups, grassroots organisations and Community 
Development Centres (CDCs). These parties co-ordinate with one another 
in meeting the diverse needs of their charges, ranging from financial aid and 
employment services to family counselling and rehabilitation. While these 
are key players in social and community care, it must be noted that the larger 
eco-system comprises many more types of agencies; agencies such as 
social enterprises, corporate organisations with elements of social objectives, 
and religious organisations can be considered part of it.  
 
SCS run on the principles of self-reliance and “many helping hands”. These 
principles reflect the historical development of social and community care 
through mutual help systems, or gotong royong, among communities and 
clan associations. The principles have also been emphasised by the 
government in a non-welfare state so that individuals will rely on themselves 
and their families as the first line of support instead of on welfare aid. The 
principles also apply to VWOs, where these organisations are seldom fully 
funded by the government, but have to tap on various sources of funding 
including the Community Chest and the organisation’s own fundraising 
efforts. Based on these principles, the government partners with SCS by 
subsidising organisations and funding programmes that are delivered 
through VWOs and not by the government itself. The government assistance 
programmes provided through the CDCs are means-tested.  
 
The modus operandi of government support through highly subsidised social 
infrastructure and services is aligned with the developmental welfare state 
model typified by Goodman et al. (1998). Government investments in 
housing, healthcare and education build a social infrastructure that is 
conducive for foreign investments and economic development. Economic 
growth enables a hardworking workforce to be self-reliant but will be 
supported by many helping hands should one fall into hardship. Therefore, 
the SCS sector plays a secondary role to the primary objectives of economic 
development, to remediate where individuals whose needs are not met by 
the main system are served. Examples of such areas are special education 
and people with disabilities, as well as areas where negative consequences 
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of the primary systems need to be tackled, e.g., integration of a large pool of 
foreigners in view of an open immigration policy. 
 
6.3.2 Analysis 
 
Today, Singapore has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the 
developed world. The global challenges that have driven the inequality 
originate largely from depressed wages of the lower-educated and lower-
skilled. In such a climate, a liberal welfare model, a developmental welfare 
state, and the principles of self-reliance and “many helping hands” need 
serious rethinking, as they may serve to exacerbate rather than ameliorate 
the problems of stagnating wages and widening inequality. Self-reliance 
depends on the availability of and access to jobs and earnings, which have 
a direct bearing on one’s ability to be self-reliant. This ability is greatly 
challenged in the current global context.  
 
In the last seven years, Singapore has greatly expanded welfare provision. 
A range of workfare programmes were introduced, e.g., the Workfare 
Income Supplement, Work Support Programme and other ComCare 
assistance, and existing financial assistance programmes expanded. 
Government budget for SCS has also been increasing from year to year. 
However, Singapore’s safety net system remains largely residual in nature, 
with FY2011 public spending on social sectors (i.e., healthcare, education, 
community and family services and employment) representing 5.5% of GDP 
in 2011, compared with the OECD average of 22% in that year.2 
 
One major economic inefficiency resulting from the non-profit nature of SCS 
is market failure. SCS depend on third-party funding. Therefore, the invisible 
hand of the price mechanism that results in the matching of demand and 
supply is absent. With SCS serving largely a clientele with limited means, 
clients are not able to signal demand by their willingness to pay. Outcomes 
in SCS are also hard to measure, unlike in commercial products where 
outcomes translate into profits. Funding does not respond directly to client 
needs or outcomes, but to what appeals to funders. As a result, SCS are 
generally under-resourced, and inequity in resource allocation is inevitable 
(Cheng 2009; Ng and Sim 2012). 
                                            
2. Singapore’s public spending on social services is computed from the government 
budget allocations for the Ministries of Education (MOE), Health (MOH), the then 
Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports (MCYS) and Manpower (MOM) for 
FY2011, and compared with nominal GDP of S$326.8 billion in 2011. OECD public 
social expenditure data is from OECD 2012 paper on “Social spending after the 
crisis” (OECD 2012), including public expenditure on four broad social policy areas, 
i.e., pensions, income support to the working-age population, health and other social 
services such as spending on active labour market programmes. 
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The diverse types of organisations in the eco-system of the SCS sector also 
make co-ordination difficult. Further, with the belief in many helping hands 
and a residual approach to assistance, needy families have to apply to 
individual programmes to show that they deserve that particular type of 
service. For example, a branch of CDCs disburses the government financial 
assistance schemes under Ministry of Social and Family Development 
(MSF).3 Employment assistance is handled by another branch in CDCs 
funded by the Ministry of Manpower, counselling and case management by 
Family Service Centres (FSCs), and financial and social assistance related 
to medical services by hospitals and the Ministry of Health. There are also 
other financial assistance schemes provided by different agencies, e.g., the 
ethnic self-help groups and FSCs, which can be accessed either in addition 
to government assistance or when families do not qualify for government 
assistance. The upside is a range of programmes available, but the 
downside is inefficiency, with overlapping services in some situations and 
gaps in others. To some extent, inefficiency is inevitable in this sector, but to 
a large extent inefficiency can be reduced by rethinking the philosophical 
underpinning of social and community care. 
 
Besides inefficiency, the current “many helping hands” (MHH) approach 
inadequately addresses the multiple challenges faced by modern families in 
an increasingly complex and interconnected world. A plethora of separate 
and independent programmes does not gel with the reality that the family is 
one entity experiencing different types of needs simultaneously and in 
interaction. Therefore, the different challenges faced by a family unit need to 
be dealt with holistically through increased integration and merger of 
services.  
 
While a referral system is in place, the onus ultimately lies in the 
resourcefulness (and self-reliance) of individual families to go to different 
agencies and apply for assistance, often an undignified process for the 
beneficiary. The government has embarked on a whole-of-government 
approach to service delivery, an important step to enable applicants to reach 
the required services no matter which point of entry they start off with. It 
remains to be seen whether the this approach and the introduction of Social 
                                            
3. Most ComCare functions will be taken over by Social Service Offices (SSOs) to 
be distributed throughout Housing and Development Board (HDB) towns (source:  
MSF Press Release 14 March 2013 on “Social Service Offices to be set up in HDB 
towns to strengthen delivery of social services to needy Singaporeans”: 
http://app.msf.gov.sg/PressRoom/SocialServiceOfficestobesetupinHDBtowns.aspx
#sthash.UFUORvO2.dpuf).  
      Population Outcomes: Singapore 2050 
 
142 
 
Service Offices (SSOs) will result in real integration of services, but moving 
forward, greater integration of services is required.  
 
The potentially acute manpower shortage in this sector therefore needs to 
be urgently addressed. Disparities are evident between well-resourced and 
not-so-well resourced VWOs in the ability to hire and retain staff. Low pay 
persists in this sector despite acute manpower shortage. Efforts towards 
improving the image and professionalism of the sector have begun with 
social workers, where the MSF has introduced salary revisions, accreditation 
and professional development schemes. However, the initiatives have so far 
helped to reduce the gap between salaries of social workers and other 
professionals while still keeping social workers’ salaries at the bottom among 
professionals in non-social service sector jobs (Ng and Sim 2012). The 
initiatives have also resulted in disparity between social workers and other 
social service professionals.  
 
Following worldwide trends, Singapore has also adopted outcomes 
management and strengthened regulation to address “market failure” 
problems:  
 
 Many funders require proposals stating intended outcomes that act as 
key performance indicators on which continued funding is contingent. 
The National Council of Social Service (NCSS), an umbrella body with 
oversight of the majority of VWOs, runs an Enhanced Programme 
Evaluation System (EPES) for the VWOs under its jurisdiction.  
 
 For better accountability, funding has moved away from “block” funding 
to programme-based funding.  
 
 In 2007, the Charity Council introduced a code of governance, which 
serves as a guide for charities, on a comply-or-explain rather than a 
mandatory basis. The code provides a framework for how charities are 
to be run and also “helps charities to be more effective, transparent and 
accountable to their stakeholders” (Charity Council 2011).  
 
The role of the government in SCS can perhaps be described as invisible 
but very present. It does not provide services directly, but its subsidies, 
conditions and planned programmes mould how services are delivered and 
how agencies are run. Such centralisation provides for more efficient 
management of the sector, though not necessarily more efficient delivery of 
services. However, for an increasingly educated population in a developed 
nation that is contending with greater social challenges, such centralisation 
of power is too hierarchical and heavily concentrated on the central planner. 
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Overly centralised and bureaucratic government intervention may lead to 
“government failure” and other administrative problems. Examples include:4  
 
 Skewed incentives to meet key performance indicators, which at times 
compromise true welfare outcome, e.g., closing cases as an indicator. 
 
 Prescribed service models lack flexibility to respond to ground issues 
because changes must be top-down to tweak requirements, e.g., 
programme staffing ratios. 
 
 Programme funding on a per user basis increases uncertainty of funding 
compared to funding on head-count basis. 
 
 When policymakers provide programme funding with prescribed models 
and target populations, agencies tend to concentrate on issues and 
output which the policy funds, rather than actively and flexibly responding 
to changing needs on the ground.  
 
These specific processes will have to give way to more sophisticated 
regulatory and funding practices as Singapore becomes an advanced 
society. 
 
Related to the role of the government in SCS are the following 
considerations as well: 
 
 Muted role of private philanthropy in Singapore; 
 
 Real or perceived political links of certain SCS, e.g., the role of 
grassroots organisations and CDCs under the People’s Association; 
 
 Tensions in the various roles and functions of agencies, e.g., CDCs as 
community development agencies or as providers of financial assistance, 
grassroots organisations in responding to residents or their member of 
parliament (MP), and Family Service Centres focusing on remedial case 
work or on preventive/developmental community work.  
 
The SCS also suffer from a dearth of data for service planning. First, national 
social statistics are lacking, such as the number of people with disabilities 
and types of disabilities, and consistent crime trends reported by finer 
categories. VWOs that are supposedly experts working with vulnerable 
populations do not have information on trends to be able to respond 
effectively. There is thus a need for the government to set the direction on 
                                            
4. See Ng and Sim (2012) for a detailed analysis. 
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collecting, analysing and publishing data that is relevant to the work in the 
sector. 
 
Second, reporting of data to information systems does not necessarily lead 
to the data being extracted and shared. Agencies report local data but do 
not know what the overall statistics are. Again, agencies are on one hand 
unclear of where they stand and what directions to take, and on the other 
worried that the reported information will be used against them. MSF, NCSS 
and the Infocomm Development Authority (IDA) have embarked on an ICT 
Master Plan, a key anchor of which is an integrated data system for 
information sharing across agencies. This is an important move in light of 
the increasing needs and required integration of the sector.  
 
Overall, the governance and funding structures of the sector — based on a 
residual approach emphasising “many helping hands” and self-reliance — 
result in inefficiencies and inadequate quality in meeting the individual and 
community needs of an increasingly complex society. The sector is tasked 
with uplifting the disadvantaged and relieving social tensions in order to bring 
about greater equity and cohesion but will increasingly fall short without 
some overhaul and recalibration. Lack of resources is also leading to 
inequities within the sector itself. The sustainability of the sector therefore 
hinges on a major review of its basic tenets and large public investments.  
 
6.3.3 Recommendations  
 
The first set of recommendations includes suggestions to review the 
philosophical underpinnings of the system:  
 
Redefine self-reliance 
 Self-reliance needs to be redefined from one that emphasises temporary 
and minimum help to one that emphasises holistic assistance to enable 
beneficiaries to gain a foothold towards self-reliance. 
 
Broaden application of “many helping hands” 
 The “many helping hands” principle is good and aligned with this study 
group’s focus on the individual-in-community. The defining 
characteristics of the individual-in-community concept are in prioritising 
social besides economic goals (as opposed to “individual-in-economy”), 
and recognising that the individual is intimately part of a community and 
it is important therefore not to develop just individuals, but also to 
develop communities. 
 
However, a broader application of “many helping hands” should be adopted 
than the current micro application, for example: 
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 Holistic and integrated intervention can replace the requirement that 
an individual separately applies for different programmes. 
 Full funding — inclusive of the funding partnership of government, 
Tote Board and Community Chest — of agencies and programmes 
where a strong programme evaluation system is in place can help 
SCS agencies to better utilise their resources in direct work.  
 
The current regulatory and funding framework has been reasonably effective 
in addressing market failure. However, improvements can be made to 
ameliorate the resultant “government failure” problems. In moving from no 
regulation to programme-specific monitoring, the country has swung too far. 
Control can be loosened. Funding based on delivery models can be reduced 
in terms of specificity and reporting requirements. Some movement back to 
block grants or employee-based funding can be explored to encourage more 
ground initiatives and reduce dependence on policymakers to set trends or 
interventions. It allows more flexibility and responsiveness, rather than 
requiring specific outcomes that insufficiently capture the positive 
externalities that SCS entail. 
 
Foster trust 
A regulatory and funding environment that is broad and leaves specific 
details to agencies requires trust — trust from policymakers to do the right 
thing and do it well, and trust from the public that the system is fair and non-
corrupt. Scandals of unethical practices have not helped in fostering this 
trust, and this trust has to be built now. The group’s vision of a cohesive 
society is a starting point in fostering a community of trust. In embracing this 
vision, trust and cohesion have to be sufficiently strong for scandals not to 
shake confidence. Any scandal has to be dealt with harshly but also 
tempered with the recognition that such isolated incidents do happen in any 
system. The challenge is balancing regulating SCS with a heavy hand or a 
light touch, between vigilance and blame.  
 
The issue of trust also extends to beneficiaries. In an expanded system of 
help, while introducing conditions to minimise abuse, there will have to be 
greater acceptance of the few individuals who will try to sidestep the system 
and not allow them to diminish the amount of help that many other individuals 
need. The dignity of beneficiaries must be preserved while we screen and 
ration assistance. Overall, trust has to be built upon mutual responsibility 
based on a more open system of accountability and transparency. 
 
De-emphasise reporting outputs and details 
Reporting requirements and the resources to support the fulfilment of such 
requirements also need to be reviewed. Investments have to be made to: 
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 Provide agencies with the headcount to handle data reporting work and 
provide technical support, thereby releasing case workers to client work; 
 
 Determine good key performance indicators to reduce skewed 
incentives; and 
 
 Determine a core and minimum range of data to report  
 
Overall, de-emphasising reporting of outputs and identifying various macro 
impacts will give agencies more freedom and bandwidth to exercise 
discretion in meeting outputs in order to fulfil overall impact aims. In fact, 
identifying concrete social outputs and impact is to a large extent impossible. 
Some flexibility needs to be exercised.  
 
Establish a professional social and community services council 
A professional body such as a social and community services council could 
provide ground leadership and standards. The council can therefore also 
act to address other challenges, such as: 
 
 Ensuring standards of unfunded VWOs; 
 
 Reducing resource disparity between agencies, in terms of size, target 
populations, etc.  
 
Establish a more holistic and integrated service system 
More holistic and integrated service delivery is needed for three reasons: 
 
 Recognition that individuals and families are experiencing multiple and 
increasingly complex stressors in a globalised world; 
 
 Recognition that individuals and families are one entity and therefore 
experience the multiple stressors simultaneously and in interaction; 
 
 Recognition that individuals and families are more than merely functional 
units within an economy, and require interventions that are customised 
to the different needs of each individual, family and community.  
 
Beyond the initiatives that have already begun on a whole-of-government 
approach and improved collaboration and referrals through the local 
community networks, realising a truly integrated person-centred delivery of 
services will require mergers in some programmes.  
 
Towards 2050, the study group envisions a single centre and programme 
providing the different programmes that needy families often need in tandem, 
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including finances, employment, training, housing, preventive and long-term 
healthcare, and family relations.  
 
Co-locate social care and other services 
The study group’s vision of an individual-in-community concept with strong 
social cohesion will require concerted efforts towards building that 
community. The group sees much potential in a locality approach in 
healthcare, education and social care. Having the different social 
infrastructural development in a local centre where different activities are 
integrated within the centre can foster greater synergies in person-centred 
social development. The movement then is towards localisation and away 
from nationalisation.  
 
Establish umbrella ministry with oversight of social and community-
related care responsibilities of other ministries 
Issues of inter-ministry boundaries will have to be addressed and ministry 
oversight reconstituted. For example, social protection and services that 
currently comes under MSF will have increasing connections with economic 
and manpower development as the Singapore economy matures, and with 
healthcare as the Singapore population ages. One model to consider might 
be an umbrella ministry (for example an enlarged Ministry of Social and 
Family Development) having oversight of the social and community-related 
care responsibilities of other related ministries (e.g., health, manpower, 
community).  
 
Community development becomes an important element that holds the 
social, economic and healthcare development aspects together. Outreach 
will therefore be crucial in building community and away from centre-based 
remedial work.  
 
Some movements towards integrated facilities are currently seen in requiring 
commercial buildings to locate social and community agencies within them, 
and the development of hospitals with multiple uses besides medical 
services. One under-explored possibility is the school-in-community idea, 
which will be developed further in the section on education.  
 
The recent introduction of SSOs in HDB towns is also a potential step 
towards the kind of localised integrated centre recommended by the study 
group. However, it is currently unclear whether SSOs should become an 
integrated point of call or a centre focused on financial assistance with 
referral to other agencies for other kinds of assistance. An integrated centre 
will require multi-disciplinary teams of social workers, community workers, 
career consultants, community health workers, etc., working with each family.  
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Address manpower shortage and quality issues 
The acute resource constraints and manpower shortage in the sector need 
to be urgently addressed, not only to move towards the future vision of 
integrated care, but also to meet current inadequacy in baseline services. 
CDCs are currently inadequately equipped to handle low-income clients with 
multiple and complex needs. Their wide range of work in community 
development and financial assistance prevents them from delving deep into 
clients’ root issues. As general degree holders without background in social 
services, and provided with limited training on case management, they have 
insufficient training for intensive work with vulnerable clients. On the other 
hand, staff in FSCs are professionals trained to handle needy populations 
— but these face acute manpower shortage.  
 
There is an urgent need to improve the status, salary and recognition of 
social workers and other SCS professionals. Clear career paths and 
progression also need to be drawn up. More community workers and SCS 
professionals trained in community development will be required.  
 
Given the complexity and multiple challenges experienced by needy families: 
 
 Job scopes of case and community workers have to be broadened 
beyond narrow confines, and should be expected to be “messy” and 
cross boundaries. In integrated care, staff must be trained to understand 
the end-to-end suite of needs and empowered to handle a multitude of 
queries/issues and offer appropriate solutions. 
 
 All social care professionals, including doctors, allied health 
professionals, social workers, financial assistance workers and 
volunteers should be trained in four core competencies: ethics, cross-
cultural work, integrated care and work with the elderly.  
Stronger administrative support — for instance in human resource, finance 
and data recording for VWOs — need to be developed so that the 
organisations can focus their energies on client work.  
 
Share data for planning and research 
To improve service planning and delivery, there needs to be greater 
availability and dissemination of social data. More social data and data in 
finer detail need to be published on a regular basis. More data should also 
be made available for research and evaluation.  
 
The current development of an integrated data system needs to be done 
carefully with consideration for it to be used as a system that facilitates 
integration and more effective work, rather than as a watchdog to monitor 
agency and client compliance. The natural anxieties of agencies and clients 
Chapter 6: Social Infrastructure 
Development 
 
149  
 
on how data sharing will be used against them need to be acknowledged. 
That the system streamlines work processes and not add to burdensome 
paper work will also have to be looked into. Careful decisions on the core 
information to be shared will help in addressing ethical issues.  
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6.4 EDUCATION 
 
6.4.1 Background 
 
Singapore’s education system is highly regarded. It boasts a remarkably 
high literacy rate, which was 96.4% in 2012.5 Singapore students also rank 
high in international tests. In the 2009 Program for International Students 
Assessment (PISA), Singapore’s 15 year-olds were ranked fifth for reading, 
second for mathematics and fourth for science (MOE 2010c). Many 
countries have studied and worked to emulate our education system. 
However, despite achieving remarkable and seemingly desirable outcomes, 
observers of our education system, including politicians, sociologists, 
teachers, parents, students and psychiatrists, have raised several key 
concerns.  
 
The move towards a knowledge-based economy in the late 1990s required 
a workforce that would be prepared for a fast–paced and ever-changing 
landscape. This era saw the unveiling of “Thinking Schools, Learning Nation”, 
which defined the need for Singapore’s people to be prepared for life’s 
challenges and to learn continuously to ensure the future sustainability and 
wealth of the country. Since 1997, ability-driven education saw the 
introduction of more tracks, alongside the Normal and Express streams in 
secondary schools, which would lead to the GCE ‘O’ Level examinations. 
The Integrated Programme (IP) was introduced in the Express stream, which 
allowed for the bypass of the GCE ‘O’ Levels. Schools were encouraged and 
given autonomy to customise and run specialised programmes in electives 
such as music, art and sports.  
 
Today, public education in Singapore comprises a network of independent 
schools, autonomous schools, Special Assistance Plan (SAP) 6  schools, 
mission schools and government schools. Since 1988, "several well 
established schools were allowed to become independent of the Ministry of 
Education”. Independent schools charge the highest fees and are granted 
the most flexibility in, amongst other things, curriculum, school management, 
reward and deployment of staff (Tan and Gopinathan 2000). This flexibility 
was intended to bring about creativity and innovation towards a student's 
learning experience. Another incentive of school management flexibility was 
the school's ability to attract and retain a teaching talent pool. An example 
of an independent school would be Raffles Institution. In the next tier are 
                                            
5. Department of Statistics website at: 
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest_data.html#16. 
6. SAP schools offer students enhanced learning of Chinese language, culture and 
values. Students can take Higher Chinese as a subject in these schools. 
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autonomous schools, which charge more affordable fees, but have less 
autonomy over their operations. Autonomous status too was granted based 
on their academic results. An example of an autonomous school would be 
Dunman High School. The level of autonomy decreases as one moves down 
the categories of schools to the government schools. An example of a 
government school would be Ang Mo Kio Secondary School.  
 
There are also Specialised Independent Schools, which “cater to students 
with talents in specific fields” (MOE 2006). Today, there are schools 
specialising in areas such as sports, mathematics and science, and the arts. 
In recent years, specialised schools for students at the bottom end of the 
academic achievement spectrum were also introduced. These schools run 
a “customised curriculum to suit the learning needs of its students” and “work 
closely with ITE and industry partners to develop programmes and 
attachment opportunities for its students” (MOE 2013). An example of such 
a school would be Crest Secondary School. The aforesaid types of schools 
listed above are funded and regulated by MOE.  
 
There are also Special Needs Schools in Singapore, supporting children with 
disabilities. Such schools, unlike the other schools listed above, are run by 
VWOs and funded by MOE and the MSF through the NCSS. An example of 
a Special Needs School would be Pathlight School.  
 
Thus, the direction the education system has taken in recent years is greater 
flexibility and diversity at the secondary school level, providing multiple 
pathways for students to meet their different interests and ways of learning.7 
There are different streams, programmes and types of schools. Some 
schools offer only one stream or programme. The system allows for bridges 
between the different pathways so that students’ choices do not lead to 
educational “dead-ends”, with each path designed to be sufficiently porous 
so that late bloomers or those backtracking on early choices are not trapped. 
However, in reality, the likelihood of switching actually happening may or can 
be low. 
 
The main assessment for sorting students into the different pathways at the 
secondary school level is the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), 
taken when students are in Primary 6 (at around age 12). Although primary 
school education is less differentiated than secondary school, many schools 
practise their own ability-based tracking by classes. At age nine, all Primary 
3 students would be tested for giftedness (unless they opt out of the testing), 
with approximately 400 students (estimated at the top 1% of the cohort) 
being pulled out of mainstream education into the Gifted Education 
                                            
7. Retrieved from MOE website, http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/. 
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Programme (GEP).8  
 
In summary, some defining characteristics of Singapore’s education system 
that has been lauded for the high quality of education and students include: 
 
 Investments in national curriculum planning 
 
 High quality teacher training and competitive remuneration to ensure 
highly qualified teachers 
 
 National examinations to test ability 
 
 Many pathways to success through ability-based streaming, and 
different school types and programmes 
 
6.4.2 Analysis 
 
While decentralisation of school management has led to greater diversity in 
curriculum and teacher training, the national education policy ensures 
conformance to a core curriculum and the National Institute of Education 
remains the educator of the majority of teachers, thus setting a high bar for 
all school types. Besides, the schools with greater autonomy from MOE are 
also schools that have more resources and capabilities. They are therefore 
able to achieve even higher standards than the bar set by MOE.  
 
The educational development in Singapore reflects the corporatisation and 
marketisation of education that Lee and Gopinathan demonstrate has taken 
place due to globalisation. “The movement from centralisation to 
decentralisation is concomitant with the growth of marketisation in education 
with an emphasis on competition and performance indicators which enables 
the government to change its mode of regulation from direct control to 
‘steering from a distance’” (Lee and Gopinathan 2005, 266).  
 
Examples of market mechanisms applied in education include first, Direct 
School Admission (DSA), which gives secondary schools and junior colleges 
greater discretion in student recruitment; and second, the ranking of school 
performance that is published in the newspapers, which has since been 
scrapped. The increased competition resulted in schools beginning to 
expend energies towards marketing themselves based on the ranking or 
other niche areas (Tan 2010).  
                                            
8. Retrieved from MOE website, 
http://www.moe.gov.sg/education/programmes/gifted-education- 
programme/faq/gep-pupils/. 
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Another important ideology on which Singapore’s education system is built 
is meritocracy, where students are rewarded according to their academic 
performance. For example, students are assigned to schools and streams 
based on their PSLE results and admitted to post-secondary institutions 
based on their ‘N’ or ‘O’ Levels results. While meritocracy is often interpreted 
as helping to level the playing field because it rewards based on ability and 
not on other metrics such as family wealth, meritocracy as applied in a 
streamed system such as Singapore’s functions more as a sorting 
mechanism than a leveller.  
 
This sorting function was stressed in the early beginnings of nationhood. In 
a speech to school principals in 1966, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
“stressed that the education system ought to produce a ‘pyramidal structure’ 
consisting of three strata: ‘top leaders’, ‘good executives’, and a ‘well-
disciplined and highly civic-conscious broad mass’” (Tan 2010, 297–8). This 
sorting role of education has also been theorised as “sponsored mobility” by 
Turner (1960) in his description of the education system in the United 
Kingdom. The goal of sponsored mobility is to optimise talent by “sort[ing] 
out early in the educational programme the promising from the unpromising 
so that the former may be segregated and given a special form of training to 
fit them for higher standing in their adult years” (Turner 1960, 861).  
 
In contrast, in a system with “contest mobility” which in 1960 was illustrated 
by the American education system, elite status is the prize won in an open 
contest, based on the “aspirants’ own efforts” (p.856). Turner’s sponsored 
mobility of 1960 continues to be an apt characterisation of Singapore’s 
education system, although pundits may now have a different name for it. 
For example, Low (2013) described Singapore’s approach (not just in the 
education system) as “trickle-down meritocracy” as it sees “the growth of the 
economy and the progress of society as driven by its elite, by its best and 
brightest”, and therefore “channels a large share of resources and 
opportunities to its high performers and talents”.  
 
Stressful competition, inequality and immobility 
From the description above, it looks like efficiency has been a key aim of 
Singapore’s education system — efficiency in terms of reducing wastage of 
school drop-outs, wastage of talent not being groomed to their best potential, 
wastage of non-competitive schools not striving to improve student 
performance, and wastage of not sorting students into specific tracks to suit 
their aptitudes. While the aims are laudable, it is clear that equity has not 
been a key concern. Yet, equity has become a major challenge of the system. 
 
There is growing concern that this highly differentiated system based on 
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high-stakes examinations is overly competitive and resulting in greater 
inequality and lower social mobility. These unintended consequences are 
actually not as “unintended” when informed by social science theories, and 
they need to be incorporated into the main planning of our education system.  
 
There are a few possible reasons and longer-term effects of the hyper- 
competitiveness, inequality and immobility. First, repeated studies overseas 
have shown that streaming or tracking (and in extension greater 
differentiation in educational pathways) lead to more unequal outcomes, and 
possibly lower average outcomes (Brewer and Kramer 1985; Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2005; Hindriks et al 2010; Meighan and Harber 2007). The 
PISA also shows that compared to the OECD average, Singaporean 
students’ scores were more unequal and more dependent on parents’ socio-
economic status, along with other countries that also had more differentiated 
education systems, such as Belgium and Australia. Countries with uniform 
and public education such as Korea, Finland and Norway, were more equal 
and depended less on parents’ socio-economic status than the OECD 
average.  
 
Research out of the United Kingdom (Machin 2007), China (Yeung 2012) 
and Hong Kong (HKIE 2013) suggest that expansion of tertiary education 
results in a wider educational achievement gap between rich and poor 
students, because richer students are better able to access the expanded 
tertiary education. Singapore should bear the lessons from overseas in mind 
in how Singapore expands tertiary education. 
 
Second, there has been increasing concern that increased decentralisation 
and differentiation in the education system reduces social mobility. Studies 
on cohorts who were in the Singapore school system during the 1980s and 
early 1990s — who therefore experienced only the beginnings of the 
increasing differentiation of the system — indicate that for these cohorts, 
intergenerational mobility, or the extent to which a person’s earnings 
depended on parents’ earnings, were at most moderate (Ng 2013c; Yip 
2012). Ng (forthcoming) further posits that intergenerational mobility will be 
of increasing challenge due to three political economic factors: wide and 
widening income inequality; a residual welfare system; and a differentiated 
education system. More particularly, overseas theoretical and rigorous 
empirical research show that intergenerational mobility is lower when the 
education system is more differentiated, private in nature and regressive in 
its spending (see Pekkarinen et al. 2009; Ng 2013c) — characteristics that 
Singapore’s system has increasingly moved towards.  
 
Third, the multitude of school types and pathways has led to strategising 
amongst many parents for the best schools and best pathways for their 
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children. Aggravating the high stakes of making the “right” choice at age 12 
is the narrowness of the sorting criteria that is applied at this age; the PSLE 
is based on academic performance in four subjects: English, Mathematics, 
Mother Tongue and Science, with students assessed on a bell curve. This 
leads to tremendous stress over an examination taken at a young age. 
Students and parents alike may often perceive the PSLE as a most pivotal 
milestone with lasting consequences. Despite official claims that all schools 
are good schools, there is a rush for a few preferred secondary and primary 
schools. Huge parental involvement and strategic planning in a child’s 
educational journey has built up frenzy during the annual Primary 1 
registration exercises, PSLE examinations and Secondary School selection. 
With basic lessons at school no longer viewed as sufficient, teachers are 
giving remedial classes and homework exercises while parents are sending 
their children for additional tuition, such that students are spending long 
hours at school followed by homework and tuition.  
 
While inequality, immobility and parental strategising are not the intended 
outcomes for the design of the education system, social science theories 
inform that they are expected interrelated outcomes of creating categories 
of students. Ng (forthcoming) posits three theoretical reasons. First, based 
on labelling theory from sociology and social identity theory from psychology, 
differential labels assign prestigious or stigmatised tags whenever 
categories of people are created, leading to self-fulfilling prophesies of those 
categories becoming more prestigious or stigmatised, and eventually even 
resulting in people behaving according to their labels. Second, differential 
resources result because the more prestigious schools will attract more 
resources and the less popular schools less resources, leading to greater 
inequality and immobility, and even more parental strategising. Whether 
prestigious schools have more resources originally or subsequently, the 
resource advantage makes them more able to invest in students for better 
outcomes. Third, the resulting inequality in the make-up of the different 
streams, programmes and school types result in different networks of friends, 
parents, potential employers, and even potential spouses (Homlund 2008) 
that are instrumental to current and future successes.  
 
Given the above support from international comparisons and social science 
theories, parents’ fears of the consequentiality of primary and secondary 
school admissions and PSLE examination results are therefore perceived 
as well as real. Parents’ anxiety and strategising feed the inequity further, 
leading to cumulative advantage and disadvantage as not every school and 
parent has the same level of resources. Schools themselves recognise the 
benefits of being at the top of the pack and seek to secure their “preferred” 
positions vis-à-vis other schools so as to attract and retain the “best” talents 
amongst teachers and students. The success that schools have in doing so 
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further cements their status as graduating alumni get stronger and funding 
increases for the next generation of students.  
 
The inequality and frenzy have also filtered down to the preschool level, 
where parents with means would send their child to expensive preschools. 
In comparison, parents from low-income families might not send their 
children to preschool at all. Overall, a study on preschool education in 2012 
found the quality of preschool education to be lacking in Singapore, with 
Singapore scoring a rank of 29 out of 45 countries.9 Rightly, the government 
has recognised the need to intervene in preschool education to level the 
playing field. Based on research on the importance of early education 
(Heckman 2006), the current efforts are necessary and crucial. However, 
the study group believes that much of the inequality and preoccupation with 
sending children to the “right” preschool is also driven by the anxieties 
parents have over giving their children an early head-start for the competitive 
primary and secondary school systems. Therefore, going forward, 
addressing the issues in the main system is paramount to addressing 
inequities in preschool. 
 
Long-term consequences 
There are three possible longer-term consequences of an education system 
that is overly competitive, with reproduction of inequality and immobility: 
social segregation, lower empathy and lower connectedness with 
community.  
 
With early streaming into specific school-based tracks, students are mixing 
mostly with students that have profiles similar to their own, e.g., the best 
class/GEP/ Foundational Class/Normal Stream/Arts School. A Straits Times 
article reported that more than 50% of students in top schools like Raffles 
Institution and Nanyang Girls High School have fathers who were university 
graduates whilst only 7–13% of students from neighbourhood schools had 
graduate fathers (Chang 2011). It has also been said that the introduction of 
SAP schools has led to a de facto ethnic segregation, such that Malays are 
under-represented in the top secondary schools (Tan 2010). Hence, one 
consequence of such fine tracking is prolonged social segregation of 
students by interest, academic ability, socio-economic status and ethnicity.  
 
As a result of our children experiencing prolonged periods in segregated 
streams and schools, it would be no surprise that Singapore's young would 
find it hard to identify and empathise with people who are different from them. 
                                            
9. See “Starting Well: Benchmarking Early Education across the world”, a 2012 
report by the Economist Intelligence Unit commissioned by the Lien Foundation. 
http://www.lienfoundation.org/pdf/publications/sw_report.pdf. 
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In fact, the hyper competition based on relative positions motivates students’ 
efforts towards individual gains rather than collaborative community good.  
 
A similar phenomenon can be observed at the school level, where 
marketisation and focus on the delivery of results have resulted in schools 
being disconnected from the community at large. Unlike in the past, when 
schools were part of the community (and village heads were the principals), 
schools today are largely disengaged from what goes on in its local 
community. Being part of the neighbourhood is no longer important to 
schools. The compulsory community involvement programme (CIP) 
generally brings students overseas or controlled and specialised settings 
within Singapore (e.g., old folks’ homes), which does little to engage 
students and teachers with the needs in their locale. 
 
In recent years, MOE has taken steps to reduce the emphasis on academic 
competition towards greater inclusivity. In 2008, MOE set up the Primary 
Education Review and Implementation (PERI) committee, followed soon 
after by the Secondary Education Review and Implementation (SERI) 
committee. The committees made recommendations that would develop 
students holistically and better prepare them for the future. Lim observed 
“the strong egalitarian emphasis on levelling up” (2012, 42). For example, 
recommendations in the PERI such as recruiting only graduates to teach in 
primary schools, providing language facilitators in primary schools to ease 
students’ transition from homes that use predominantly mother tongue 
languages, and the de-emphasis on academic examinations at primaries 
one and two were felt to be more beneficial to students from working-class 
backgrounds. In the SERI, one recommendation included the setting up of 
specialised schools for Normal (Technical) students.  
 
Other initiatives towards greater inclusivity and well-rounded educational 
development include a greater emphasis on ramping up the quality of 
Special Needs Education in recent years, and an Edusave Character Award 
to reward students for exemplary character and values in 2011.  
 
At the school level, banding for secondary schools has been removed and 
they are now encouraged to develop their individual niches beyond 
academics. Minister for Education Heng Swee Keat suggested in a speech 
in December 2012 during the appointment ceremony of new principals that 
principals should not be unduly focused on winning awards and on 
aggressive inter-school competition. Principals at the ceremony were 
encouraged to lead by example and make efforts to collaborate (Heng 2012). 
 
The theoretical and empirical arguments on inequality and immobility 
presented in this report suggest there should be some dismantling of 
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multiple pathways, review of examinations, and movement away from 
market-based accountability structures. In a New York Times article, 
education sociologist Sean Reardon observed that the widened disparity in 
students’ academic performance in the US has been due not only to the rich-
poor gap but also to the increasingly rich-middle class gap. Taking a leaf 
from the US experience, where school types have greatly diversified and 
parental investments in their children’s learning activities are disparate, more 
systemic educational reforms might be required than remedial efforts 
propelling the most disadvantaged students forward.  
 
The effects of inequality, over-competition and segregation could undermine 
the efficiency intents of the system. Low (2013) calls the strategising by 
parents a wastage that has resulted from an over-emphasis on sorting based 
on relative performance. The long hours that Singapore students spend in 
school and additional tuition call into question the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of remedial lessons and extra coaching, especially when 
contrasted with Finnish students. Finnish students spend one of fewest 
number of hours in school among developed countries (Rather 2012), yet 
have consistently come up tops in PISA, out-ranking Singapore students in 
reading and science in 2009 (Ng 2013b). It is therefore unclear that 
streaming and competition in the school system are key factors to high 
performance. Rather, other traits such as curriculum planning and teacher 
quality, which the Finnish education system also shares, might be more 
important factors.  
 
Given the plethora of differentiated paths that segregate students, the 
marginal benefits of continued specialisation are bound to diminish and 
marginal costs have already surfaced and will continue to increase. This 
cannot be a sustainable model for Singapore’s education system in the long 
term, and can only give rise to greater social stratification and tension. 
Unless conscious steps are taken to encourage more interaction among 
children, Singapore risks a gradual decline in social cohesion for generations 
to come.  
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6.4.3 Recommendations 
 
The aims of the recommendations for the education system are focused on: 
 
 Increasing priority on education’s role in fostering social cohesion, 
reducing inequality and improving social mobility 
 
 Decreasing strain of an overly competitive system 
 
System-level recommendations 
 
Decrease differentiated pathways 
The study group has argued that the main reason for the ill effects 
highlighted in this report is the ability-based segregation of students into 
many pathways. The main direction then is to move towards less streaming 
and more mixed schools in terms of student abilities and backgrounds. This 
is fundamentally in the opposite direction from the current trajectory, and an 
immediate step is for MOE to review and pull back from introducing more 
new programmes and specialised schools.  
 
By 2050, the study group envisions classrooms with small class sizes of 
mixed types of students and two or three teachers working together in each 
class to tailor the teaching to each student’s learning needs. In such a 
classroom where teachers know each student’s standard well, there is less 
need for national examinations to gauge student competence. The group 
feels that such a vision is not far-fetched for an advanced economy that 
Singapore will be in 37 years’ time.  
 
Towards this type of classroom, streaming will in time have to be deferred 
and programmes such as IP and GEP will have to be dismantled. If we 
believe the GEP model of pedagogy — with more project work, deeper 
questioning and discovery — is superior, then the issue for improving social 
mobility and reducing inequality is not how to “dumb down” but how to level 
up. In the transition, there may be some element of “robbing Peter to pay 
Paul” but our longer-term vision must be to create a world-class experience 
for every child. 
Hence, the study group recommends the postponement of streaming10 to 
age 16, when students choose either to enter junior colleges, polytechnics 
or institutes of technical education. Unlike the Finnish system, which does 
not have national examinations till age 18, PSLE can be retained but only to 
                                            
10. Because this is a rather major change to the education system and will require 
more deliberation on the effects of doing so, a key consideration would be how to 
do it in a way that is least painful.  
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assess if students have attained the competencies required of a 12-year-old 
to progress to secondary school.  
 
Primary schools can then teach a wider spectrum of core competencies 
instead of over-emphasising academic results via PSLE. Under the above 
types of school environment, the study group believes that MOE’s goals to 
nurture “each child” in competencies for the 21st century can be realistically 
achieved rather than left as an idealism. These competencies, which broadly 
encompass confidence, self-directed learning, active contribution and 
concerned citizenship, can and should be developed in every child (MOE 
2010).  
 
School-level recommendations  
 
Channel more resources to weakest schools 
Given the current competition between schools and the clamour for better 
schools, the study group recommends that the Ministry signals its 
commitment towards making “every school a good school”,11 by starting a 
plan of action to channel more resources to schools assessed as the 
weakest. For example, MOE could send the best teachers to disadvantaged 
schools and schools that show up at the bottom of the charts, and inject 
additional resources and support services into these schools to help them 
level up. The group believes that such a move will not stigmatise schools or 
lead to a “race to the bottom” in an educational management climate that 
emphasises collaboration and support.  
 
Prioritise remedial help to weakest students 
Similarly, within each school and classroom, remedial help should be 
prioritised towards the weakest students with the support of allied educators, 
teacher assistants, and even peer teachers. Peer teaching has been found 
to be effective in the learning for both the peer teacher and peer learner 
(Annis 1983; Britz 1989; Maheady and Sainato 1985; Lien 2013) and may 
be an under-utilised resource in mainstream education.  
 
Review what is core to meeting holistic educational needs 
To complement the efforts to improve disadvantaged schools, it is also 
useful to review what is at the core of meeting the holistic educational needs 
of a child and to put in place some regulation in the differences in facilities 
and resources between schools. For example, some schools boast 50-metre 
lap pools and clinical psychological services whilst others are more basic.  
Develop “school-in-community” principle 
                                            
11. Retrieved from MOE website, http://www.moe.gov.sg/initiatives/every-school-
good-school/. 
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The group recommends the further development of a “school-in-community” 
principle where schools become engaged partners of their local 
neighbourhoods. The relationship between the school and community takes 
place in both directions. The school-in-community relationship sees the 
school being involved in various types of community activities, for example, 
the outreach project “Community in Bloom” can see more school 
involvement. Schools can create student ambassadors to represent the 
school in different community events. Conversely, a “community-in-school” 
relationship is about the community being involved in the school. The tie-up 
between the Singapore Sports Council (SSC) and schools has enabled over 
200,000 regular users of the schools’ facilities. There is more scope for 
school facilities to be shared with the community, e.g., shared library and 
cafes, and for neighbourhood residents to be involved in the school, such as 
school celebrations at the start of the school year, fun fairs, drama nights, 
etc. The composition of school boards could be required to include members 
of the community where the school is located. While the school principal 
would have direct control over curriculum and staff matters, the school board 
could complement this role through its recommendations on the school’s 
involvement in the community, integration matters, support for the needy, 
and a number of other social and community issues.  
 
Over time, the fostering of the school and community nexus will enable the 
intertwining of school histories with individual and family biographies, bound 
by formal and informal responsibilities, strengthened by interpersonal 
networks, and reinforced by shared values (Ho 2006, 98). Thus, the school-
in-community idea has the potential to meet multiple aims of this chapter, 
including: 
 
 Developing students holistically in the 21st century competencies — that 
students become confident and concerned citizens who contribute 
actively to their local communities 
 
 Reducing segregation and fostering commonality and understanding 
through shared experiences 
 
 Strengthening community and social cohesion 
 
 Saving space through the sharing of resources and facilities in land-
scarce Singapore 
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Recommendations for staff 
 
Review training, assessment and remuneration of principals, teachers 
and allied educators 
The reorientation of the education system from academic excellence to 
holistic development, and from testing and sorting to collaborative 
progression, will require changes in the training and assessment of 
principals, teachers and allied educators. The current efforts to steer 
principals away from over-emphasising examination results can be 
enhanced by redesigning the regulatory and management framework of 
schools and teachers to one that encompasses more egalitarian goals and 
thereby giving more rewards for gains in building character, helping weaker 
students and fostering co-operation besides high academic attainment. 
Although these goals are less measurable for accurate assessment of 
teacher performance, the group believes they are more sustainable in the 
long term, as they build on the ideals of the teaching profession.12 The group 
hopes for an accountability structure that relies less on market-based 
principles and methods, and instead is based more on collaboration and 
mutual trust between MOE and the schools.  
 
High-quality and centralised teacher training and curriculum development 
will continue to be key. Not only do they sustain high academic standards, 
they should now also aim towards preparing teachers for the future 
classroom, such as teaching in mixed settings, individualising teaching to 
each student, fostering peer learning and applying knowledge to life and 
personal character instead of examinations.  
 
In recognition of the important work of educators in developing the future 
generation, remuneration of teachers must continue to be competitive. In 
addition, to truly signal education’s priority on redistribution, helping weaker 
students and developing students more holistically beyond academic 
performance, the group recommends that allied educators and school 
counsellors should be given the same remuneration as teachers. The 
current pay scale where teachers are paid more than the other educators 
signals a priority towards academic performance. More administrative 
support should also be provided so that teachers can focus on teaching. 
 
Recommendations for post-secondary education 
 
Review educational targets taking into consideration equity issues 
Singapore’s plans for post-secondary education, as laid out in the 
recommendations by the Committee on University Education Pathways 
                                            
12. Teachers' Pledge retrieved from http://www.moe.gov.sg/about/. 
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Beyond 2015 (CUEP), are bold and forward-looking. Taking a leaf from 
overseas findings on the inequity effects of tertiary expansion, the study 
group wonders whether the magnitude and speed of expansion of university 
places might compound the inequality effects embedded in our current 
system. It urges a review into moderating the targets by taking into 
consideration equity issues. More thought must be given to expanding 
tertiary education in a way that first increases access for students from 
poorer families, and second, does not create many different elite and 
stigmatised paths. Already, there are murmurs from private school students 
claiming that they are stigmatised by potential employers who prefer 
graduates from mainstream universities (Chia 2013). At the other end of the 
continuum, in the chase for international rankings, Singapore’s main 
universities might overly differentiate themselves on specific programmes, 
resulting in exclusivism and elitism. We must remind ourselves that 
ultimately the main role of our public universities is to provide the human 
capital needs of the nation.  
 
In terms of numbers, that half of future generations are university graduates 
may lead to two scenarios of social concern. First, there may not be enough 
jobs requiring degree holders. Hence, degree holders from elite programmes 
at top universities may be highly sought after while others from less 
prestigious institutions are considered second-class and have difficulty 
finding degree-level jobs. The aspiration for a degree may therefore lead to 
disappointment. Brown and Lauder posit that in the global auction for high 
skills, “learning may not meet [Singaporeans’] earning expectations given 
the increasing supply of graduates both in Singapore and beyond” (2012, 
45). Second, if half of future generations have university degrees, then 
young adults with polytechnic and ITE diplomas would become minorities. 
As minorities, the stigma for these diploma holders might worsen.  
 
While the study group suggests caution in numeric targets of the types of 
post-secondary educational qualifications, there are two sectors that require 
government intervention and concerted efforts to ramp up the number of 
trained staff. First, local participation in vocational occupations such as 
electrical works, plumbing and carpentry, have hollowed out due to the low 
wages and status ascribed to them. This is not a tenable situation — 
Singapore cannot continue to depend on foreigners to fill the gap for such 
professions that all society needs. Along with the current wage restructuring, 
concerted efforts are urgently needed to greatly improve the image of the 
hollowed-out skilled trades; and more generally the image of an ITE diploma. 
Instead of shrinking the proportion of ITE places — as a result of expanding 
the proportion of university places — the government could signal its 
commitment to and value of technical education by continued investments 
in ITE that are comparable to its investments in university education.  
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Second, in light of the manpower shortage and needs in healthcare and 
social care, post-secondary education will also have a key role in directing 
manpower towards these sectors and help raise their professional image 
and standards. The increase of trained professionals at degree, diploma and 
certification levels requires government intervention now to meet current 
shortage as well as expansion in future. Similar to hollowed-out vocational 
jobs, jobs in these sectors, e.g., social work, counselling and nursing have 
lower status and remuneration. These essential services that meet public 
needs require government intervention to educate the public about the value 
of these jobs and set benchmarks on their remuneration that matches other 
professions.  
 
Singapore already has a strong Continuing Education and Training (CET) 
system. It can be better utilised to inject flexibility in post-secondary 
educational pathways, so that one is not dead-ended into a particular 
profession and mid-career switches can be possible especially into sectors 
that require more manpower at certain points in time. To meet these 
objectives, the CET system should be complemented with post-secondary 
institutions to (Raffe 2003):  
 
1. Build and strengthen pathways between ITE and polytechnic, 
polytechnic and university, and even university and ITE (to allow for 
people wishing to switch from academic to vocational careers) 
 
2. Broaden pathways (allowing for multiple entries based on different 
certifications, experiences, job skills, etc.)  
 
3. Defer decision points (e.g., by allowing young people to take time off for 
internships, more flexibility in allowing for gap years) 
 
4. Lengthen education pathways (e.g., allowing the return to study by 
working adults through work-study arrangements at universities and 
polytechnics, on-the-job training through partnerships between ITE and 
potential employers) 
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6.5 HEALTHCARE 
 
6.5.1 Background  
 
Singapore’s healthcare system has received high accolades globally, 
particularly since the World Health Organization proclaimed Singapore’s 
healthcare system the sixth best in the world in 2000. The World Health 
Statistics 2011 also ranked Singapore fourth highest for life expectancy at 
birth (82 years). Notwithstanding these robust health metrics, Singapore 
spent only 4% of GDP on healthcare services in 2010, less than half that of 
the United Kingdom (9.6%) and less than a quarter that of the United States 
(17.6%).  
 
The relationship between health and the economy is well established 
empirically. Better health increases a community’s capacity to work, 
translating into higher productivity, which in turn leads to higher incomes. 
Good lifetime health can extend labour force participation and sustain the 
vitality of the workforce despite ageing trends. In the reverse direction, a 
well-performing economy also enables higher healthcare spending and 
therefore better health.  
 
Singapore’s public healthcare system is widely considered as well designed 
and financially sustainable. The combination of subsidies in the public health 
sector and the “3M” system of financing — Medisave, or personal savings; 
MediShield, or personal insurance; and Medifund, or means-tested 
government assistance should Medisave and MediShield be insufficient — 
ensures that a large majority of Singaporeans have affordable access to 
good healthcare while still providing a certain level of patient choice. State 
ownership of public hospitals as well as a dominant role in the availability 
and supply of healthcare helps to contain cost pressures.  
 
The government’s philosophy on healthcare financing is based on a cost-
sharing concept and has four main pillars: (1) healthcare subsidies; (2) the 
Medisave and MediShield systems; (3) family support; and (4) an emphasis 
on individual responsibility in the past, that has been re-tuned towards a call 
for shared responsibility and thus to a “many helping hands” approach that 
is similar to that applied in social care. 
 
The above healthcare financing philosophy based on individual 
responsibility and “many helping hands” are articulated by the mission 
statement of the Ministry of Health (MOH): “Through MOH, the government 
manages the public healthcare system to ensure that good and affordable 
basic medical services are available to all Singaporeans. We achieve this 
through providing subsidised medical services while promoting individual 
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responsibility for the costs of healthcare services. Our population is thus 
encouraged to adopt a healthy lifestyle, taking responsibility for one’s own 
health. Safety nets are provided, however, to ensure that no Singaporean is 
denied access into the healthcare system or turned away by public hospitals 
because of lack of money” (our emphasis). 
 
The MOH’s mission of ensuring access to good basic healthcare accords 
with the definition of universal healthcare as set out by the World Health 
Organization. However, the universality of healthcare coverage is 
determined by who and what is covered, and how much of the cost is 
covered. Hitherto, Singapore’s demographic structure with high potential 
support ratios13 and robust economic growth have allowed the individual and 
family to carry the bulk of the burden of healthcare with highest out-of-pocket 
health expenditure shares as compared with other developed nations. 
 
The philosophy of individual responsibility and self-reliance leads to three 
practical implications:  
 
 Co-payment financing limits tendencies for over-consumption of 
elective and discretionary healthcare services. This is probably one 
of the reasons why Singapore’s public expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total expenditure remains the lowest amongst 
developed nations. Some, however, have argued that the strong 
hand of government is a stronger reason for the low levels of 
expenditure and consumption as well as favourable health outcomes 
(see for instance Lim 2013 and Phua 2011). 
 
 Means testing in Singapore’s public healthcare and long-term care 
sectors ensures equitable allocation of resources to those who need 
it most. The gross incomes and residential property assets of the 
patient as well as their household members are all taken into account 
in assessing eligibility for subsidies.14  
 
 The responsibility for the “small bills” typically associated with 
primary and preventive care is left to individuals and the government 
focuses its intervention on structuring paying for the “big bills” that 
are largely hospital-based. This has resulted in the current acute 
care-centric system, where acute care hospitals are the central 
nodes around which health services are currently organised. In terms 
                                            
13. The number of people aged 15–64 per older person aged 65 and above.  
14. For acute hospital means testing, only individual income and housing type are 
factored into the means test. For community hospitals and nursing homes, means 
testing is referenced against the income and housing assets of the immediate family. 
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of financing, patients pay most primary care out-of-pocket, tertiary 
care is paid from mixed sources through the 3Ms, and long-term care 
is means-tested and mainly based on out of pocket cash, 
ElderShield, philanthropy and subsidies. 
 
The distribution in terms of provision also roughly follows the distribution in 
financing. Eighteen government polyclinics provide for about 20% of 
Singapore’s primary healthcare needs, with the bulk of primary care (80%) 
provided by about 2,000 private general medical practitioner clinics island-
wide. In contrast, in tertiary care, 15 public hospitals and specialty centres 
take care of about 80% of Singapore’s patients while 10 private hospitals 
and specialty care centres take care of the remaining 20%. Long-term care, 
e.g., nursing home or community-based facilities for chronic illnesses, is 
provided mainly by the voluntary sector, although it is noteworthy that many 
voluntary welfare organisations (VWOs) are subsidised by government 
funds, while polyclinics provide primary care for almost half of patients with 
chronic illnesses (Sng 2011).  
 
Governance of public healthcare is divided into six clusters which centre on 
an acute-care hospital in each cluster: National University Health System, 
National Healthcare Group, Singapore Health Services, Alexandra Health 
System, Jurong Health Services and Eastern Health Alliance. They are 
governed by MOH Holdings (MOHH), the government’s holding company of 
public healthcare assets.  
 
The establishment of the National Electronic Health Records (NEHR) 
system will provide a common access point for medical information. It is 
hoped that NEHR will cover the entire healthcare continuum in Singapore 
(Figure 6.1). Challenges remain however with this project as the MOH has 
less control over private sector providers as well as VWOs that would be 
responsible for input as well as users of the output from the NEHR system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 An integrated care continuum  
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Source: Adapted from Faezah Shaikh Kadir (2011), “Role of the Multi-
disciplinary Team in Integrated Care”, Singapore Family Physician 37(3): 
15, 17. 
 
6.5.2 Analysis 
 
Singapore’s healthcare system will face a number of significant challenges 
in the years to 2050, but especially so in the next 10–15 years. Firstly, the 
ageing of the population will likely require increased national expenditure on 
healthcare. Many of those aged 65 and older in 2013 are from less educated, 
low-skilled cohorts born in Singapore’s pre-independence period with 
insufficient CPF balances. Their greater healthcare costs would increase the 
pressure on the “many helping hands” approach and raise the need for 
expanded financing of healthcare as demand increases.15 Limited data is 
available for this “lost generation” although data from the 2010 census show 
there were 406,957 persons with no or only primary education aged 55 and 
above that year whilst 2011 CPF data show that 40% of current active CPF 
                                            
15. According to the CPF Annual Report 2011, only 58.9% of active CPF members 
meet the Medisave minimum sum at age 55 ($34,500 as at 1 July 2010), with 
average balances of $29,928. 
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members do not have the $36,000 Medisave minimum sum at age 55, 
equating to about 708,000 persons. 
 
With declining potential support ratios (Table 6.1), the capacity of individuals 
and families as main pillars of one’s safety net may come under increased 
strain, requiring more assistance from the MHH approach. 
 
Table 6.1 Support ratios in IPS’ population projections: Scenarios 1 
and 2  
    2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Potential 
Support 
Ratio16 
Scenario 1 7.7 4.4 2.5 1.8 1.7 
Scenario 2 8.0 4.9 3.2 2.7 2.7 
Parent 
Support 
Ratio17 
Scenario 1 9.4 11.8 21.6 44.6 52.8 
Scenario 2 9.4 11.6 20.0 34.3 37.1 
 
The second challenge is healthcare price inflation, which has outpaced 
general price increases. In the 10 years leading to 2011, the healthcare 
consumer price index (CPI) rose an annual rate of 2.8% as compared with 
the 2.0% average annual increase in overall CPI. As Singapore becomes a 
mature economy, rising expectations for better care coupled with advances 
in medical technology would raise the bar on what society considers as basic 
levels of healthcare, in turn putting upward pressure on costs. There are 
risks of supply-induced demand and Baumol’s cost disease,18 as demand 
for healthcare services rises on the back of an ageing population.  
 
Third, current imbalances in the public-private-people mix of provision, 
financing and regulation as well as in the dominance of acute-care in the 
continuum of health services will increasingly strain the system and worsen 
distributional issues. The system will need to adjust to the increased 
interactive complexity and interdependence in the continuum of health 
services. An ageing population will increase demand across the health and 
                                            
16. The potential support ratio is the number of persons aged 15–64 per person 
aged 65 and above.  
17. The parent support ratio is the number of persons aged 80 and above per 100 
persons aged 50–64. 
18. Baumol’s cost disease is a phenomenon in the labour market, first described by 
Baumol and Bowen (1966), which explains the lack of growth in productivity in 
certain labour-intensive industries that involve significant human interaction, 
including inter alia, the performing arts and healthcare. 
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intermediate and long-term care services continuum both from increased 
incidence of “catastrophic” medical events as well as chronic ailments such 
as diabetes, hypertension, lipid disorders and strokes. The next few 
paragraphs discuss these imbalances. 
 
The current acute care-centric system reinforces the perception that 
expensive hospitals are the first port of call for all healthcare needs, including 
trivial ailments and conditions. The limitation of the 3Ms — that they only 
finance hospitalisation and certain outpatient expenses incurred at a hospital 
in Singapore — further encourages patients to skimp on early or preventive 
care and only seek treatment for catastrophic events which can be fully 
covered under the 3M structure. This results in longer lengths of stay in 
relatively expensive acute-care facilities, frequent re-admissions and 
sometimes in the need to travel long distances for treatment. That the 
primary care in Singapore is financed mainly by households and employers, 
and not by the government, limits access to primary care especially for the 
less well-off. The way in which primary healthcare is financed affects the way 
it is structured and organised. This gap in financing has inadvertently 
weakened the primary care network in Singapore and is a significant 
limitation in the system’s capacity to deliver care in the community. 
 
With the catastrophic “big bill” expenses mostly covered by MediShield, the 
higher frequency and medium impact nature of chronic and long-term 
illnesses limit the viability of self-funded insurance schemes to finance such 
intermediate and long-term care. Existing medical insurance coverage 
systems are not designed to cater to long-term care as the costs of chronic 
care accumulate over an extended period of time, possibly across a wide 
range of service providers and settings. Lack of inflation protection in the 
ElderShield programme can reduce the effective coverage provided by the 
programme over time. 
 
The current acute care-centric healthcare model also leads to the under- and 
arguably more ad hoc provision of preventive care such as health screenings, 
public education and promotion of healthy living. With our hospital-centric 
healthcare system, the financing, provision and management of preventive 
care has been anchored by the Health Promotion Board in partnership with 
various types of organisations, from primary care providers to employers to 
VWOs. Subsidised financing appears to be ad hoc, depending on the 
campaigns that are being held with various agencies and donations. More 
investments in preventive care could arrest medical problems early on and 
prevent expensive treatment when conditions have become catastrophic. 
However, a balance needs to be struck to guard from over-screening and 
information overload, which might lead to unnecessary tests and medical 
procedures. The risk of over-screening can be mitigated by firmly 
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established clinical practice guidelines, such as those promulgated by 
Singapore’s Academy of Medicine.19  
 
In an acute care-centric model, mental healthcare also becomes 
underdeveloped. For a start, mental healthcare in Singapore is centred on 
acute care through the Institute of Mental Health (IMH). In addition, social 
care is a big part of mental healthcare, where preventive and remedial work 
through counselling and psychotherapy are important interventions in place 
of, or a complement to, medical treatment. Such social care is predominantly 
community-based and has therefore been provided for mainly by the social 
and community services sector. The National Mental Health Blueprint 2007–
2012 laid out a strategic plan for “promoting primary prevention, improving 
the provision and co-ordination of psychiatric services, developing mental 
health professionals, enhancing the mental health monitoring of the 
population and the quality of psychiatric services, as well as promoting 
mental health research” (Ministry of Health 2010, 4). More needs to be done 
to realise these aims and an overall healthcare system that supports more 
community-based initiatives away from institution-based efforts will be key.  
 
Co-payments are necessary to prevent over-consumption because they 
mitigate moral hazards that may arise where patients consume more than 
they should because someone else is paying. They are not medically 
hazardous in situations such as acute care and hospital services where 
genuine patients would not defer care. However, co-payments are less 
useful and perhaps even detrimental in preventive services such as cancer 
screening and regular diabetic follow-ups where people are already reluctant 
to seek healthcare due to the asymptomatic nature of their conditions. They 
are therefore powerful policy tools in healthcare that could drive economic 
and operational efficiency, enabling services to function well with reduced 
wastage and over-consumption. On the other hand, co-payments could 
result in lower aggregate levels of health and undesired long-term outcomes 
if bluntly and insensitively applied. Co-payments are also intrinsically 
regressive, with a higher burden suffered by lower-income workers. 
 
Finally, the existence of a large private market for healthcare and growth in 
medical tourism could lead to sub-optimal allocation of resources between 
the public and private healthcare sectors. According to data in the 2010 
Singapore Medical Council Annual Report, the private sector employs 40% 
of all medical specialists but caters to only 20% of healthcare needs in the 
acute hospital sector. Public hospitals supply 72% of hospital beds but 
                                            
19. See the academy’s “Guidelines and Consensus Statements for Healthcare 
Professionals”, http://www.ams.edu.sg/policy-advocacy/guidelines-consensus-
statements-for-healthcare-professionals. 
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employ just over 60% of registered specialists whilst private hospitals target 
a growing medical tourism market (although some report bed occupancies 
of only 40–60%). The Primary Care Survey 2010 indicates that whilst 
polyclinics employ only 14% of all resident general practitioners in Singapore, 
they attend to 45% of patients with chronic conditions that require long-term 
follow-up and in general, regular medications and management of risk 
factors, such as hypertension, asthma and chronic obstructive lung disease, 
diabetes and cancers (Sng 2011). Polyclinics serve 47% of Singapore’s 
elderly population’s primary care needs and the survey highlights this as an 
increasing trend.  
 
6.5.3 Recommendations for Healthcare 
 
The study group’s recommendations are outlined in three broad areas: 
 
 Strengthening the commitment to universal healthcare 
 Focusing healthcare on the well-being of patients 
 Developing resources to support a person-centric universal healthcare 
system 
 
 
Strengthening commitment to universal healthcare by improving 
access and affordability 
 
Provide clear definition of government’s universal healthcare coverage 
commitment 
With a rapidly ageing resident population, medical cost inflation and 
technological advances, individuals and families will find it increasingly 
difficult to shoulder healthcare expenses without governmental and societal 
support. Robust, established and accepted systems and policies need to be 
established to decide what the state will pay for, what it will subsidise and 
what it will not. This is a vital policy effort for sustainability as it allows for a 
sliding scale of health benefits depending on the resources available at any 
given point in time.  
  
Introduce basic and compulsory universal social health insurance 
(low-cost with no opt-outs) 
This is to maximise the benefits of risk-pooling and to reduce the effects of 
adverse selection. Health insurance is generally not economical for the 
elderly. The risk-based premiums paid by the elderly is prohibitively high and 
most will either be unable to afford or avoid paying these premiums, leading 
to a lack of coverage and sub-optimal risk-pools, which would reduce the 
viability of commercial schemes. To ensure the largest, most effective risk-
pooling, the government should establish a national social health insurance 
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model on a community risk-rating basis into which the entire population is 
enrolled, with no options to drop out of the scheme. This would be supported 
by central administration functionality, coupled with an underwriting 
commitment from a government reinsurance fund. There is hence some 
redistribution introduced into a universal health insurance, which could also 
consider setting premiums based on one’s ability to pay. The existing 
MediShield and ElderShield programmes could be further integrated and 
strengthened to build the foundations for such a universal basic social health 
insurance system in Singapore. 
 
Broaden coverage of the 3Ms 
Coverage of the 3Ms has been incrementally expanded, and this should 
continue especially since technological advancement has enabled more 
procedures and treatments to be done without hospitalisation. To move the 
system more towards preventive and primary care, and also to cater to long-
term care needs, individuals should be permitted to use Medisave and 
Medifund for a much wider range of physical as well as mental health 
treatment. Whilst MediShield coverage should remain primarily for 
catastrophic diseases, the definition of catastrophic illnesses could be 
broadened to non-fatal but high-impact and high-cost conditions such as 
cleft lip surgery or special needs care for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
children. The risks for these conditions are best pooled, and their coverage 
should also expand to long-term care.  
 
Index means test to inflation 
At a time of significant inflation in health and long-term care costs, inflexible 
means-testing thresholds could rapidly increase the out-of-pocket expenses 
of an increasing number of households. The absence of inflation 
adjustments could place considerable stress on households during periods 
of high inflation. Inflation indexation should be implemented for means-
testing criteria, co-payment schedules and MediShield/ElderShield benefits 
so as to ensure rapid rises in medical costs do not diminish affordability over 
time. 
 
Introduce co-payment caps 
The lack of co-payment caps can significantly reduce affordability for lower-
income patients as medical costs rise at rates above general wage increases 
and public subsidies remain unadjusted. The co-payment quantum for at-
risk groups should be capped and co-payment requirements should be lifted 
completely for selected cost-effective preventive health measures such as 
mammography and pap smears. Such co-payment limits should also be 
more seamlessly co-ordinated with the Medifund eligibility criteria. 
 
Make Medifund eligibility more transparent 
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Medifund acts as a safety net for those unable to afford subsidised medical 
bills after Medisave and MediShield coverage, if applicable. Medifund 
eligibility could be made more transparent to provide additional assurance 
to the segments of the population that do not have medical savings buffers. 
Currently, Medifund coverage is dependent on post-fact approval by a 
Medifund committee, resulting in a lack of certainty over the patient’s liability 
at the time the costs are incurred. While the current post-fact approval is said 
to provide flexibility in granting Medifund to individuals who might otherwise 
not be eligible, in our recommendations to move towards a stronger 
universal commitment and greater support for low-income people, the less 
stringent criteria might make the flexibility less necessary.  
 
Focusing healthcare on well-being of patients 
 
Build person-centric health system 
The principles of self-reliance and “many helping hands” have enabled 
Singapore’s healthcare system to be financially sustainable. However, 
besides the increasing difficulty that individuals have in relying on personal 
and family resources to finance their healthcare needs, Singapore’s self-
reliance model has led to an acute care-centric model that might have side-
lined patient well-being. Cost-sharing requirements also lead to burdensome 
administration and high dependence on the expert diagnoses and approvals 
of the doctor. While the group has argued that the 3M system is basically 
sound and can be retained with considerable broadening of its scope, there 
is a need to reform the regulatory and delivery models of healthcare. 
 
Establish outcomes-based regulatory framework 
Currently, financing of public health centres based on cost-recovery and of 
private centres based on fee-for-service incentivise seeing more patients 
and doling out more treatments rather than working towards improved health 
outcomes. Basically, every health episode is a revenue opportunity. A 
movement to an outcomes-driven performance measurement system, which 
is agnostic about the means of achieving health, could help spur innovations 
and collaborations that improve the overall health of the nation. It could also 
balance healthcare provision towards more preventive and primary care 
since chances of favourable outcomes are higher when illnesses are 
detected and treated earlier. Public hospitals and clinics could be financed 
based on national health statistics and private centres could be held 
accountable by requiring the publishing of their health statistics. The 
outcomes could be measured in terms of cost-effectiveness, thus helping to 
contain costs and prevent a race to achieve the highest health indicator at 
all costs. It can also encourage efforts to harness technology for higher 
productivity. No doubt, careful planning of what and how health outcomes 
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are to be measured would determine the success of such a financing and 
regulatory framework.  
 
Shift value orientation from professional-centricity to patient-centricity 
In terms of delivery, a shift in the value orientation of healthcare needs to 
first take place, from professional-centric (mainly specialist doctors) to 
patient-centric, from remedial-focused to preventive and primary care-
focused, and from institution-based to community-based. Such a re-
orientation in essence requires some devolution of power and responsibility 
from doctors to other health-related professionals such as nurses, social 
workers and community workers, and also to volunteer citizens. The latter 
are stronger touch points in preventive and chronic care, and also more 
accessible in the community. For example, long-term management of 
chronic illnesses that do not require further medical diagnosis might be more 
effectively managed by a friendly volunteer or community worker who is in 
regular contact with the patient for other social and community care needs. 
The modes of care could also expand to non-traditional forms such as 
remote care via tele- or e-services, which can be cost-effective in the local 
context.  
 
Localise healthcare using a community health model 
In order to realise the above shift in orientation, a localised community health 
model whose relationship between health services and the community could 
be characterised in both directions. Healthcare services could be offered 
along with other community services such as education and family services 
for the holistic care of individuals and families. The community could become 
more highly involved in the provision of healthcare (as described in the 
previous paragraph).  
 
Co-locate healthcare with other services  
The unit of healthcare provision then is not the hospital but the locality in 
which all the different types of social, community, educational, and health 
services are built and organised. This is akin to the slogan by former Health 
Minister Khaw Boon Wan’s “one Singaporean, one family physician” but 
expanded and intertwined with the other services — schools, integrated 
social service centres, community development centres, etc. — in that 
defined locality. These services could co-locate, for instance, a health clinic 
and a community library within a school, which could save physical space 
as well as lead to synergistic services, such as service learning for students 
in the clinic or the conducting of mental health awareness talks for both 
students and the public in the community library.  
 
Nationalise primary care financing 
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Whilst this chapter considers it appropriate for the private sector to play a 
major role in primary healthcare provision, it also considers it appropriate for 
the financing of healthcare to be “nationalised” through the increased 
portability and eligibility of the subsidies and services available under the 
Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS). Nationalisation of primary care 
financing will facilitate the outcomes-based regulation of healthcare; it also 
makes more sense for the locality-based delivery recommended above. For 
example, a plan of allocation that leads to former Health Minister Khaw’s one 
physician per family proposal might involve a public network of polyclinics in 
every estate and one primary care professional team servicing every 1,000 
residents. This recommendation needs to be further studied for its 
acceptability by private general practitioners.  
 
Developing resources to support a person-centric universal healthcare 
system 
 
Ramp up and reallocate manpower across healthcare spectrum 
Given the current and expected manpower crunch, there needs to be greater 
direct intervention to ramp up and more effectively reallocate the supply of a 
whole range of healthcare professionals. Programmes to train para-
professionals to undertake more standard procedures should be introduced. 
Given the complexity and multiple needs of a family unit, all social care 
professionals, including doctors, allied health professionals, social workers, 
financial assistance workers and volunteers, should be trained in four core 
competencies: ethics, cross-cultural work, integrated care and work with the 
elderly. 
 
Prioritise the National Electronic Health Records (NEHR) initiative 
The study group recognises the importance of information and reliable data 
in maintaining an efficient and sustainable health and long-term care system 
and believe the NEHR initiative is a significant step in boosting the system’s 
capacity to share information and data. From a governance perspective, a 
comprehensive NEHR system would permit the system to move towards a 
patient-centric model and also allow more reliable measurement and 
monitoring of health outcomes and costs. The study group therefore 
recommends the NEHR initiative be given priority, with incentives and 
penalties introduced to incentivise all service providers and stakeholders to 
utilise and participate in the system, and a national roll-out timeline for the 
launch of the data system. There should be clear guidelines on using the 
data in the system. 
6.6 CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
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There are several common themes across the three areas of social 
infrastructure development, out of which the study group has identified a 
number of cross-cutting recommendations.  
 
Set up localised one-stop centres for health and other social services 
First is the recommendation of more holistic integrated services, such as 
localised one-stop centres where healthcare, financial assistance, 
employment assistance and other social services co-exist. This localisation 
of care will require more collaboration between ministries. Such 
collaboration across disciplines and organisations will become normative 
instead of an additional good-to-have mode of service delivery. This would 
help build local communities that are naturally integrative and cross-
boundary.  
 
The study group’s recommendations envision the social infrastructure of 
2050 to be one where services will not just be community-based, but “in-
community”. The school-in-community and community-in-school model 
steers schools away from over-competitive academic orientation towards 
local relevance and more well-rounded student development. The 
community health model moves healthcare away from institution-based 
acute care towards more preventive community-based care. Social and 
community services will have oversight of services for needy populations, 
including health, financial and employment assistance. 
 
This locality focus as opposed to a national-level conceptualisation of social 
infrastructure has the potential to meet the multiple population needs 
highlighted in the beginning of this report. With the neighbourhood doctor, 
neighbourhood school and neighbourhood social and community centre all 
working together for the social well-being of the residents in that community, 
the “many helping hands” can be unified and empowered from within to 
develop children, support gainful employment for adults, engage the elderly 
and care for the needy. The locality-focused approach can also better 
integrate new immigrants and foreign workers, giving them a sense of 
belonging and responsibility in the local community.  
 
Services in such a model need to be dynamic, flexible and multi-disciplinary. 
It will require skilled workers who are conversant with community-centred 
work and community development in a diverse population and across 
different disciplines. Each worker in this model of care will need to do less in 
order to do more. Caseloads will have to decrease to enable each worker to 
do more intensive and extensive work with each client on their various 
different issues.  
Ramp up manpower for social infrastructure development 
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There is therefore an urgent need to ramp up manpower supply for social 
infrastructure development — an effort that will include substantial 
improvement in remuneration and status of all staff including allied 
healthcare professionals, allied educators and social services workers such 
as social workers and counsellors. As a society that prioritises people’s well-
being over economic gain, these workers must be duly recognised for their 
important work of shouldering the main responsibility of taking care of the 
well-being of persons-in-community.  
 
In this community-centric social infrastructure that values cross-fertilisation 
and a continuum of care, power is more dispersed from the “experts” to 
frontline staff, volunteers and even the clients themselves. Under this kind 
of manpower distribution, experts, lay volunteers and beneficiaries 
themselves would come together to co-create personal and communal 
development, recovery and progress. 
 
With boundaries blurred in delivering a range of services in multi-disciplinary 
teams to an aged population, all social infrastructure personnel should be 
trained in four core competencies: ethics, cross-cultural work, integrated 
care and working with the elderly.  
 
Redefine self-reliance principle  
Self-reliance, a key principle in health and in social and community care, 
needs to be redefined. The current definition of self-reliance requires 
temporary and small assistance so as to discourage dependence on the 
government. However, in the context of a mature skills-biased economy 
where unemployment and wage stagnation are structural, such an 
application of self-reliance results instead in cyclical dependence on aid. In 
the new paradigm of an advanced nation, the self-reliance principle would 
still be based on the government supporting individuals and communities to 
be self-reliant. However, instead of “government as a last resort”, it means 
helping to the point when people can stand on their own feet and be truly 
self-reliant. Government assistance — in using more holistic collaborative 
models as described above — would need to be longer-term and more 
generous.  
 
The group has also emphasised a paradigm where helping those who fall 
behind is prioritised. In healthcare, a strong and clear commitment to 
universal basic healthcare with social insurance would help provide an 
important safety net for a continuum of care from preventive to remedial. In 
education, commitment of resources to “level up” the weakest students and 
the weakest schools, emphasising a well-rounded set of core learning 
outcomes for all students, would require teachers and principals to be 
trained and assessed on such values instead of over-emphasising academic 
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performance. The delay of ability-based streaming to 16 years of age, and 
the reform of PSLE as a broad assessment to qualify for secondary 
education while holding on to high curriculum standards and teacher quality, 
would gear education towards continued overall high student performance 
without the negative consequences of hyper-competition, inequality and 
immobility. Social and community services, for which levelling up is a core 
business, will be more highly regarded and well resourced, as explained in 
the early section of this chapter.  
 
Extend social protection to all regardless of residential status to be 
truly inclusive 
As a city that will continue to be highly global with a continual flow of new 
migrants, the study group aims for truly inclusive communities where policies 
and programmes extend as well to foreigners and permanent residents. 
Such a society would extend legal, economic and social protection to all 
residents of Singapore, regardless of their residential status. Such a vision 
would require a more moderate ratio of local and foreign-born residents to 
work. New residents should also be provided with services to help them 
integrate not only into the community of Singapore as a nation but also 
anchored upon by their integration into the local communities where they 
reside.  
 
Apply the “many helping hands” principle more broadly 
Singapore in 2050 could also apply the “many helping hands” principle more 
broadly. The current narrow and strict adherence to it has resulted in 
perverse incentives and inefficiencies. Examples include cost-recovery 
bureaucracy in healthcare, requirements to co-ordinate with multiple parties 
for one programme that is funded by multiple sources, and clients “hunting” 
for assistance. The locality-based one-stop centres described above as well 
as other recommendations in this report on less prescriptive funding provide 
examples of applying “many helping hands” more broadly. 
 
The study group therefore also recommends that funding and regulation be 
based on their impact on well-being in terms of improvement in health, social 
well-being and well-rounded student development. Some of the impacts, e.g., 
character development and psycho-social motivation, are less measurable. 
Therefore, more general application of such non-tangible outcomes and a 
smaller set of clearly defined social goals should be accommodated. 
Otherwise, there is a danger of measuring narrow outputs and skewed KPIs. 
To make the well-being of the person-in-community the ultimate goal, 
Singapore must expend energies into measuring such impacts well, and 
through time, would get better and better at impact identification and 
measurement. 
Provide more data for planning and research  
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All the above recommendations require more data sharing with researchers 
and practitioners for their use in trends projection, service planning and 
programme evaluation. More data need to be shared as published reports 
as well as micro-data for research analysis.  
 
Foster more trust  
All the above recommendations also require more trust in society. Currently, 
a blend of low government funding but heavy government control has 
resulted in government-dependence despite the rhetoric of self-reliance. The 
central planning government has been looked to as trendsetter, funder and 
mobiliser. Inevitably, such a strong government role results in some level of 
inefficiency. The current model with strong central control needs to be 
replaced by a model where healthcare centres, social services, community 
groups and schools are given more room to experiment with ways to achieve 
the societal impacts that are collaboratively agreed upon. Governance 
needs to do more macro-managing, e.g., providing the regulatory 
environment and support, and less micro-managing, e.g., prescribing set 
delivery models. The efforts to build community and in-community services 
could also lead to more bottom-up approaches while fostering more trust.  
 
Society also needs to have more trust in service users. A society that 
chooses to have a strong social protection and to foster trust would have to 
expect some abuse from a minority few. At the same time, the collaborative 
and wrap-around manner of services that the report espouses should 
encourage greater knowledge and sharing between service providers and 
users to minimise such abuse.  
 
To foster the trust required of a socially cohesive society, Singapore’s macro 
environment plays an important role. Insights can be drawn from Oscar 
Lewis’ idea of a “culture of poverty”, which rejects mainstream societal 
values and ways (Lewis 1966). Lewis asserts that the culture of poverty 
develops more readily amongst “people who come from the lower strata of 
a rapidly changing society, and who are already partially alienated from it” 
(Lewis 1966, 24). One lesson from this is that pacing our speed of change 
— be it in terms of age profile, immigrant numbers and economic 
development — is critical in limiting the build-up of a culture of poverty and 
in building a sustainable society of trust.  
 
Overall, government budget for social welfare will increase. The question is 
to what extent. While our emphasis on social cohesion and more 
redistribution echo the ideals of Scandinavian welfare states, the study 
group is not advocating for a welfare state. Instead, given the current high 
inequality in Singapore and the social and infrastructural strains now being 
faced from high immigration, fast-paced changes and high economic 
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demands and yet low welfare provisions, Singapore should improve social 
protection and rethink its systems. 
  
Improve social protection 
Some might also question how attainable our vision and recommendations 
are, given Singapore’s current path. Can more egalitarian ideals be 
consistent with a migrant, Asian and socially stratified society? Our optimistic 
answer is yes. Singapore is currently at the cusp of social change. Inequality 
and division have become so wide that society appears ready for a review 
of the social compact. This is the time to emphasise social cohesion in policy 
priorities. The study group feels that there is groundswell for this. However, 
moving forward, citizen involvement will have to be skilfully managed in 
policy reforms, e.g., in establishing the extent to which people are willing to 
pay more taxes for a more egalitarian society.  
 
Finally, there is a danger that the policy shift might swing Singapore’s 
trajectory to the other extreme, where the country becomes uncompetitive 
and unable to attain a decent standard of living for our general population. 
Singapore will have to keep monitoring its policies and environment. Current 
policies and systems are likely to be inadequate in addressing the 
challenges of high inequality, low fertility and a rapidly ageing population. 
Inequality and low fertility are challenges faced by other countries as well, 
and the countries that face them did not expect this result by adopting the 
liberal market-oriented policies that they did (e.g., the US and China for 
inequality, Taiwan and Korea for low fertility). But hopefully with lessons from 
the past, Singapore will be better equipped to put in place a more balanced 
and equitable social infrastructure.  
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CHAPTER 7: SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
7.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
This chapter examines social capital and its development within the context 
of Singapore’s demographic changes and population challenges, and 
proposes policy recommendations to address issues in areas related to 
family; intergenerational relations; social identities; social divides; social 
cohesion and national identity; and national service and service to the nation. 
The study group begins by examining the core concept of social capital, 
along with its applications and relevance for the Singapore population 
scenarios and contexts. We then discuss key issues pertaining to social 
capital before providing a list of recommendations for the development of 
social capital in Singapore. 
 
7.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Social Capital: Concept and Relevance to Singapore 
 
Drawing on the works by various scholars (see Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993 
and 1995; and Stone 2003), the group uses the term social capital to refer 
to the actual or potential socio-psychological resources that facilitate 
individual or collective action to co-ordinate or co-operate in order to resolve 
problems and achieve goals for mutual benefit. The concept of social capital 
focuses on the resources available to help individuals do more than they can 
otherwise do on their own to achieve goals and accomplish positive 
outcomes. These resources are derived from the structure of social relations 
and the nature of social interactions between individuals. As such, social 
capital is rooted in social networks, relationships, trust and norms (especially 
reciprocity norms) shared among the individuals involved. 
 
Like traditional economic capital, social capital can be drawn upon as a 
resource to provide the means to achieve goals and, all other things being 
equal, individuals and communities with higher social capital are more likely 
to have higher efficacy in achieving the intended goals. However, there are 
two important differences that distinguish social capital from economic 
capital. First, while economic capital is tangible and ultimately uni-
dimensional in that it is reducible to monetary terms, social capital is 
intangible and multi-dimensional in nature with multiple bases of resource 
and influence. Second, while economic capital depletes when it is spent and 
remains stable or grows when kept in reserve, social capital exhibits the 
opposite behaviour — it grows when used and depletes when unused 
because networks, trust and norms are reinforced when translated into 
action, but decay over time when not acted upon. 
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Scholars have distinguished two types of social capital: bonding and bridging 
social capital. Each comes about as a result of different network structures 
and serves different functions within a given community.  
 
Bonding social capital involves trust and reciprocity norms in closed 
networks where individuals have mutual links to each other based on a 
distinct commonality. Such closed networks generally come about due to 
specific demographic characteristics such as race or religion but may also 
exist within groups that are brought together through a common cause or 
interest such as civil society or sports groups. While bonding social capital 
develops social cohesion among individuals within the group, high levels of 
bonding social capital can be exclusionary; it can also lead to negative 
consequences when employed excessively and in the absence of any 
bridging between groups due to strong within-group norms and social 
controls. Examples of these negative consequences include group-think and 
the stifling of personal freedoms.  
 
Bridging social capital, on the other hand, involves cross-cutting ties across 
groups. This is centred on loose connections between individuals in a more 
open social circle, which allows the sharing of fresh information, non-
redundant resources and new ideas. Bridging often occurs when members 
of one group interact with members of other groups to seek support or 
information. Bridging social capital could contribute to increased 
understanding between groups and facilitate inter-group relations. Bonding 
social capital is necessary for bridging social capital, and both types of social 
capital are important for intra- and inter-group relations when developing 
social capital in a community. 
It is useful to view social capital as both a state and a process. As a state, it 
describes the social-psychological resources at a particular point in time and 
the corresponding structure of social relations and the nature of social 
interactions between individuals. However, social relations are not static; 
they may evolve and change as they become influenced by various factors. 
As a process, the focus is on the development of social capital in which the 
interest is in the dynamics and relationships that lead to a particular state or 
various states of social capital at different points in time. Recent advances 
in longitudinal modelling allow us to track and examine a series of states of 
social capital, along other predictor and outcome variables, to understand 
how social capital changes over time in various ways (Chan 2002). 
 
Social capital is important because it predicts important outcomes such as 
collective action, problem-solving and social resilience to threats and crises. 
Social capital is critical to Singapore, given that we are a young and small 
country with a heterogeneous society made up of different races and 
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religions. The development of social capital has become particularly relevant 
to Singapore as we are now confronted with various population scenarios 
associated with multiple demographic changes related to increases in 
population size and diversity. These changes are complex and inter-related 
and much of their impact, both social and economic, are likely to depend on 
the development of social capital. Adequate social capital will help prevent 
negative societal consequences and promote positive ones. Thus, both 
prevention and promotion goals guided our discussion of issues as well as 
our recommendations.  
 
This chapter summarises the key issues and recommendations, with the aim 
of facilitating further public discussion and providing inputs for policymakers 
to make informed decisions on population policies for different population 
groups and profiles. 
 
 
7.3 ANALYSIS 
 
Issues Relating to Development of Social Capital in Singapore  
 
In this section, we discuss issues of social capital in areas related to family, 
intergenerational relations, social identities, social divides, social cohesion 
and national identity, and conscription (i.e., National Service) and overall 
service to the nation. The discussion provides the basis for the 
recommendations outlined in the next section. 
 
Family 
Families are important building blocks for social capital development as they 
are primary vehicles for fostering attachments and rootedness. Strong 
families can engender rootedness and affective commitment to Singapore 
by creating strong social and emotional attachments as well as a sense of 
belonging. 
 
Public policy and public discourse regarding the family in Singapore have 
largely been centred on the concept of a nuclear family consisting of two 
generations, with both parents present or an extended family comprising 
three generations living under one roof. In order to understand the 
relationship between families and social capital in the context of Singapore’s 
population challenges, it is necessary to go beyond this narrow conception 
of family (i.e., nuclear or extended family) and to take into account several 
trends that are likely to persist into the future. These include rising 
singlehood, low total fertility rate (TFR), ageing and longer life expectancy, 
and increased immigration and influx of foreigners. Specifically, these trends 
are likely to lead to a diversity of family forms that are qualitatively different 
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from the traditional concept of a nuclear or extended family, some of which 
are either already evident today or likely to become pervasive in the near 
future. Examples include double-income married couples with no children 
(commonly referred to as “DINK”), double-income married couples with 
children brought up by foreign domestic workers, single-parent families, 
multi-generational households comprising more than three generations, and 
transnational marriages. These heterogeneous family forms, which are 
currently not explicitly accounted for in policymaking, will need to be 
examined in detail and taken into consideration in the efforts on family 
development and relating family to social capital. 
 
The combined trends of rising singlehood, declining TFR and increasing 
lifespan in Singapore imply that there will be an increase in the proportion of 
elderly living alone. Hence, it is critical to correctly identify and adequately 
address the relevant and emerging issues of health and community care. 
For example, elderly who are living alone do not have the type of financial, 
physical and social support that a family can provide for their healthcare 
needs. This has implications for early health promotion, the relevance of 
various initiatives to enhance active ageing, and infrastructure planning 
including the type and accessibility of facilities. 
 
Finally, rising singlehood itself is a trend with social capital ramifications for 
Singapore. As more Singaporeans remain unmarried, either by choice or 
constraint of circumstances, they will form an increasingly large and 
significant segment of the population. Public policies, especially those 
formulated with the intent to promote family formation and procreation, will 
need to recognise the needs of Singaporean singles and their contributions 
and rights (both actual and perceived) as citizens. This is particularly 
relevant in the area of housing policies, given that current policies explicitly 
provide family support, e.g., providing financial incentives for family support. 
Failing to do so will lead to a sense of alienation and perception of unfairness 
and discrimination among Singaporean singles who constitute a large and 
significant segment of the population that can contribute either positively or 
negatively to social capital development in Singapore. 
 
Intergenerational relations 
In the 2013 Population White Paper (NPTD 2013) and related official 
statements on Singapore’s ageing population, a central focus was on the 
adverse consequences that would result from increasing old-age 
dependency ratios for Singaporeans if there are no mitigation effects from 
procreation and immigration. The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the 
number of persons 65 years and over per one hundred persons aged 15 to 
64 years. The conceptualisation is based on the assumption that it is 
appropriate to bifurcate Singaporeans into two groups with those below the 
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age of 65 having to economically support those above it. The validity of this 
assumption is questionable on both economic and social grounds. It 
incorrectly assumes that upon reaching 65 years of age, Singaporeans are 
no longer able to contribute to society at large and will suddenly and 
automatically become a burden and dependent on those who are younger. 
 
The age of 65 years is one of many arbitrary cut-offs that could be selected 
to indicate economic contribution and dependency. The official retirement 
age is a function of national and organisational employment policies, which 
can be changed (see also Chapter 2 on Capital). In addition, actual 
permanent retirement from any employment and economically productive 
activity is partly dependent on the individual’s choice and circumstances, 
some of which may be influenced by the prevailing social norms and policies. 
In reality, many Singaporeans aged 65 and above are economically active 
and contribute either directly or indirectly, as well as significantly, to the 
vibrancy of Singapore’s economy, while many aged 25 years or younger1 
are still in the schooling phase of life, and not in a position to provide financial 
support to family members. 
 
Moving forward in the population projections, older Singaporeans will 
become more highly educated and have longer life expectancy. Together 
with advances in technology and medical science, adoption of healthy 
lifestyles and redesign of work, it is highly likely that post-65 year olds will 
be in sufficiently good health for a longer period of time, thereby allowing 
older Singaporeans to make productive and significant contributions, both 
economically and socially. 
 
Older Singaporeans should have opportunities to stay well integrated into 
both the workplace, at their own pace and in their chosen area of work, and 
the society, in various voluntary endeavours. Each generation of older 
Singaporeans will possess not only economic capital but also important 
social knowledge and skills related to history, culture and practical 
experiences that can be transferred to younger generations. These 
resources are valuable assets to society and contribute positively to social 
capital. When older Singaporeans are cast in more positive light or have built 
strong family ties, intergenerational relations are enhanced and positive 
intergenerational transfers are more likely to occur, which in turn contribute 
to the development of social capital. 
 
In short, population policy formulation and public discussion need to move 
away from a fixation on reducing the old-age dependency ratio and the 
                                            
1. These are known as “young dependents” (although traditionally either 15 or 20 
years rather than 25 will be used as the cut-off age). 
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conjecture that a high ratio will produce adverse consequences, while 
rethinking the current assumptions upon which the old-age dependency ratio 
is based. The current focus on the old-age dependency ratio and its 
conceptualisation perpetuates a counterproductive stereotype that ageing is 
inherently negative and incorrectly casts older Singaporeans in a negative 
light. This is counterproductive to addressing population challenges and 
likely to harm intergenerational relations and negatively affect social capital. 
 
In contrast to the negative framing of the concept of old-age dependency 
ratio and the underlying notion that constructs ageing as a liability, our view 
of older Singaporeans as an asset and valuable resource will lead to a 
different orientation towards social expenditure on the elderly. The latter 
should not be construed as a zero-sum cost or as the depletion of resources. 
This erroneous construal will lead to misallocation of resources and funds. 
Instead, it should be construed as a continuous investment in human 
resources, with efforts in enhancing health, work, community development 
and other elderly-focused initiatives regarded as strategic, goal-directed 
investment to enhance citizen well-being and developing intergenerational 
relations. This investment will have a positive multiplier effect that broadens 
and builds social capital. 
 
Social identities 
Social identity is the part of an individual’s self-concept, derived from 
perceived membership in a social group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). People 
possess multiple social identities corresponding to their social group 
memberships (e.g., nationality, ethnicity, religion), and these identities may 
vary in strength. Different identities can be activated in different situations. 
Individuals from different groups may differ in the weights and priority to 
which they assign to their different social identities. Because social identities 
influence the way an individual thinks, feels and acts, they are powerful sites 
for the development of social capital. Social identities can be potentially 
unifying or divisive forces through their direct impact on cognition and 
emotion, which in turn influence individual and intergroup behaviours. 
 
As the demographic profile of the population changes, issues related to 
ethnic and religious group identities will increase in importance and 
complexity. The current CMIO model in which Singaporeans are classified 
into four ethnic categories (i.e., Chinese, Malay, Indians, Others) does not 
adequately reflect the complex realities of how people perceive themselves 
and one another, especially with regard to local-foreigner perceptions. For 
example, based on the CMIO model, PRC Chinese foreigners and new 
Singapore citizens who were PRC Chinese nationals are classified in the 
same Chinese ethnic category as Chinese Singaporeans who have grown 
up in Singapore or lived here for many years. While belonging to the same 
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ethnic category according to CMIO classification, Chinese Singaporeans are 
clearly distinguishable from PRC Chinese foreigners and naturalised citizens 
in terms of some cultural beliefs, values, attitudes, norms, habits and 
perceptions. Moreover, PRC Chinese themselves are not a homogeneous 
group given the immense cultural diversity across different regions of origin 
in China. Such “within-PRC Chinese” differences create new layers of 
complexity. 
 
The cultural differences among the various groups within the same ethnic 
classification are likely to result in important group differences in how they 
behave and react to the same situation. When not adequately managed, 
these practical group differences could lead to violations of expectations, 
misunderstanding and conflicts, which in turn threaten bridging social capital. 
Using the same ethnic category (e.g., Chinese) as a basis for policies (e.g., 
ethnic-based self-help groups) and predictions of behaviour is unlikely to 
achieve the desired goal and likely to lead to negative unintended 
consequences. This is because important actual group differences are 
masked when individuals from these different groups are classified together 
into the same ethnic category. 
 
Challenges similar to the issues on ethnicity also apply to the classification 
of individuals into religious groups. Religious customs and practices differ 
between distinct communities, and this could occur even within the same 
religion (Kong 2010). These differences can sometimes alienate people or 
lead to conflicts between people who possess differing beliefs or between 
locals and foreigners who are unfamiliar with the religious landscape in 
Singapore. As with the CMIO model, the current classification of the major 
religions in Singapore does not capture the complexities and heterogeneity 
within the same religion. Failing to adequately manage differences that are 
rooted in religious group identities will threaten bridging social capital. 
 
The Singapore government has been successful in engaging leaders of the 
major religions in Singapore to address multi-religious issues including inter-
religious group conflicts. However, the inflow of foreigners, which changes 
the profile of the population, will increase religious diversity in Singapore due 
to introduction of new religions and splintering within a traditional major 
religion or religious community. Thus, the government may face new 
challenges in attempting to identify the actual and emergent leaders who 
exert influence over the believers. As the nominal membership of a religious 
group— classified according to the major religions in Singapore — increases 
due to the inflow of foreigners, the actual diversity of the communities within 
the same official religion category could increase in complex ways and lead 
to increasing fragmentation in the traditional religious communities. For 
example, divergences within the same official religion category may occur 
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along class, ethnic or nationality lines. The increased diversity could also 
lead to the lack of a unified religious authority for a major religion. 
 
Given that religious beliefs address fundamental issues of values and 
morality, which could influence basic cognitions, emotions and behaviours, 
religion provides a social identity that has potentially powerful effects on 
individuals and groups. The strength of a religious group identity may be 
further enhanced for religious groups with increased social interactions in 
terms of frequency, duration and intensity. A strong religious group identity 
will readily translate into collective perception and action that are often 
persistent and resilient. It increases bonding social capital among the 
believers and could lead to positive or negative consequences depending 
on the alignment of interests between religious groups and between the 
religion group and the larger society. For example, religion could play a 
significant role in helping newcomers to adjust to Singapore, which can 
facilitate the development of bridging social capital between locals and 
newcomer groups. 
 
Religion could also motivate a religious community into societal contributions 
through social services. However, religious harmony remains the paramount 
concern for Singapore. Care must be taken to ensure that religious harmony 
is preserved despite the increasing diversity associated with population 
changes due to the rapid inflow of foreigners. 
 
Social divides 
Part of our population challenges involves different forms of social divides 
that add to the complexity of social stratification in Singapore (Tan 2004). 
These social divides have not been given explicit or sufficient attention in the 
Population White Paper and in public discussions on population issues. 
These social divides separate people into distinct social groups in a way that 
reduces bridging social capital. Some of these social divides are created or 
accentuated by the large and rapid inflow of foreigners. When not 
adequately addressed, they will hinder the positive development of social 
capital. Such divides include social inequalities (both actual and perceived) 
such as large and increasing disparities in opportunities and outcomes 
relating to wages, income and wealth, education, occupation, housing and 
land use. The divides also include social disparities in lifestyle and social 
norms. 
 
Social divides manifest themselves as societal issues that call out for urgent 
attention. Examples include the decline in social mobility, mismatch between 
citizen aspirations and job opportunities, possible unemployment or under-
placement of Singaporean graduates, differences in values and attitudes 
relating to meritocracy and definitions of success, fairness at work, and 
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social equality and equity in land use. These societal issues, which take the 
form of citizen concerns and aspirations, are fundamental because they 
relate to societal goals and the kind of society that Singaporeans want. Thus, 
we need to give priority to adequately address these citizen concerns and 
aspirations as a means of making progress towards achieving desirable 
societal end goals. Social tension is likely to emerge if these social issues 
are framed as unfortunate or inevitable consequences of difficult but 
necessary decisions in policy trade-off situations to achieve a vibrant 
economy. 
 
Social cohesion and national identity 
The 2013 Population White Paper states that the first of three pillars for a 
sustainable population and dynamic Singapore is to build a strong 
“Singaporean core” (the other two pillars are creating good jobs and 
opportunities for Singaporeans and creating a high quality living 
environment). It also states that a strong Singaporean core is needed for a 
cohesive society. The definition of a Singaporean core and what is meant by 
its strength are not explicitly stated in the White Paper. However, judging by 
various references made to maintaining a specific citizen proportion and 
sustaining it as the Singaporean core of the total population, augmented by 
non-citizens, we may infer that the Singaporean core is operationally defined 
in the White Paper as Singapore citizens. 
 
When used in the context of strengthening social cohesion and national 
identity, the concept of “Singaporean core” needs to be related to both 
bonding social capital within the core and bridging social capital between 
those in the core and those outside it. In this regard, when defining or 
identifying the core, it is important to distinguish between legal and socio-
psychological markers of being Singaporean. 
 
From a technical perspective, Singaporean core may be equated with the 
proportion of the total population who are Singapore citizens. This 
perspective operationalises the concept of Singaporean core in terms of a 
purely legal definition. Membership in or outside the core is dichotomous and 
mutually exclusive, and it is determined by the rule of law and objectively 
verifiable (e.g., possession of a Singaporean identity card). However, this 
legal definition is distinct from the social-psychological markers that an 
individual uses, whether consciously or not, perceiving who is a “true” or 
“real” Singaporean and considering what is meant by being a Singaporean. 
 
From the perspective of Singaporeans who have grown up in Singapore and 
lived here for many years, these markers are likely to include alignment with 
certain core values (e.g., racial and religious harmony, meritocracy, rule of 
law) and adherence to certain behavioural norms, e.g., not jumping queues, 
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volume of speech and gestures used in conversation, not eating in public 
transit, etc., that have taken root among Singaporeans in the past few 
decades. When new Singapore citizens are perceived to regularly exhibit 
behaviours that indicate value incongruence or norm violation, they are 
deemed as being “un-Singaporean” and less likely to be accepted as “true” 
or “real” Singaporeans. Social integration may then become more difficult, 
negatively affecting social cohesion among Singaporeans. When foreigners 
in Singapore are perceived to regularly violate values and norms that matter 
to Singaporeans, it creates an “us versus them” mindset that will reinforce 
local-foreign divides. This in turn negatively affects bridging social capital, 
thereby threatening social cohesion in Singapore. 
 
There are also social capital implications of foreigner groups dominating in 
major sectors such as the healthcare, finance and service industries. Over-
reliance on foreigners, especially on specific nationality groups, will threaten 
social cohesion through weakening our economic security and social 
resilience. In the event that a critical mass of foreigners choose to leave 
Singapore or engage in disruptive value-incongruent or norm-violating 
behaviours, e.g., labour strikes, unfair employment practices, etc., it will 
have direct and immediate effects on economic functioning. It will also create 
intergroup tensions and erode trust, producing lasting adverse effects on 
bridging social capital between Singaporeans and foreigners. These effects 
will translate into decreased commitment to Singapore and weakened 
rootedness to the country. 
 
Singapore’s infrastructure and local population were not prepared for the 
rapid and large influx of foreigners that occurred in the past few years. The 
large numbers of foreigners and rapid influx create threats to social cohesion 
from crowding, clustering, competition, comparisons and conflicts (Chan 
2012a) and increase the risks and uncertainties that accompany population 
challenges (Yeoh and Lin 2012). Understanding these challenges will help 
focus attention on the real concerns of Singaporeans about integrating 
foreigners and provide a framework for efforts towards integration and policy 
formulation and implementation. For example, the framework by Chan 
(2012b) proposes that population policies need to pay attention to the policy 
purpose, priorities and perceptions and explicates the various ways we can 
enhance integration by adopting more citizen-centric approaches to public 
policy, developing opportunities for contributions by locals and foreigners, 
investing in community development, being more sensitive in our 
communications and effectively managing conflicts and crises. 
 
National Service and service to the nation 
There are two population challenges regarding National Service (NS) that 
need to be addressed urgently and adequately. The first concerns citizen 
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perceptions of new citizens and foreigners who do not serve NS and the 
other concerns citizen commitment to NS. 
 
NS is widely considered by Singaporeans as a national duty of male citizens 
that involves significant sacrifice. Comparison with foreigners who do not 
serve NS may involve cost-benefit analyses of the relative contributions that 
Singaporeans and foreigners have made to Singapore and the relative 
benefits they have gained from the economic pie and public policies. The 
comparison is however much more than an economic calculation. It involves 
principles of fairness, social reciprocity, sense of belonging, divergence of 
interests and beliefs in the rights, responsibilities, privileges and entitlements 
of citizens and non-citizens. The concerns arising from the comparison of 
NS are rooted in non-economic values and principles, and cannot be 
adequately addressed by economic or monetary answers alone (Chan 
2012a). Having served NS is also highly ranked by Singaporeans as a 
social-psychological marker of being Singaporean when they perceive new 
male citizens (Leong 2012). Perceptions of unfairness and social tensions 
happen when they see that there are many new citizens who do not need to 
serve NS. These perceptions and tensions, which arise from the erosion of 
the universality principle of NS, threaten bridging social capital between 
Singaporeans who serve NS and new male citizens who do not, and also 
eventually bonding social capital among Singapore citizens. 
 
The first challenge stemming from comparison of NS liability leads to the 
second challenge of maintaining citizen commitment to NS. As the number 
and proportion of foreigners and new citizens who do not serve NS in the 
population increases, the comparison on NS will threaten the social-
psychological concept of the Singaporean core and the number in this core 
will decrease relative to the legal definition of Singapore citizens. This 
declining Singaporean core may question the meaningfulness and 
worthiness of doing NS and defending a country that is inhabited by a large 
proportion of foreigners and new male citizens who do not perform NS. The 
adverse outcomes are directly indicative of a significant weakening of 
national and social resilience, stemming from the erosion of NS as an 
institution and declining citizen commitment to the defence of Singapore and 
citizen rootedness in the country. 
 
The primary purpose of NS is national defence, but NS has important social 
by-products that are directly relevant to social capital. The mandatory, 
universality and interactional aspects of NS make it a powerful institution and 
environment for socialisation with a diverse range of people, as well as the 
integration and rootedness of those who serve NS and their families and 
significant others who are affected. Given the significant role of NS as a site 
of social capital development and the above two population challenges 
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related to NS, Singapore needs to better explicate, tighten and enforce NS 
obligations, particularly as a consideration for citizenship. In addition, given 
that NS provides a powerful experience for developing social capital and 
national socialisation, it begs the question of why certain groups such as 
females and foreigners are left out of the process. 
 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the major issues discussed in the preceding section, we next 
examine the implications of specific population challenges and derive the 
following five sets of recommendations for social capital and its development. 
 
Family and Intergenerational Relations 
 
Enhance integration of policies and co-ordination of initiatives 
between MSF and MCCY 
With effect from 1 November 2012, the Ministry of Community Development, 
Youth and Sports (MCYS) was restructured into the Ministry of Social and 
Family Development (MSF) to bring a sharper focus on the government’s 
work in the development of families and social services (PMO 2012). The 
previous roles of MCYS on strengthening community bonds, volunteerism 
and philanthropy as well as engaging youth and developing sports, were 
taken over by a newly formed ministry (Ministry of Culture, Community and 
Youth, or MCCY). Several agencies under the purview of the former MCYS 
were also taken over by MCCY. MCCY is now seen as the lead ministry to 
co-ordinate the government’s efforts to build social capital and strengthen 
community bonds (Ng 2013). However, the family is an important site of 
social capital, with major implications from issues of different family forms 
and intergenerational relations. Hence, there is a need to ensure that a 
“whole-of-government” approach to social capital development will go 
beyond the technical co-ordination across agencies to enhance policy 
integration. We propose that MSF and MCCY institutionalise regular inter-
ministerial forums at both the senior management and staff operational 
levels to ensure that policies and initiatives are well integrated in the areas 
of family and social capital. There is also a need to co-ordinate with the 
Ministry of Health on issues of active ageing and intergenerational relations. 
 
Conduct studies on transnational marriages 
Recent data showed that about 40% of all citizen marriages in Singapore in 
2012 involved a foreign spouse (NPTD 2013, 19). While marriage is a 
personal choice, the conditions under which some of these transnational 
marriages are formed may not be conducive to forming stable and quality 
families. An example is the case of Singaporean males entering into 
marriages through commercial matchmaking with women from foreign 
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countries in which there are little or no interaction between the couple prior 
to marriage. These marriages may tend to be less stable and they create 
citizenship, child custody, child development and family functioning issues 
when they result in separation or divorce. To prevent and mitigate the social 
problems that accompany severe marital conflicts and dysfunctional families, 
more empirical studies on transnational marriages are needed to develop 
evidence-based approaches to facilitate these marriages to become sites of 
positive rather than negative social capital (Yeoh et al. 2013). 
 
Review policies on rights and privileges for singles and non-
traditional family forms 
To address the problem of the low TFR, government policies have been 
formulated to explicitly signal and recognise the importance of marriage and 
parenthood. This is done through administering Marriage and Parenthood 
packages that directly benefits and gives priority to marriage and childbirth 
in areas such as housing, paid leave and financial support for childcare. That 
is, maximum Marriage and Parenthood benefits are given to Singaporeans 
with the traditional family form consisting of a married couple with children. 
However, some of these Marriage and Parenthood initiatives may have 
direct or indirect effects that result in important disadvantages to citizens 
simply because of their status as a single or unwed parent. Given that 
marriage and child-bearing are personal choices and both singlehood and 
failure to bear children may also be a result of circumstances beyond one’s 
control, Singaporeans who are single or in non-traditional family forms may 
feel alienated or unfairly discriminated by the Marriage and Parenthood 
policies. These perceptions may reduce their stakes in Singapore and 
weaken their commitment and rootedness to the country. The tension is 
likely to increase as Marriage and Parenthood policies expand to cover more 
areas in diverse life domains (e.g., housing, work leave, financial incentives), 
especially in areas involving citizen rights and entitlements that are thought 
not to depend on marital or parenthood status. With the likely increases in 
the number of singles, delayed marriages, childless couples, delayed 
parenthood and various non-traditional family forms, we propose a 
comprehensive review of policies to address the needs of these diverse 
groups of Singaporeans who should be part of the Singaporean core and 
could contribute significantly to social capital. 
 
Develop mixed-use infrastructure and facilities to promote family and 
intergenerational relations 
Facilities that are built to cater to the needs of the elderly and increase their 
well-being, such as senior activity and wellness centres, should be located 
within residential areas. However, wherever practically feasible, these 
facilities should be developed as part of a mixed-use infrastructure and 
facilities cluster as opposed to exclusively for elderly care (this 
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recommendation corresponds with similar points raised by the Land and 
Social Infrastructure Development study groups). This will help prevent 
stigmatisation and isolation of the elderly and conflicts over land use in 
residential areas. The mixed-use and facility cluster should serve a 
complementary range of activities and services (e.g., childcare, senior 
activities, libraries, social enterprises, etc.) and enable accessibility to and 
foster interactions of different generations. These facilities could also be 
tailored to the specific needs of communities based on grassroots feedback 
so as to create a sense of community ownership and belonging. 
 
Target health screening and promotion early  
Research has shown that individuals with poor health are more likely to have 
poor social relations and low social well-being. Many activities for developing 
social interactions and relationships (especially those involving older 
persons) presuppose a basic level of health among the individuals involved. 
Good, healthy functioning is a fundamental pillar for developing social capital. 
Although the life expectancy of Singaporeans has increased, this index of 
human development does not measure health conditions such as long-term 
chronic illness or ailments that Singaporeans may face as they grow older. 
We propose that that the government work with the private and people 
sectors to institute a comprehensive and targeted national health screening 
programme over the individual’s lifespan beginning from a young age. The 
early screenings will enable the early detection of health risks and more 
effective prevention and management of health problems for an ageing 
population.  
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Create alternative care arrangements for the elderly 
With increasing singlehood, declining fertility and increasing life expectancy, 
there will be more elderly Singaporeans who are living alone. Many of them 
may not have family members or caregivers to provide the physical and 
social support that will facilitate active ageing or even the basic support 
necessary for a reasonable level of healthy functioning and well-being. We 
propose that the government study alternative care arrangements for the 
elderly and introduce new arrangements to complement existing ones. While 
some of these alternative arrangements can be quite readily introduced as 
they are practical, feasible and conform to social norms, others may involve 
bold and innovative solutions. For example, the government may consider 
authorising the formation of a quasi-family unit where elderly Singaporeans 
are allowed to live together in the same housing unit and care for each other 
with legally binding rights and responsibilities.  
 
Social Identification  
 
Systematically engage non-PR foreigners on issues of harmonious 
relations across different nationalities, races and religions  
As stated in the Population White Paper, non-PR foreigners living in 
Singapore currently form a significant part of the total population (1.49 million 
in 2012, or 28% of the total population), and it is projected to increase in size 
and proportion, estimated at 1.8 to 1.9 million or about 31% in 2020 and then 
2.3 to 2.5 million or about 36% in 2030. In population discussions, the 
government uses the term “transient non-resident population” to refer to this 
group of non-PR foreigners. However, the adjective “transient” is a 
misnomer in terms of their role in the development of social capital in 
Singapore. The numbers imply that for every 10 persons living in Singapore, 
three or four are non-PR foreigners. This large group of non-PR foreigners 
includes various types of work pass holders in diverse jobs (e.g., 
professionals, managers, executives, technicians, construction workers, 
foreign domestic workers, etc.), students and dependents of citizens and 
PRs, and work pass holders. They interact with Singaporeans on a daily 
basis as they live, work and play in Singapore. They constitute a 
heterogeneous composite of foreigners of different nationalities, ethnicities 
and religions with diverse values and cultural backgrounds, and their 
presence adds to the diversity of core beliefs and attitudes held by 
individuals living in Singapore.  
 
Given the fact that social identities based on nationality, race and religion 
are strongly evocative of one’s thoughts, feelings and behaviours including 
collective action, it is important to create opportunities and programmes for 
non-PR foreigners to learn more about local norms and values relating to 
national pride, race relations, and religious sensitivities, and how they may 
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adapt to these norms and be sensitive to these values. Compared to most 
new citizens and PRs who have taken a significant step to commit to 
Singapore, aim to fit into the society and have higher stakes in the country, 
most non-PR foreigners are likely to view Singapore as a transit point for 
work or study. It is unrealistic to expect that all or most of the non-PR 
foreigners will naturally or make significant and sustained efforts to fit well 
into local norms and values. Hence, we propose that the government work 
with the various stakeholders (e.g., employers, religious groups and ethnic-
based self-help groups) to systematically engage non-PR foreigners to 
increase their sensitivity to local norms and values, with particular focus on 
promoting harmonious relations across different nationalities, races and 
religious groups in Singapore. This systematic engagement is necessary to 
prevent and mitigate the adverse effects on social resilience that result from 
inter-group conflicts. When done effectively, it also increases the pool of 
non-PR foreigners with high integration potential to become suitable PRs 
and eventually integrated new citizens who contribute to the Singaporean 
core. 
 
Conduct citizen-led mandatory and voluntary programmes to help 
suitable foreigners better understand Singapore before they become 
PRs and new citizens  
To enhance local-foreigner integration, efforts should be made to promote 
foreigners’ understanding of Singapore in terms of important laws, values, 
norms and cultures. Although an important part of this understanding may 
come naturally over time from daily experiences in Singapore, these 
naturalistic experiences may be limited for foreigners with few opportunities 
for interaction given the circumstances of their workplace and social 
networks. Moreover, there are many local norms, values, cultures and laws 
that are best learned by the foreigner from a combination of structured 
programmes and daily experiences. We propose that a wide spectrum of 
Singapore citizens be engaged to conduct both mandatory and voluntary 
programmes on different critical aspects of Singapore, focusing on laws, 
norms, values and the practices and beliefs associated with the major ethnic 
and religious groups in Singapore. Having a wide spectrum of Singaporeans 
to lead these programmes will also provide Singaporeans an avenue for 
positive interactions with diverse foreigners, thereby enhancing local-
foreigner integration and bonding social capital. It is important that these 
integration programmes be conducted early and well before foreigners are 
granted PR status or citizenship. This will reduce the problems of integration 
tensions experienced or caused by new PRs and new citizens. 
 
Review regulatory safeguards and barriers to entry for social and 
community services provided by racial or religious groups  
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Consistent with Singapore being a secular state with individual freedom of 
religion, the government makes a clear separation between the teachings of 
religious organisations and the secular social services that these 
organisations provide to those who are in need. Currently, government 
funding and land are not given to religious organisations that do not follow 
the rules of secularism in the delivery of their social services. However, given 
the strength of positive influence that religions could have on their believers’ 
social identities and hence their beliefs, emotions, attitudes, motivations and 
behaviours, delivery of social services by religious groups should be 
encouraged rather than prevented in some situations. For example, religious 
groups may be well suited or more suited than secular groups to deliver 
some social services to their believers. When managed well, delivery of 
services by religious groups could enhance social capital in more effective 
ways than secular groups. We propose that the government review the 
regulatory safeguards and barriers to entry relating to delivery of social 
services by religions organisations, taking into consideration both the goal 
to prevent negative outcomes and the goal to promote positive outcomes. 
 
Social Divides 
 
Involve social enterprises and non-profit organisations in businesses, 
job creation and skill development for Singaporeans  
Currently, almost all major initiatives directed at creating jobs and developing 
work-relevant skills for Singaporeans as well as facilitating small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) for Singaporeans, are led and dominated by the 
government and the labour movement through their respective agencies. 
The study group proposes that the government partner or involve social 
enterprises and relevant non-profit organisations (e.g., voluntary welfare 
organisations and civil societies) in these economic development efforts for 
Singaporeans. This involvement will highlight and build on the important 
reciprocal causal linkages connecting Singaporeans’ economic and social 
concerns. It also provides opportunities for the development of a more 
efficacious and vibrant people sector as well as synergistic relationships 
between civil society and government, both of which will enhance social 
capital (Koh and Soon 2012). 
 
Prioritise the creation of value-added jobs for Singaporeans and 
development of Singaporean core at worker and leadership levels  
Having sufficient value-added jobs for Singaporeans that provide good 
person-job fit is important for economic productivity; it also contributes to 
social capital by reducing negative outcomes from citizen unemployment 
and underemployment as well as citizen perceptions of disparity and inequity 
from upward comparison with foreigners. As mentioned in the previous 
section, the development of a Singaporean core at both the worker and 
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leadership levels across the major sectors to avoid an over-reliance on 
foreigners is critical for security, economic and social resilience. Hence, we 
propose that the government give top priority to the two goals of creating 
value-added jobs for Singaporeans and developing a Singaporean core at 
both worker and leadership levels. It could start with including these two 
goals as major key performance indicators for economic development 
agencies. This is to prevent an over-emphasis on delivering initiatives or 
project outcomes that have high economic value but may not directly 
translate to benefits for citizens; or may even create the need for a critical 
mass of workers or leaders that can only be filled by foreigners with little 
probability of effectively training and grooming Singaporeans to take over 
these jobs.  
 
Developing a strong Singaporean core in certain professions requires a 
concerted effort to improve career development, salaries and working 
conditions. In particular, community-based work (e.g., allied health 
professionals, paramedics and caregivers) that contributes directly to social 
capital faces a shortfall in part because the pay may have been depressed 
to a level acceptable only to foreigners and many Singaporeans see the 
conditions of the profession as undesirable. The study group proposes that 
the government conduct comprehensive reviews and invest more to improve 
the work conditions and career prospects of community-based professions, 
so as to attract more Singaporeans to take on these jobs.  A similar 
recommendation is made by the Social Infrastructure Development study 
group (Chapter 6). 
 
Extend the role of the Tripartite Alliance for Fair Employment Practices 
(TAFEP)  
A local-foreigner divide occurs when Singaporeans experience feelings of 
neglect and react negatively when they perceive, rightly or wrongly, that they 
are unfairly disadvantaged at work in favour of foreigners. One example is 
the belief that foreign employers are hiring or promoting foreigners based on 
similarity or affiliations rather than merit. Recently, the Tripartite Alliance for 
Fair Employment Practices (TAFEP) has stepped up its efforts to promote 
fairness at work through public education, engagement with employers and 
dispute resolution. We propose that TAFEP be given more resources and 
authority, including legal powers if needed, to extend its role of promoting 
fairness at work. TAFEP’s toolbox should include the full range of functions 
of education, engagement, arbitration, regulation, accreditation, 
enforcement and deterrence. 
Enhance whole-of-government approach in addressing social mobility 
 The large and increasing income and wealth inequality in Singapore raises 
issues of social mobility for Singaporeans from lower-income households. A 
large income or wealth disparity coupled with low social mobility will 
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reproduce social stratification of Singapore society in a way that creates 
social problems of envy, inequity, injustice, alienation, pessimism and 
conflicts. These problems are exacerbated when the lower strata are filled 
with Singaporeans and the higher strata are disproportionately represented 
by foreigners. This local-foreigner pattern of stratification will be increasingly 
reinforced if the influx of foreigners to take on high value jobs (e.g., 
professional, managers and executives) continues to be large and rapid.  
 
We propose three specific recommendations to address current gaps in the 
government’s effort to address social mobility issues. First, there is a need 
to go beyond the reliance on the Gini coefficient to develop alternative 
measures for assessing income inequality and evaluating social mobility. 
The Gini coefficient, while useful for general purposes such as international 
comparisons on broad trends of income disparity, is not adequate as a 
measure of the basic concerns or critical issues related to social fissures due 
to income disparity or social class differences. The Gini coefficient does not 
index the specific nature of the distributional properties of income in the 
population that directly relate to social fissures. It also does not capture the 
structural and process issues related to social mobility and the specific 
mobility aspirations of people in a particular income bracket. It is important 
to identify the referent income grouping that different segments of 
Singaporeans aspire to, and these groupings may not correspond to the 
conventional decile groupings in government reports and discourse. More 
robust research in the social and behavioural sciences that draws on related 
disciplines such as economics, psychology and sociology are needed to 
identify the mobility aspirations, motivations and perceptions of various 
segments of the population as well as the predictors, correlates and 
consequences of these social-psychological variables (Chan 2013a). 
 
Second, there is a need to gather data on households that will allow 
longitudinal tracking to assess changes over time on relevant economic and 
social-psychological variables. These intra-individual and intra-household 
changes over time provide more direct and valid assessments of social 
mobility than the current cross-sectional data on personal and household 
incomes. 
 
Third, the study group proposes that the government enhances the “whole-
of-government” approach to address social mobility in a more holistic and 
effective way. This requires a better integration of policies concerning 
education (including the linkages connecting all levels of education from pre-
school to university), family and social development, manpower planning 
and foreigner inflow, and economic development and restructuring. Due to 
the long term multi-faceted and inter-related nature of social mobility issues 
that cut across many government ministries and agencies, the study group 
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suggests that the government consider setting up a national secretariat at 
the Prime Minister’s Office to lead and co-ordinate strategic directions for 
research and policy related to social mobility. 
 
 
Social Cohesion and National Identity 
 
Extend considerations and criteria for granting PR status and 
citizenship 
The selection of foreigners for granting PR status and citizenship needs to 
go beyond economic criteria, to explicitly consider integration potential. In 
addition to having family ties with Singaporeans, integration potential 
includes the foreigner’s knowledge and respect for the major laws, values, 
norms and cultural practices in Singapore — especially on laws and values 
related to racial and religious harmony as well as dispute resolution in labour 
relations; and the foreigner’s non-economic contributions to building social 
capital in Singapore, e.g., time spent in interactions with the local community, 
volunteerism etc. The study group proposes that the government develop 
multiple valid indicators of integration potential to complement the existing 
criteria for selecting foreigners for granting PR status and citizenship. 
 
Revisit shared values and National Education 
There is a need to discuss national values within the context of building 
social capital, given that the motivations for social capital and the 
consequences of building or eroding social capital are evaluated and 
influenced by the individual’s and society’s definitions of success and 
perceptions of quality of life and values concerning what is right and wrong. 
More than two decades ago, the government presented a White Paper that 
outlined five shared values for Singapore (Government of Singapore 1991). 
These values are: nation before community and society before self; family 
as the basic unit of society; community support for the individual; consensus, 
not conflict; and racial and religious harmony. While many if not all of these 
shared values for Singapore may continue to be relevant now and in the 
future, there is a need to revisit how their meanings and manifestations may 
have to be elaborated or revised given the substantive and substantial 
changes in the composition profile of the population and in the light of 
changing values and contexts. This may also include identifying new shared 
values such as those related to rule of law, respect for diversity, expanded 
definitions of meritocracy and success, and values that help set acceptable 
bounds or expected norms of behaviours that integrate individual freedoms 
and collective interests. A practical set of shared values that Singaporeans 
can agree on and be committed to will contribute to social capital through 
sense making, amicable resolution of disputes, constructive collective action, 
and development of trust and reciprocity norms.  
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The study group proposes that the review of Singapore’s shared values 
should be guided by explicating the national values espoused in the symbols 
on the national flag, i.e., the five stars representing democracy, peace, 
progress, justice and equality; and the elements in the national pledge, i.e., 
unity, democracy, justice, equality, happiness, prosperity and progress. 
Such an exercise should involve a wide spectrum of Singaporeans, as 
values are only truly shared when collectively identified and shaped. 
Revisiting the shared values will also involve a review of the Singapore 
narrative on our unique circumstances as presented in National Education 
by the Ministry of Education. For example, while some of the unique features 
of Singapore that shaped our principles of governance are likely to remain 
fundamental and relevant (such as the country’s physical constraints of size 
and lack of natural resources, its multi-racial society, and the existential 
aspects surrounding the birth of the nation), other elements such as the 
features of the political system and legacy of the government, may require 
updating. National Education is effective in contributing to social capital and 
national cohesion only if the Singapore narrative is evidence-based, realistic 
and believable so as to serve as a cognitive and affective foundation for 
discussion on different perspectives on needs, goals, constraints, trade-offs 
and gains. As values take time to develop and are reinforced through shared 
experiences among Singaporeans undergoing common circumstances, it is 
important to ensure there is proactive, continuous and quality engagement 
of Singaporeans who are living overseas for a significant duration. 
 
Promote social interactions through intensification of land use and 
integrated living  
With increasing population density, there should be more efficient intensive 
use of land, combined with the provision of efficient infrastructure and quality 
mixed-use amenities that are well integrated, accessible and affordable. This 
will provide a highly effective physical environment that is conducive for high-
quality living that promotes social interactions and therefore social capital. 
For example, well integrated planning for mixed-use facilities and public and 
recreational spaces with equitable access for all groups will encourage 
social interactions among locals and foreigners as well as among people of 
different ethnicity, ages and social background. This will help prevent 
segregation and development of enclaves based on nationality or social 
class. Integrated living will also involve creating suitable employment 
opportunities in residential areas that are close to home. This work-home 
proximity will contribute to social interactions involving diverse groups, 
together with other integrative functions made possible by such proximity. 
These functions include enhancing part-time work, flexible work hours and 
work-life balance; reducing commuting time and easing the strain on the 
public transport system; encouraging women to enter the workforce and the 
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elderly to remain economically and socially active; enhancing general and 
asset-based volunteerism in the work-home vicinity, which contributes to the 
sense of community in the neighbourhood; encouraging entrepreneurship 
and innovation in business; and creating value-added jobs for various 
segments of the population (Chan 2013b).  
 
The attractiveness of quality living in integrated mixed-use facility clusters 
will increase the housing and rental prices in and near these areas. It may 
be useful to consider implementing equitable policies that lower the cost for 
residents taking up job opportunities in their neighbourhood. Given the 
multitude of social capital implications, the study group proposes that the 
government explicitly incorporate social and behavioural sciences in land 
use and infrastructure planning, so that the resulting physical environment 
will positively influence social interactions and behaviours and not create 
unintended negative social consequences (see Chapter 4 on Land and 
Physical Infrastructure for further discussion on land use). 
 
Monitor multiple indicators of social capital and social well-being to 
inform policies, population ranges and profiles  
Citizen well-being is multi-dimensional and a large part of it consists of social 
well-being that goes beyond meeting material needs and wants. Research 
has shown that the social well-being of citizens is strongly influenced by the 
quality of social relations, trust, acts of kindness, volunteerism and the 
stability of the society (Diener et al. 2009), all of which are aspects of social 
capital. Both social capital and social well-being influence social cohesion, 
Singaporeans’ rootedness to the country and the development of a strong 
Singaporean core.  
 
Recently, the government presented an overview of national outcomes in 
the form of a performance report known as The Singapore Public Sector 
Outcomes Review (MOF 2012), which is issued every two years. Although 
the review provided information on how Singapore fared in six key areas of 
national interest by tracking several indicators across different domains (e.g., 
household incomes and crime rates), it did not sufficiently reflect the holistic 
outcomes related to citizen well-being. Specifically, the section on desired 
outcomes related to fostering strong families and social cohesion reported 
on trends in marriage, fertility and immigration; and the specific subsection 
on building social capital simply stated the strategic initiatives and activities 
that the government has planned to build community bonds. The report did 
not directly measure aspects of social capital or social well-being, such as 
empirical findings related to the state of social cohesion, inclusiveness, 
integration, trust, commitment and rootedness.  
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The study group proposes that a comprehensive framework of multiple 
indicators be developed to assess and track over time various aspects of 
social capital and social well-being for the different segments of the 
population. Given that population policies could affect many aspects of 
citizen quality of life in physical, social and psychological domains, these 
multiple indicators will help identify both areas of strengths and areas of 
concerns to serve as continuous input to population policies. Such policies 
include establishing realistic projected population ranges and the various 
population composition profiles for city planning and economic structuring to 
serve citizen well-being and national interests. The multiple indicators will 
also help inform government and citizens as they evaluate policy 
effectiveness with regard to policy intent, discuss policy alternatives, and 
make decisions in trade-off situations. 
 
Develop effective communication and crisis management plans to 
address conflicts that threaten social cohesion  
Conflict threatens cohesion, especially when it increases in frequency, 
duration and intensity. Conflict over foreigners’ disregard of local norms and 
lack of cultural awareness and sensitivity are emotive and difficult. Local-
foreigner conflicts are manifested publicly, magnified and perceived more 
negatively as they build on on-going concerns and underlying tensions of 
Singaporeans. These negative spirals lead to mutual distrust and disrespect 
and a divided Singapore. Effective communication and crisis management 
of conflicts are critical for integration. We propose that the government work 
with the relevant stakeholders in the public, private and people sectors, 
including the online community, to develop effective communication 
channels and crisis management plans that are proactive, prompt and 
practical, especially when managing adverse cases of conflicts that involve 
issues of local-foreigner relations and racial or religious harmony. 
 
National Service (NS) and Service to Nation 
 
The government recently set up the Committee to Strengthen National 
Service (CSNS) chaired by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen. The study 
group recommends that the CSNS examine four major issues on 
strengthening NS and other forms of service to the nation. 
 
Recognise NS beyond giving monetary rewards  
Monetary rewards to recognise NS contributions provide explicit 
endorsement of the importance of NS and should continue to be applied in 
effective ways. However, research has shown that the provision of extrinsic 
rewards may reduce the desirability and intrinsic motivation for an activity 
(Deci et al 1999). Thus, an exclusive or primary reliance on extrinsic rewards 
such as monetary incentives may inadvertently produce a calculative 
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transactional mindset that replaces the affective and normative commitment 
to NS as rooted in emotional attachment to Singapore and defence as a 
national duty. Hence, the taskforce should move beyond ad hoc monetary 
incentives to examine how to institutionalise a holistic recognition system 
that will include a spectrum of impactful recognition mechanisms for those 
serving or have served NS. This could range from monetary rewards (e.g., 
NS allowances, tax rebates, national growth dividends) to benefits that are 
less explicitly tied to money (e.g., subsidised healthcare, access to facilities, 
priority in housing), or non-monetary in nature (e.g., opportunities for training, 
enjoyable activities, social recognition, etc.). 
 
Consider some form of NS for female citizens 
NS is a powerful site for building social capital and developing citizen 
commitment to the nation. However, female citizens are currently deprived 
of such social capital and nation-building opportunities since they are 
excluded from having to serve NS. The fact that there are already females 
serving as regular uniformed officers in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 
and the Home Team (e.g., Singapore Police Force, Singapore Civil Defence 
Force) negates the argument that females are inherently not suited for 
military service or national defence. Within the Total Defence context, female 
citizens could play significant roles in both military and non-military 
components of the SAF and the Home Team forces. The taskforce should 
examine the feasibility and desirability of having a national policy of some 
form of mandatory NS obligation for female citizens. The NS obligation for 
females could take the form of similar or different but complementary roles 
as males serving in the SAF and Home Team forces. This will significantly 
contribute to human capital in NS and help mitigate manpower shortages 
that may occur due to fewer male citizens serving NS because of low TFR 
and possibly an insufficient supply of new male citizens who are required to 
serve NS.  
 
Alternatively (although not mutually exclusive), the NS obligation for females 
could incorporate meaningful aspects of community-based work that would 
allow them to build ties in their community. One potential area of community-
based work is in the healthcare sector, particularly in healthcare for the 
elderly, after receiving adequate training. The physical site for serving 
healthcare-based NS need not be confined to hospitals but could include 
elderly-care facilities in residential neighbourhoods. Women could also be 
assigned to serve their NS duty in healthcare facilities near their homes, and 
this proximity could mitigate disruption to family life and increase resident 
acceptability of locating elderly-care and healthcare facilities in their 
neighbourhoods. If adequately integrated with other neighbourhood 
activities and programmes, this arrangement of NS duty for females could 
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also increase community bonding in the neighbourhood and contribute to 
building social capital. 
 
Use NS and “NS-in-the-community” as a strong indicator of 
commitment for reviewing residency and citizenship 
The NS obligation should be a critical test and measure of the individual’s 
and their families’ commitment to the nation, and its current strict application 
to second-generation PRs is necessary due to the criticality of NS and social 
equity. Hence, the taskforce should consider the desirability of implementing 
a new policy, where immigrants or their children who fail to serve mandatory 
NS are unable to renew permanent residencies or receive citizenship for the 
whole family, and where citizenship is granted only if the entire family takes 
up citizenship (including potentially NS-liable children). This new policy could 
attract foreigners who are serious about committing to Singapore as PRs 
and new citizens and produce new citizens who have high integration 
potential and rootedness to Singapore. It could also address perceptions of 
unfairness among Singaporeans about the current situation in which some 
PRs could enjoy benefits similar to citizens without them or their family 
members having to serve NS. 
 
Shorten the duration and increase the quality of NS  
The taskforce should consider if it is possible to shorten the duration of NS 
by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of training in NS and the 
quality of the NS experience. This is likely to be even more feasible if females 
also serve NS. With the significant increase in number of citizens serving NS 
due to inclusion of females, it may allow the current duration of NS to be 
shortened substantially without a loss in operational efficiency and readiness, 
for instance, shortening the NS period from the current two years to 1.5 years. 
The shortening of NS will allow the entire cohort of young Singaporeans and 
PRs who have served NS to enter university or the workforce earlier than 
the current age. A by-product of the shortened period of NS is that suitable 
PRs contemplating taking up Singapore citizenship may find the prerequisite 
condition of serving NS more palatable. 
 
A national-level task force, consisting of representatives from the public, 
private and people sectors, could be set up to examine the issues discussed 
above. The taskforce should complement the work of the CSNS and ongoing 
national public engagement efforts. This taskforce and the CSNS should 
also seek, analyse and incorporate feedback from the public on these issues. 
Given the national importance and security, economic, financial, legal and 
social implications of the issues, the study group proposes that the 
taskforce’s findings be incorporated into a government paper for discussion 
in Parliament. 
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Social capital is critical to Singapore’s survival and progress given the 
unique features of the country relating to its people, government and 
environment. Social capital is multi-dimensional and dynamic and hence our 
“whole-of-society” effort to ensure it develops positively rather than 
negatively will need to be multi-faceted, accompanied by continuous 
monitoring and vigilance. Singapore’s population challenges have added to 
the complexity, consequences and criticality of social capital and its 
development. Organic development of social capital will occur but our 
policies and actions, particularly those in response to the population 
challenges facing us, will influence the direction in which social capital 
proceeds. This chapter has identified what the study group believes to be 
the key issues of social capital that need to be addressed urgently and 
adequately. The group hopes the recommendations in this report will provide 
a framework and springboard for constructive discussions in public 
discourse and serious deliberations by policymakers. 
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